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Divine Predication, Direct Reference, and the Attributes of Classical Theism 
 
The Church’s affirmation of statements predicating certain positive 
attributes to God is central to Christian doctrine. However, important biblical 
and doctrinal predications include ascriptions of emotion, mental states and 
even movement to God. It is contested whether divine predications should 
understood metaphorically, analogically, or univocally. The situation is further 
complicated when one takes into account divine attributes such as impassibility 
(the idea that God cannot be acted upon or suffer due to things external to 
himself), immutability (the idea that God is unchanging), and aseity (the idea 
that God is self-caused and only dependent on himself for his existence). If 
classical theists are right in attributing aseity and impassibility to God, it is 
difficult to see how predications like “God is loving” or “God is angry” should be 
understood. In this paper I show that contemporary philosophy of language is a 
surprisingly good bedfellow for religious language. I argue that language, 
understood in light of contemporary work on public meaning and direct 
reference, enables us to make meaningful predications of God while not 
undermining our commitments to some of the most difficult theological 
ascriptions. This view of divine predication in light of public meaning and 
reference turns out to be theory of univocal predication, one I call predication 





Hectoring Hector: A Thoroughgoing Critique of Hectorian Semantics 
Divine predication has long proved a problem for theologians and 
philosophers of religion. Religious speech acts are difficult to explain, as many 
doctrinal propositions seem to run aground on the metaphysical implications of 
divine reference and predication. Determining how words refer and describe 
God is difficult when one considers the attributes that God orted to have: 
transcendence, simplicity, and holiness, among others. Theology just is the 
practice of explaining the nature of God in terms humans can understand, and 
yet God’s nature seems to imply that human language will forever be inadequate 
to the task of divine description. Attempts to explain theological language have 
made use of metaphorical, analogical, or univocal predications, and more 
recently theologians and philosophers have resorted to explaining how theology 
might be worthwhile even when one accepts that humans cannot, in principle, 
accurately speak of the divine. Kevin Hector’s recent project, Theology without 
Metaphysics, is an attempt to restore theological speech acts’ status as 
meaningful and intelligible. This work has been well-received by theologians 
and philosophers alike, but it is not without its critics. In this paper, I defend 
Kevin Hector's Theology without Metaphysics against Sameer Yadav's 
criticisms. However, I ultimately argue that Hector's version of semantic 
externalism fails; I also argue that Hector’s rejection of “essentialist-
correspondentist” metaphysics is really not the source of the problems with 




 Metaphor and the Mind of God in Nevi’im 
In The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, Yoram Hazony contrasts the 
uses of metaphor in Nevi’im and the New Testament. According to Hazony, 
metaphor is employed by Jesus to obscure teachings, but the prophets of the 
Hebrew Scriptures use metaphor to make teachings intelligible. However, this 
understanding of metaphor is too simplistic to capture the scope of 
metaphorical statements made by the Hebrew prophets. In this paper, I suggest 
that an important set of philosophical arguments are advanced by the prophets 
in ways not captured by current interpretive methodologies. The paper is 
divided into two parts. In the first half, I argue against Hazony’s assessment of 
Nevi’im. In the second, I forward my  position on the philosophical dimensions 
of Nevi’im: that prophetic writings reveal important moral facts about God’s 
nature and the ways in which we should respond to him in both action and 
emotion. Appealing to the works of Dru Johnson, Eleonore Stump and Linda 
Zagzebski, I show that the writings of the Hebrew prophets may in fact advance 
certain arguments about the emotions and motivations of God. Through the 
collected writings of Nevi’im, God functions as an exemplar for those receiving 




Transitive Speech Acts and Melting Away Wax-Nose Anxieties in Wolterstorff’s 
Divine Discourse 
In Divine Discourse, Wolterstorff offers five patterns that interpreters 
can use to deal with problematic passages of Scripture. Two strategies 
recommended by Wolterstorff include (1) changing the rhetorico-conceptual 
structure of a text, and (2) interpreting the passage as what Wolterstorff calls 
“transitive discourse.” However, anytime the interpreter takes these steps away 
from the most likely intended meaning given to the text by the human author, 
he leaves himself open to what Locke called “wax-nose anxieties.” Despite 
Wolterstorff’s best efforts to limit the threat posed by wax-nose anxieties, 
Maarten Wisse argues that the two aforementioned strategies leave Wolterstorff 
especially open to wax-nose concerns. In what follows, I will recount both 
Wolterstorff’s view and Wisse’s assessment. I will then show that there is no 
plausible way to save Wolterstorff from Wisse’s criticisms and offer an 
alternative interpretative strategy for problematic passages that are often 
considered transitive discourse. I argue that one of Wolterstorff’s ex isting 
strategies is sufficient for dealing with problematic passages once proper 
attention is given to genre, and it does so without invoking transitive discourse 





Divine Predication, Direct Reference, and the Attributes of Classical Theism 
I. Introduction 
In this paper I will address the nature of divine predications in both 
biblical and doctrinal contexts. The Church’s affirmation of predicating certain 
positive attributes to God is central to Christian doctrine. Important divine 
predications include ascriptions of emotion, movement, and mental states to 
God. The way in which such predications should be understood is a subject of 
much disagreement. Whether statements such as “God is loving” should be 
understood metaphorically, analogically, or univocally is contested. Further, if 
we suppose that humans are able to use multiple forms of predication to speak 
meaningfully about God, there still remains the task of determining which 
statements should be construed in which sense. Much of this discussion centers 
on the epistemological status of our predications and what kind of knowledge is 
necessary to make meaningful predications. There are considerable reasons to 
doubt that finite humans have the epistemological equipment to ascribe 
features to a God that theology identifies as transcendent and infinite.  
The situation is further complicated when one takes into account 
attributes such as immutability, aseity, and impassibility. These predicates 
ascribe to God the qualities of being unchanging, self-caused, and absolutely 
unaffected by things external to himself. If classical theists are right in 
attributing aseity and impassibility to God, it is difficult to see how predications 
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like “God is loving” or “God is angry” could be anything but metaphorical. Such 
terms appear hopelessly intertwined with the human qualities of emotions, such 
as passion, bodily states, and causal dependence on the object of the emotion. 
Many of our terms seem to rely upon our notion of specific properties founded 
in finite human experience, and these properties are often thought to be 
incompatible with traditional understandings of God. However, contemporary 
thought about language, sense, and meaning may yield different results for 
divine predication.  
In what follows, I examine divine predication in light of modern views of 
language. While medieval thought on predication presupposes that a great deal 
of conceptual commitments are rigidly connected to language use, 
contemporary philosophy of language emphasizes the public sense of words and 
word use instead of the concepts and properties that correspond to words. This 
is not to say that recent theories are metaphysically neutral by any means. My 
project will examine metaphysical implications of explicating divine predication 
according to recent theories of direct reference and public meaning.1  For the 
purposes of my paper I assume that theists can affirm statements that include 
positive predications of God. on the works of William Alston and Linda 
Zagzebski, I argue that language understood in light of contemporary work on 
public meaning and direct reference permits us to make meaningful, univ ocal 
                                                 
1  See Donnellan’s “Reference and Definite Descriptions” (1966), “Putting Humpty Dumpty  
Together Again,”  (1968), “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,” in The Semantics of 
Natural Language  (1972) and "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms" (2012); Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity (1980) and Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures (2013and 
Putnam’s “Meaning and Reference” (1973), and Mind, Language, and Reality  (1975 
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predications of God while not undermining many of the theological 
commitments of the classical theist. 
II. The Nature of the Problem and Some Methodological Worries 
Much of the recent work on predication focuses on metaphysical 
implications of divine predications. Whether or not predication of various 
attributes indicate that God has multiple properties; the extent to which 
predication entails shared properties between humans and the divine; and 
which predications are compatible with God’s attributes have been the primary 
focus of contemporary discourse.2  Less attention is given to the linguistic 
importance of sense, reference and public use than to what might be 
metaphysically entailed by certain (presumptively true) propositions.3   
Yet theories of language dramatically affect what exactly is involved in 
making divine predications and affirming doctrinal propositions.4  If parts of 
                                                 
2 For example, Daniel Bonevac (2012) argues for a version of analogy in which analogical 
statements indicate only structural similarity and need not yield shared properties between the 
human and the div ine. Bonevac also argues that the notion of Turing reducibility provides a 
possible model for how we can truthfully predicate multiple properties of God while maintai ning 
div ine simplicity. Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey  Brower (2006) argue against Platonic 
universals on the ground that predications that ascribe properties to God undermine aseity. 
Instead, they forward a truthmaker understanding of predication, which they believe has the 
advantage of being both ontologically neutral and consistent with divine simplicity. Richard 
Swinburne (2007) uses a “predicate scheme” model of predication and contends that 
predications can be univocal, analogical and metaphorical depending on the sense of the word.  
3 With the notable exception of William Alston (1989) and Swinburne (ibid), to whom I will turn 
in a later section of this paper. 
4 It is informative here to contrast Swinburne’s v iew with Aquinas’s description of attributive 
predication. According to Aquinas, analogies indicate a substantial metaphysical relationship. 
To use Aristotelian terms, words predicated of both God and humans  indicate a prior-posterior 
relationship, in which human “wisdom” follows from God’s “wisdom” in an ontologically 
significant way . Swinburne explicitly distinguishes himself from Aquinas, stating that on his 
theory of predication the theist is obligated to  no such metaphysical positions when she affirms 
div ine predications. For Swinburne, the meaning of words has less to do with our understanding 
of things like properties and more to do with our understanding of the sy ntactic and semantic 
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speech are thought to correspond to discrete metaphysical components, and 
meaningful language must be able to successfully signify these features of 
reality, a theory of language that allows for robust religious language, 
particularly of the sort that will be of interest to a classical theist, will be hard to 
come by. For example, if a proper name (e.g., “Jesus,” “Elohim,” “YHWH”) is 
thought to correspond to a particular essence, quiddity, or haecceity, and/or 
predicates (e.g., “holy,” “good,” “angry”) are thought to correspond to 
properties, whether these parts of language  successfully signify anything will 
depend in part upon what happens when the word is used among competent 
speakers of a language, such as to evoke a particular concept, idea, or 
representation in the minds of linguistic agents. However, in the 
aforementioned example, many of the properties and essences supposedly 
signified by religious words are definitionally beyond the comprehension of 
human speakers. For example, classical theists hold that God is simple, and 
predicates can only be applied to him in a way that does not violate the divine 
attribute of simplicity (understood as the claim that God is identical to his 
attributes and has them all essentially). Such an understanding of divine 
predicates results in apparent nonsense since simple things do not bear 
properties, motivating the charge that these predicates are meaningless.  
This is only one feature of the many-horned problem that is divine 
predication. Consider another example, the notions that God is asei, immutable, 
and impassible. The first predicate, aseity, asserts that God is self-caused: that 
                                                                                                                                               
criteria for word use. Like Bergmann and Brower (ibid), Swinburne takes his account to be 
metaphysically neutral about things like properties.  
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is, God exists in and of himself. Nothing contributes to or sustains God’s 
existence; nothing is metaphysically prior to his existence. The second 
predicate, immutability, is precisely as it sounds: God is unchanging. His 
immutability is thought not only to refer to his character, such as his enduring 
wisdom and compassion, but his entire being. The last predicate mentioned, 
impassibility, concerns whether God can be affected by or acted upon by 
anything.  
These predicates are intimately intertwined: He cannot be acted upon 
because he is wholly self-caused; he is immutable because all of his properties 
are essential, so he cannot be acted upon by properties external to himself. 
These properties also render the idea of God as a personal agent inscrutable, as 
our ways of identifying and describing persons and agency seemingly rely on 
things that violate these features. Persons act, experience, and perceive. These 
terms signify concepts that involve ideas of change and being acted upon in 
their definitions. At the very least, these predicates seem to rule out many 
biblical propositions about God: He cannot have ephemeral emotional states; he 
cannot be angry with his people and elsewhere rejoice over them. He cannot 
relent of anger, and he cannot be moved by the actions of man. When such 
statements appear in Scripture, it seems they must have metaphorical currency 
in order to be true alongside divine attributes like those just listed. 
The linchpin for the problem of divine predication is the classical 
attribute of transcendence, the idea that God is wholly other from his creation 
and supremely excellent. In short, transcendence is traditionally thought to 
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entail the proposition that human experience, cognition, and faculties will fail to 
capture (or at least fully capture) the nature of the divine being. God is so 
different from everything he creates that human resources are inadequate to 
describe him. Transcendence, it has been argued, bars meaningful religious 
language by definition, as our words can never successfully signify that which 
we are incapable of grasping. 
Many of those who embrace classical attributes attempt to resolve these 
apparent conflicts from within a metaphysical system that continues the 
practice of associating words with a metaphysical system like the one I 
described above. One in particular bears mentioning. Eleonore Stump’s recently 
published Aquinas Lecture, The God of the Bible and the God of the 
Philosophers,5  is a short and brilliant work in which she meticulously argues 
that contrary to superficial appearances, Aquinas’s classical theism is not in 
conflict with the personal depictions of God in the Hebrew Scriptures. Put 
briefly, Stump argues that Aquinas’s God is both esse (being) and id quod est (a 
being).6  On this reading, Aquinas merely claims that we do not grasp the 
quiddity of God; importantly, he does not claim that God is esse alone.7  Such a 
God can be responsive and active without changing or being acted upon. When 
he acts, his actions are not his accidents, so he never changes in properties. He 
acts in the eternal present; therefore, he does not change through time. Further, 
he can act in response to humans without being acted upon just as humans can 
                                                 
5 2016. 
6 Stump 2016, 77-87. 
7  Ibid 88-89. 
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write in response to the works of a deceased author without being acted upon by 
the dead author himself.8  
I am not persuaded that Stump has shown that the God of classical 
theism can be genuinely responsive while also being asei and impassible for 
reasons I will not recount here; however, I will note the rather obvious point 
that Stump succeeds in showing that the commitments to aseity and 
impassibility found in classical theism can be reconciled to the predications of 
God found in the Hebrew Scriptures only if we accept Aquinas’s complex 
metaphysical system. Stump herself admits that this is merely one way of going 
about the project of reconciliation, but it is nevertheless one given by one of 
classical theism’s greatest proponents.9  While it is helpful to understand how 
Aquinas made his matrix of theology, metaphysics, and exegesis consistent, the 
recent revival of interest in classical theism is not merely a historical one. It is a 
theological endeavor, one through which many are asking whether or not we 
ought to embrace the central claims of classical theism now, and whether they 
are in fact superior to the claims of neotheists1 0  who ascribe traits like 
mutability, temporality, finite power, relativity, and potentiality to God. 
One way of going about this problem is to see if the best way to do 
theology involves, like Stump, adopting Thomistic metaphysics wholesale along 
                                                 
8 Ibid 91-95. 
9 Ibid 96. 
1 0 Neotheism is a relatively new term. My  use of the word follows Alston’s description (ibid, 
123). Examples of neotheistic theologians and philosophers include John Hick, John Sanders, 
Bill Hasker, Alfred Whitehead, and Charles Hartshorne, although many analytic phil osophers 
have a hy brid view of God’s attributes (e.g., Richard Swinburne and William Lane Craig).  
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with classical theology like Stump; others, though, may resist adopting such a 
position for various reasons. One may simply find scholastic metaphysics (or 
even neo-Aristotelian metaphysics that might likewise be reconcilable to 
classical theism) unconvincing. Another line of objection is more worrisome, 
one I find best expressed by Alan Torrance in his recent lecture exploring the 
impact of classical theism on systematic theology and Christian and Jewish 
philosophy. After reviewing some of the difficulties that arise when one tries to 
reconcile the attributes of classical theism with the language of the Scriptures, 
Torrance remarks: 
What should also be clear is the extent to which this has resulted from a 
process of reasoning whereby the ‘pressure of interpretation’ has been 
from prior metaphysical suppositions and speculations onto the Biblical 
witness rather than from that witness onto our epistemic base and its 
attempt to engage in faithful reflection on the (real) kinship with 
creatures that the eternal has established in time.1 1  
 
If the project of theology—including philosophical or analytic theology—
should begin with the Incarnation and revelation of God, one might be reluctant 
to accept the doctrines of classical theism if they can only be shoehorned into 
biblical theology by going to great lengths, such as adopting a complex 
Aristotelian metaphysics that is not obviously recommended by Christian 
revelation. This is not to say that Aristotelian metaphysics is false, nor is it to 
say that classical theism and many of the related metaphysical claims are 
irreconcilable to the Incarnation or other mediums of revelation. It is also not a 
matter of whether we should even expect to find metaphysical theories, much 
                                                 
1 1  Torrance 2015. 
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less a particular theory that is endorsed, in biblical texts. The concern, I take it, 
seems to be with what is primary in our thinking. When one is engaged in live 
Christian theology rather than a historical project, certain formal worries 
emerge that are absent in other contexts.  We might, like Torrance above, be 
worried about our philosophical biases coloring our view of God rather than our 
view of God coloring our philosophy. Or relatedly, we might be concerned about 
whether we are unwittingly and unnecessarily marrying Christian theology to a 
dubious or at least unproven metaphysics, and thereby doom the philosophical 
appeal of Christianity along with the failing ideology to which it is wed. 
I am among those who have the aforementioned concerns about the 
revival of Hellenistic Christianity. The way we go about making sense of the 
attributive claims of classical theism is among my worries. On one hand, it is 
telling that notions like immutability, aseity, and impassibility have endured in 
the Church. On the other, I am resistant to attempts to justify these theological 
claims on metaphysical grounds that may strike some as radical or unlikely.  
This brings me to the second recent work worth mentioning here in my 
effort to highlight the problematic relationship between metaphysics and 
language inherent to the problem of divine predication. Kevin Hector’s opus, 
Theology without Metaphysics,1 2  made waves in theological discourse because 
it attempted to explain the linguistic facets of the theological project while 
eschewing troubling metaphysics. Instead of expecting our language and minds 
to correspond to something like essences, Hector contends that, when employed 
                                                 
1 2 2011. 
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in language, a concept merely “orders the manifold of one’s experience, and one 
does so by judging certain aspects of that experience to be relevantly similar to 
other aspects.”1 3  These concepts are subject to rules of precedence, public use 
(or “intersubjective recognition”), and recognized authorities. Theological 
language demands a particular set of rules: Christ functions as the authority and 
establishes rules of precedence, and the Holy Spirit “normatizes” intersubjective 
recognition through the tradition of the Church. Such a view both deflates what 
is required of theological language by not demanding that our concepts truly 
capture the reality of God’s transcendent nature and sets the high demand that 
theological language be traceable back to Christ through the tradition of the 
Church.1 4  While Hector’s view bears certain similarities to semantic 
externalism, it ultimately incorporates both Wittgensteinian philosophy and a 
Barth-inspired account of analogical predication that moves his theory away 
from a truly externalist view. 
Hector’s account is notable because it is the most recent attempt to 
deflate the metaphysics involved in theological predications, and it is arguably 
the work most sympathetic to analytic philosophers’ sensibilities since 
Wittgenstein’s idea of religion as a particular language game or “form of life.”1 5  
As has been pointed out elsewhere and acknowledged by Hector himself, there 
                                                 
1 3 Hector (ibid) pp. 100-01. 
1 4 Hector (ibid) pp. 95, 100-02. 
1 5 See Wittgenstein 1966, 1980. See also Burley (2012) and Sherry (1972) for nuanced 
assessment on theological (mis?)applications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
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is nothing genuinely anti-metaphysical about his theory of religious language.1 6  
It does, however, attempt to reject classical ideas about predication. I argue 
elsewhere that Hector’s theory collapses into exactly the kind of metaphysics he 
rejects.1 7  For now, though, I will simply admit that I do not find Hector’s 
account satisfying, and I do not think it manifests the virtues of semantic 
externalism at its finest for problems of predication. I think a better argument 
on this subject is waiting to be had. 
Let me recount: Stump and Hector, respectively, represent two different 
ends of a spectrum.1 8  Stump embraces the venerable metaphysics of Aquinas; 
Hector attempts to do without metaphysics altogether, in part by relying on the 
metaphilosophy of Wittgenstein. What they share in common is that they are 
approaching the problem from a theological perspective in which the 
interpretation of Scripture plays a central role. Arguably these works can be 
classified as the philosophy of revelation or philosophical theology. This is in 
contrast to works on religious language in mainstream philosophy of religion, in 
which no such prior commitments to descriptive theological propositions or 
meaningful sacred texts are made.1 9  Instead, the problem of divine predication 
                                                 
1 6 Y adav 2013, p. 124. See also Hector (2013). 
1 7  I argue that Hector’s theory is fraught with several metaphysical problems in my  paper, 
“Hectoring Hector: A Thoroughgoing Critique of Hectorian Semantics” (2017). 
1 8 Admittedly, this is a narrow spectrum, as there are yet more polarizing v iews such as via 
negativa and Hick’s pluralism, to consider. Given that I am concerned with positive 
theologically descriptive propositions, such as God is impassible or God is good, I will exclude 
these v iews from consideration for the purposes of this paper. 
1 9 I recognize this distinction between philosophical theology and philosophy of religion is likely  
to be hotly  contested. Certainly the historical authors on whom I will rely in what follows 
recognized no such distinctions. It is mentioned only to draw out the methodology by which I 
will approach my subject matter, which is complex and has many  implications for human 
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is approached from a more tenuous position: Is it possible that humans can 
make any meaningful utterances about a being who would qualify as divine or 
supernatural, and if so, how? 
So in addition to the fact that Hector’s and Stump’s theories are arguably 
the most influential of the last few years, their approaches also bring to light 
important methodological distinctions.2 0  For the sake of the reader, it will help 
to directly address the nature of the discussion that follows. My approach will 
follow the very recent analytic tradition of incorporating few theistic 
assumptions at the start of my argument. By excluding theological assumptions 
available to works of philosophical theology, I hope to show how divine 
predication is indeed possible on an externalist account.  For this, I will largely 
rely on the underappreciated religious language essays of William Alston as a 
springboard for further investigation.  
However, I expect one of the virtues of my view to be that it makes sense 
of some of the doctrinal propositions central to Christianity, and theoretically, 
those of the other major monotheistic religions. I approach the subject from the 
perspective of theological realism: God is only worth speaking about if he exists. 
                                                                                                                                               
epistemology and philosophy of mind, theistic metaphysics, as well as religious language and 
theology. The philosophical landscape in v iew must be restricted, even if arbitrarily. The role of 
religious assumptions in philosophical reasoning seemed like as good a place as any  to place the 
intellectual boundary stones, to borrow a biblical idiom.  
20 Prior to Stump and Hector, there have been several noteworthy works on religious language 
in the last several decades. Wolterstorff’s Divine Discourse (1995) is excellent and raises a 
unique set of questions about the relationship between God’s words and the words of the 
authors of Scripture; Richard Swinburne gives a sy stematic account of his public discourse 
theory of religious language in Revelation (2007); and William Alston deals with a variety of 
philosophical questions in Divine Nature and Human Language (1989). The last of these works 
will feature prominently in this paper. 
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If he does exist, I further assume (possibly against the majority of contemporary 
theologians) that speech about the divine is only really interesting if it can serve 
as the vehicle for cognitive and phenomenal content about God himself (and not 
merely about that which is in the confines of natural experience). Put another 
way, religious speech acts include terms that have uniquely supernatural senses 
or meanings. One of the major drawbacks of mainline theories of religious 
predication is that they arguably reduce important dogmatic propositions to 
nonsense, mystery, or ritual with no correspondent mental content. Even 
accounts that rely on metaphor have a tenuous relationship with theologically -
robust propositions. By my lights, a worthwhile theory will avoid these 
disastrous consequences while also being metaphysically modest.2 1  I think 
direct reference theory, when modified with semantic externalism, has the 
potential to do this very thing. 
III. Semantic Externalism, Kinds, and Properties 
 Direct reference and its close kin, semantic externalism, were originally 
leveraged to explain our notions of natural kinds. In applying this linguistic 
theory to theological speech acts, I aim to produce results similar to those 
gained by applying semantic externalism to natural kinds.2 2  To be clear, against 
the likes of Wittgenstein, I do not take “religious language” to be a distinct form 
                                                 
21  I will say  more on this point later. 
22  I have in mind Donnellan’s “Reference and Definite Descriptions” (1966), “Putting Humpty 
Dumpty  Together Again,”  (1968), “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,” in The 
Semantics of Natural Language  (1972) and "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms" 
(1983); Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1980) and Reference and Existence: The John Locke 




of language, just as mainstream semantic externalists do not take language 
about natural kinds to be a phenomenon unique to the scientists. Rather, they 
take direct reference and semantic externalism to be an account of language 
broadly construed.2 3  More specifically, Kripke and Putnam thought their 
respective theories were simply answering questions about and making 
corrections to philosophical ideas of reference, sense, proper names, and 
meaning that had been previously raised by philosophers like Mill, Frege, and 
Russell. It turned out that their theories had fascinating implications for the 
philosophy of science and philosophy of mind; however, the positions advanced 
under the banner of direct reference and semantic externalism were simply the 
results of our common sense intuitions about language. Given the close 
association between Kripke’s and Putnam’s views and science, there may 
understandably be some trepidation when it comes to comparing natural kind 
concepts to theological ones. It is important to remember that what is at stake at 
the core of Kripke’s and Putnam’s arguments is simply the nature of language, 
and not anything unique to the sciences.2 4   
Like semantic externalists, I expect religious terms to consistently track a 
particular object of reference. While sometimes terms are learned and acquired 
via description, terms can also be acquired by means of direct reference. Direct 
                                                 
23 Alston 1989, p. 12. Alston in preferred the terms speech and speech acts to language  because 
he was worried that theologians might misunderstand him along the lines of Wittgenstein, 
taking him to be describing a unique language that is “religious language.” For simplicity, I have 
not adopted his convention and will instead use what I take  to be the common sense, 
nontechnical meanings of the terms. 
24 One might understandably protest that claims about the “deep structure” of natural kinds 
entail that direct reference is really about the sciences; this aspect of direct reference will be 
addressed in due course. 
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reference can identify individuals, but it can also identify kinds and properties.2 5  
This begins with ostension, the pointing out of an individual or object. The 
individual is named: Fred is that or water is that. In the latter cases concerning 
kinds and properties, agents make use of an exemplar that is a paradigmatic 
constituent of a kind or bearer of a property. To identify a kind or property x is 
to refer to a subject and claim, x is like that.  Generally speaking, these terms are 
expected to map onto actual, existent objects given to us by the world.  
We learn more about kinds and properties by studying exemplars. In 
most discussions of direct reference, this is done using ordinary sense 
perception and empirical observation in the domain of the sciences. However, 
more recently, Linda Zagzebski argued that the faculty of admiration and use of 
reflection can also individuate and facilitate the study of moral kinds.2 6  In any 
case, the primary objects that are taken as potential subjects of direct reference 
have been natural ones; more specifically, natural individuals, the properties 
that depend upon or constitute individuals, and the kinds to which individuals 
and properties are purported to belong. 
For illustrative purposes, it helps to consider externalist semantics as 
applied to natural kinds. Consider terms like “water” and “tiger.” One upshot of 
the direct reference approach to terms is that we do not get bogged down in 
                                                 
25 As I will explicitly address later, I use “properties” is the most metaphysically -deflated sense: 
Any thing that can be acquired as a concept and predicated or attributed to a subject.  
26 2017. She remains metaethically neutral on whether this is a purely  naturalistic project, or 
whether nonnatural faculties, properties, and kinds are involved. However, in Divine 




disputes about the proper description of difficult and contested terms.2 7  Instead, 
we begin with what has been identified indexically (e.g., that or like that) and 
allow descriptive content to follow, much like how experts in the natural 
sciences have discovered the full (roughly speaking) descriptive content of water 
after paradigmatic instances of water were already determined. 
Another peculiar feature of natural kind semantics is the role of one’s 
linguistic network, the community in which terms are used. Putnam’s 
formulation of direct reference requires that there is a procedure for identifying 
examples of a kind or property that is recognized by one’s community. Just as 
scientific experts recognize certain procedures as determining what is 
constitutive of instances of water (and that, further, constitution matters at all), 
there is a social dimension to terms in externalist semantics. It is clear why this 
claim is important to the theory: If there is not a generally accepted procedure 
for picking out paradigmatic instances of a kind or property, then there is no 
way to discriminate between vernacular users (who might misidentify instances 
of a kind or rely on inaccurate descriptions) and those experts to whom the 
linguistic community defers.  
This “division of linguistic labor”2 8  has significant results for direct 
reference. First, Putnam contends that individuals talking about water  and 
tigers in the past were talking about the same stuff that today’s users of “water” 
and “tiger” are, despite the fact that today we have significantly different ideas 
                                                 
27  Indeed, the direct reference of Kripke and Putnam began as a refutation of Frege’s and 
Russell’s descriptivists accounts of sense and reference. See the bibliography for more on this.  
28 Putnam 1973, p. 710. 
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about the constitution of water and tigers. This is because direct reference traces 
meaning backwards to a “baptism” or “coining” of a word. On Kripke’s view, 
there is a causal chain of communication linking the name to contemporary 
discourse;2 9  on Putnam’s, there is division of linguistic labor in which the 
speaker participates, and this linguistic community allows the speaker to inherit 
the term.3 0  That historical users of the term “water” actually used “water” in the 
same sense: When Aristotle thought about biological taxonomies, “tiger”  meant 
the same thing for Aristotle that it does for the contemporary user. This is 
because our changing descriptions of tigers do not change the meaning of 
“tiger”; the meaning of “tiger” was set the day it was ostensively designated and 
named. Even if Aristotle did not know that tigers carry the gene ARHGAP10, he 
successfully referred to tigers in virtue of his word’s participation in a causal 
chain or linguistic community. This is because the designation of the word is not 
set by a psychological state of Aristotle or any other person; the intension of the 
word (and therefore the extension) is set by the act of reference conjoined with 
metaphysical facts about the world, and not the epistemological facts about 
users’ concept or description of the word.3 1  If something indeed turns out to be a 
tiger, of the same kind designated at the word’s advent, then it belongs to the 
                                                 
29 Kripke 1970, p. 210. 
30 Putnam 1973, p. 702, 704. 
31  Donnellan later argued that things are not quite this simple, that there is “wiggle room” for the 
intension of words because reference does not always clearly apply to one natural structure. For 
example, there may be more than one underlying structural feature that is unique to a  kind, or a 
single reference may in fact identify  two distinct kinds. In these cases, a scientific community 
may  get to decide the determiner of reference (which structure, or which of the two kinds) 
ultimately counts as the object of reference. Donnellan thinks this flexibility will ultimately turn 
out to be triv ial, though. See Donnellan (2012) for more on this.  
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extension of the term. The intension just is whatever actually turns out to be a 
tiger. 
Further, competent language users do not need to know the best available 
description of a term in their linguistic community because of this division of 
linguistic labor. When a user invokes “tiger” in a speech act, she need not know 
about the gene ARHGAP10, despite the fact that humans now know that these 
gene is a feature of what it is to be a tiger.  The user’s description need not even 
be enough to uniquely identify tigers; she may simply know that tigers look like 
big cats and have stripes. This does not uniquely identify tigers; panthers, for 
example, have stripes that can only be perceived upon close inspection. Still, 
such a user can successfully use the word “tiger,” given that there are experts in 
her linguistic community who can provide the distinguishing characteristics of 
the word “tiger.” The user merely needs to have mastery of what Putnam calls 
the “stereotype” of a word, usually consisting of superficial properties of the 
referent, and experts need to be able to identify paradigmatic examples or 
samples of the referent.3 2  This is why a user of “tiger” who thinks that only the 
fur of tigers are striped has learned something about tigers when she discovers 
the skin of tigers are striped: She has not acquired a new word, “tiger*,” but 
rather has acquired new information about tigers. Likewise, the expert who, in 
evaluating paradigmatic examples of tigers, discovers they care gene 
ARHGAP10, has now expanded her ever-changing definition of tiger to include 
this new data. 
                                                 
32 Putnam (1973). 
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Since intension is not set solely by psychological features but also by the 
linguistic community and the world, meaning is not “in the head,” as Putnam 
famously remarked.3 3  The set of tigers, once the referent for “tiger” has been set, 
is just whatever tigers exist out the real world. What counts as a tiger, that is, 
the intension of “tiger,” is just whatever that turns out to be, when the term 
"tiger” was set by ostension. This property of language has been dubbed 
semantic externalism: The meaning of a word is at least partially  determined by 
features external to human minds. 
Note that the procedure for identifying that to which a term applies does not 
have to be perfect in order to be useful any more than scientific procedures have 
been perfect at various points in the scientific history of discovering the deep 
physical structure of natural kinds. Further, while it implies the assumption that 
linguistic means suitable to intentional objects of reference exist and will yield 
meaningful descriptions of the objects of our experience (just as the direct 
reference of Kripke and Putnam each assume that scientific procedures yield 
meaningful descriptions of natural kinds), it does not require that such 
meaningful descriptions exist, nor does it require that we will succeed in our 
attempts to refer and coin terms for everything in human experience.  
Indeed, there are limitations on what qualifies as a successful use of 
natural kind terms. Most proponents of externalist natural kinds semantics 
agree that successful users must meet a minimum epistemic threshold of 
understanding in connection to the term they use; at the very least, users must 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p.704. 
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grasp a superficial description, or stereotype in Putnam’s terminology, for the 
natural kind in question. The standard for what counts as sufficient knowledge 
for a word might vary from word to word, and from culture to culture. Most 
people would think that a vernacular user can use terms like “plutonium” and 
“quarks” without being able to give much of a description, so long as they can 
point to some expert who can provide the relevant information.  
In contrast, we expect vernacular users to be able to specify some 
descriptive content for water in order to demonstrate minimal competence. In 
most cases, we would also expect that they would be able to identify 
paradigmatic examples of water if given the opportunity. This is because what 
counts as minimal competence depends on what role the term plays in the 
linguistic community—“water,” for example, is presumably common to socio-
linguistic practice in every human context in which it is used. Vernacular users 
of common terms will usually be able to identify paradigmatic instances of the 
relevant kind and grasp some descriptive content, although they do not need to 
be able to do these things so long as they can defer to an expert in their 
linguistic community who can.3 4  It is not that the descriptive content 
determines the meaning of natural kind terms—this is not a lapse into 
descriptivist semantics. The experts in a linguistic community may know no 
more about water than Aristotle did and still successfully refer; however, these 
experts would know less about that to which they refer than those experts who 
know that it is H2 O. 
                                                 
34 Zagzebski 2017, p. 33-4. 
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IV. Alston and Religious Speech 
In my view, the best account of theological language derived from 
semantic externalism is given by William Alston.3 5  However, his account faces 
an important limitation: His only detailed consideration of direct reference in 
theological contexts concerns proper names and not predication.3 6  Alston 
discusses the problem of divine predication in other respects, though, but I will 
not give a detailed treatment of his view of predication here. 
Alston identifies several ways in which the upshots of direct reference 
over descriptivist accounts of proper names produces fortuitous results for 
theological speech. First, he claims that direct reference is more fundamental to 
human speech than descriptive speech acts in terms of referential priority.3 7  
When a speaker offers both a descriptive reference and a direct reference as a 
means of identification, deference is given to the content of the direct reference. 
In practice, humans treat direct reference as though it has greater fidelity to the 
subject of reference than descriptive reference. Alston gives several cases in 
which this has desirable consequences for religious speech acts. Variations of 
these cases appear below. 
Case 1: 
                                                 
35 1989, 2005. 
36 1989, p. 104. 
37  1989, p. 109-10. Alston also argues that direct reference is more basic genetically. By  
genetically, Alston means that direct reference seems linguistically prior to most instances of 
description (e.g., most uniquely identifying descriptions contain at le ast one referring 
expression, and descriptive reference is usually occur in the context of understanding 
paradigmatic cases of the relevant predicates). 
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 Imagine our subject, Mel, takes herself to have an experience with God in 
which she received a message. The truth of the matter, though, is that the devil 
or a false spirit appeared to Mel, and when he did, he represented himself as 
God. The devil claims to many of the descriptions and names of God for himself: 
He says he is the all-powerful creator, YHWH-Yireh (ְיֹהָוה), Elohim, and 
redeemer. This imposter is the sole source of the message Mel receives. Mel 
reports this experience, stating, “God gave me a message.” Alston comments, in 
this case “most of the operative descriptions...are uniquely true of God, while 
the direct referential contact is with, say, Satan.”3 8  Despite Mel’s grasp of 
accurate descriptions of God, most of us share the intuition that Mel is really 
talking about the creature that appeared to her. She is referring to that thing she 
experienced, whatever it was that gave her the message. We give preference to 
this aspect of her speech act over the descriptions that Mel might report. Even 
though she describes God when saying, “The all-powerful creator gave me a 
message,” the fact of the matter is that she refers to the devil.  
Case 2a: 
 Cases 2a and 2b also concern attempted references to God with mistaken 
descriptions; however, they fail to involve immediate objects of reference. In 
this case, Brienne tells us about God. She describes him in detail for our benefit. 
Unfortunately, her descriptions are not true of God in reality, but rather are true 
of R’hllor, the fictional deity in Game of Thrones. According to Brienne, God 
demands human sacrifice by fire, commissions witches and priests, and uses 
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shadow demons to accomplish his will. According to direct reference theory, 
Brienne is talking about God, but she is simply wrong in her description. Alston 
observes, “Here the mechanisms of direct reference place our talk in the right 
sort of effective contact with God, but we radically misconstrue His nature, in 
such a way that most of our descriptions are true of something else.”3 9  Alston 
suggests that it is possible that all religions, even if they were founded upon 
genuine contact with God, distort God’s nature and teachings. However, 
supposing the speaker is in contact with the appropriate linguistic chain of 
transmission, she is still referring to God despite her mistaken descriptions.  
Conversely, if the word has been radically changed, it is possible that a 
name has been passed through the chain of transmission without the referent, 
and in this way the term has broken with its original use.4 0  The most common 
example of this phenomenon in the philosophy of language concerns the term 
“Madagascar,” which originally referred to the an area on the  continent of Africa 
but came to refer to the island off of its coast thanks to some confusion caused 
by Marco Polo. Proponents of direct reference do not see such transmissions as 
legitimate because at some point in the chain speakers no longer intend to refer 
to the original object of designation. This is sufficient to constitute a break with 
the historical trajectory of the term, even though the token word is still the 
same. In such cases, Alston remarks, “the distortion is so great that most of the 
                                                 
39 Ibid, p. 111. 
40 Kripke 1980. 
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descriptions are not true of God it is likely that most of the descriptions are not 
true of anything, and so they would fail to pick out anything.”4 1  
 Case 2b: 
 A slightly modified version of this example has similar consequences. 
Suppose R’hllor actually exists, but is a fallen angel or demon, and not God or a 
god. In this scenario, Brienne is using descriptions that accurately describe 
something in the world, but not God. Further, Brienne’s linguistic community 
begins to adopt these descriptions of R’hllor in their descriptions of God. When 
Brienne exclaims, “God is cruel and kills men with demons!”, to whom does she 
refer? Alston thinks that so long as the relevant linguistic community is 
sustaining a legitimate chain of transmission in which God was originally 
designated by reference, and so long as the community has genuine encounters 
with God along the way (and not R’hllor), they are still referring to God when 
making mistaken descriptions: “I think we would have to say that the people are 
referring to, addressing prayers to, worshiping, God, but, unfortunately, are 
radically misinformed about His nature and purposes.”4 2  
Case 3: 
 We are still left with cases where description fixes the reference. Alston 
cites Henry Nelson Wieman and Julian Huxley as examples. Both had 
naturalistic ideas that arguably apply to God: 
                                                 




Consider Henry Nelson Wieman, who thought of God as some complex of 
natural processes that is responsible for the realization of value in the 
world; or Julian Huxley, with his naturalistic trinity of the basic forces of 
nature...if their descriptions are the only determiners of reference, they 
are referring to what uniquely satisfies those descriptions, if anything. 
But suppose, as may be the case for one or another of these souls, the 
person is in effective experiential contact with the only true God, but 
naturalistic predilections lead him to this radically false construal of what 
he is experiencing.4 3   
 
If there is no intended referent other than that which satisfies the description, 
incorrect descriptions will not pick out God. However, if Wieman or Huxley 
observe some phenomena that constitutes an experience of God (perhaps 
something like natural revelation) and they name this experience, that name 
will refer to God, even if they misconstrue exactly what the experience was. 
Alternatively, 
...perhaps, as may be the case with Wieman, he intends to be referring to 
whatever it is that people in the Christian community are referring to as 
‘God’...I would say that these people hold wildly heterodox views about 
God, rather than that they hold views about some being other than God.4 4  
 
In sum, if we interpret these various examples using direct reference, we 
get precisely the consequences we desire. In case 1, it seems that the agent is 
actually speaking about an imposter despite her grasp of theological 
descriptions; according to direct reference, this is precisely who she has 
identified. The application of direct reference will not force us to conclude that 
she has received divinely-sanctioned messages given that she has mistakenly 
                                                 




described something other than the actual object of her reference. Cases 2a and 
2b show that mistakes we make in describing the divine do not prohibit us from 
successfully speaking about God so long as we have an actual encounter with 
God to ground our reference and we have not made a significant break with the 
linguistic chain of transmission. Case 3 likewise makes sense of the intuition 
that those with incorrect beliefs can still talk about God without recourse to 
correct descriptions. 
In the above cases, reference is ultimately set by direct reference rather 
than reference by description. Ruling out the odd circumstance when the agent 
explicitly sets the object of some description as his ultimate determiner of 
reference (whether in thought or speech), direct reference makes sense of the 
intuitive ways we go about interpreting religious language, much like it 
complements our intuitions about natural phenomena and scientific language. 
When the satisfaction of a particular description is not intentionally set as the 
final decider of reference, our default mode in speech is direct reference and not 
descriptive reference. 
 Alston recognizes two advantages to this approach to theological speech. 
Alston points out that there seems to be individuals “who are incapable of 
forming putatively identifying descriptions, or of considering them as such, 
whether by reason of tender years or otherwise.”4 5  We tend to think such people 
                                                 
45 Alston 1989, p. 106, 115. John Henry Newman famously expressed similar worries about 
children and the uneducated in his University Sermons and Grammar of Assent; however, he 
came to significantly different conclusions about the nature of theological speech and 
formulation of doctrine. 
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can still engage in meaningful speech about God; children and the uneducated 
are even held up as pillars of faith in some religious traditions. Direct reference 
allows “the weak and the foolish” to talk about God without having to make use 
of burdensome theological language.  
Additionally, direct reference allows for interreligious discourse on the 
same God.4 6  So long as religious traditions spring from a genuine encounter 
with God, they share a common referent. Schisms derived from diverging 
descriptions of God sharing the same baptism and linguistic community may 
still be worshipping the same deity. In case 2b above, Brienne and her fellow 
worshippers belong to a religion that traces its linguistic story back to a 
legitimate ostensive reference to God, and from time to time they have actual 
encounters with God in, say, prayer, despite the fact that they believe false 
descriptions of God (that actually apply to R’hllor, or perhaps nothing). We can 
imagine another community developing a similar religion based on an 
encounter with the same God, and perhaps they have been more successful in 
applying accurate descriptions of God. Should Brienne bump into one of the 
members of this religious sect, they would be talking about the same individual 
when using the word “God.” Like “water” or “tiger,” the extension of “God” does 
not depend on the psychological states of Brienne or her new friend from 
another faith. It depends on the original ostension and the metaphysical facts. 
Thus, despite coming from different religions, Brienne and her friend can talk 
about and indeed worship the same God. 
                                                 
46 Ibid, p. 115. 
28 
 
 While Alston’s theological iteration of direct reference has these 
advantages, one might be concerned by certain features of his examples. 
Theological speech succeeds in Alston’s cases only when the speaker has (a) 
direct access to an experience of God, or (b) indirect access to an experience of 
God through a genuine religious community (whether the agents are 
consciously aware of this experience or not). Apart from these instances, agents 
fail to refer unless they can articulate a uniquely identifying description of God, 
and the problem of divine predication makes it difficult to see how such 
articulations are possible. In Alston’s examples, those who rely solely on 
descriptions fail to successfully refer, no doubt because he intends to make the 
case for direct reference to God and not for divine predication. However, it 
stands to reason that not all agents necessarily have the kind of access to 
religious experience that Alston describes in his examples. This is one way in 
which the direct reference employed in natural kinds semantics is very different 
from theological cases of direct reference. Genuine experiences of the 
supernatural are conceivably not as abundant as the natural. Our lives are 
fecund with the material for natural kind semantics; it does not seem so with 
the divine.  
 Even if one concedes that there is sufficient religious experience to refer 
to God, this is not enough to explain some of the most significant religious 
language. Speech acts describing God and his character cannot be parsed in 
terms of identifying an individual. We need to be able to talk about what God is 
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like. Here predication plays a central role, and direct reference, so described by 
Alston, does not seem sufficient to get us by.4 7  
V. Theological Reference and Predication 
 Direct reference can assist us in our worries about divine predication, 
though, and this is best seen by analogy with natural kinds semantics. While 
Alston does not attempt to apply direct reference to divine predications, as I 
mentioned above, direct reference has been applied to moral terms. Recall that 
in a prior section (“Semantic Externalism, Kinds and Properties”) I described 
the role of Putnam’s “division of linguistic labor” in establishing reference. The 
competent speaker need only (1) know a stereotype for the term, and (2) be 
properly connected to experts in her linguistic community.4 8  For Putnam, a 
stereotype usually amounts to a description of a kind’s superficial features, like 
striped and big cat for tigers. 
In Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory, the stereotype content that a 
user must be able to grasp in order to be a competent vernacular user of a term 
mentioned in (1) above is not a description per se. This is one of the significant 
departures from natural kind semantics.4 9  As Zagzebski points out, vernacular 
                                                 
47  Alston thinks that not only is description of God possible, but that God has more uniquely 
identify ing descriptions than any other being (2005, p. 229). His own account of predication 
that relies on mind-related predicates (“m-predicates”) that are explained using a functionalist 
account of minds as a model in “Functionalism and Theological Language” (1989; see especially 
p. 7 8-9). I do not think functionalism is a promising theory, but more important ly, I do not 
think it is necessary to resort to functionalism to give a sufficient account of div inely -applied 
predicates. 
48 See Putnam 1973. 
49 Moral kinds semantics also departs from natural kinds semantics in that role of experts or 
authorities is not as clear or extensive when it comes to morality. Unlike natural kinds, 
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users may be hard pressed to give a similarly descriptive account of compassion 
or honor.5 0  Instead, Zagzebski thinks content sufficient to amount to a 
stereotype can be obtained through narratives. In fact, it is not just that users 
fall back on narratives in cases where they lack access to a more explicit 
definition of a moral term. In some cases, narratives appear to communicate 
more about the meaning of a particular term than a definition ever could. This is 
because narratives preserve the causal connections to the linguistic networks in 
which they belong.5 1   
Zagzebski thinks that the meaning of moral terms can be lost when trying 
to move them from one linguistic network to another for this very reason. The 
extension of Confucian terms like “ren” breaks down when the term is imported 
in linguistic networks that are shaped by Christianity. This is not necessarily the 
case with terms like “water” or “tiger”—the basic descriptive content is so 
readily accessible to users that it seems like the terms can (relatively) easily 
move from one linguistic network to another without a break in extension. It is 
clear at least some moral kind terms (to borrow Zagzebski’s examples, “ren” and 
“sin”) are trickier than this. However, it seems as though some analogy to 
                                                                                                                                               
indiv iduals seem to take their own resources for identifying moral properties (i.e., admiration) 
to be largely  reliable. Further, psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, and relig ious 
experts study morality, but experts in these fields are not taken to be the final authority on the 
subject in the way , say, physicists and biologists are taken to be the final authority of the natural 
kinds under examination in their disciplines.  
50 2017, p. 34; ch. 8 
51  Ibid, p. 28-9, 33; ch. 8. 
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natural kinds can still be made, even if the occurrence of similarly challenging 
terms in the natural sciences may be infrequent.5 2   
Following Zagzebski, consider those moral terms of theological 
significance, be it “good,” “merciful,” or “compassionate.” These terms, too, 
seem to result from a similar kind of transmission. These terms are inherited 
from a religious community tracing back to those who claim to have direct 
experiences of God. Those whom we take to have genuine ex periences of God 
and legitimate reports, whether Abraham, Paul, or Mohammed, are thought to 
have significant information that contributes to our understanding of what God 
is like. It is not that those who used the word “God”  prior to Abraham failed to 
talk about God (assuming they belonged to a linguistic community grounded in 
genuine religious experiences); it is that Abraham has provided further 
description to help the community successfully recognize and understand God. 
Prophets function like “experts” in Putnam’s division of linguistic labor, 
providing further identifying information about God. Religions, insofar as they 
have reason to believe in the authenticity of the prophets, incorporate this 
information into the linguistic community’s definition of God. This can happen 
                                                 
52 Alan Ford and David Peat note that terms like “signal” caused a breakdown in communication 
between Einstein and Bohr due to the different functions these terms played in the network of 
terms belonging to their respective theory of phy sics (1988, p. 1234). Ford and Peat contend that 
there are many  words in the sciences that do not translate from one theoretical network to 
another because the term already has important causal connections in its original network t hat 
will not be carried over simply by importing a simple ostensive definition of the term. Eaker also 
notes that terms in different scientific networks “reveal incommensurable definitions and 
distinct extensions—sometimes overlapping, sometimes not” (64, 74-5). (She further contends 
that it is a v irtue of Donnellan’s version of natural kind semantics that his theory of natural kind 
terms realistically captures this aspect of scientific theory and practice —a point to which I will 
return in a later section). 
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orally via tradition and sacraments, or it can occur through the preservation of 
sacred texts.  
While prophets (and other religious leaders who count as unimpeachable 
authorities on religious matters)5 3  elaborate on what God is like, recall that on 
direct reference theory definition does not set the meaning of a term. Just as 
scientists revise their definition of “water”  over time based on their improved 
understanding of water, the meaning of “water” is always whatever anything 
that counts as an instance of water based on the ostensive definition and the 
metaphysical reality of what that stuff, i.e., water, just is. Likewise, when 
prophets contribute new descriptions to our understanding of God, the meaning 
of God has not changed because God just is as he is, and our baptism or 
designation of God has established that we are talking about him. 
With this mind, we can now turn to the content of these descriptions of 
God, in particular, the meaning of theological predications. On the 
aforementioned understanding of how Zagzebski’s moral kind terms sometimes 
function in linguistic networks, there seems to be a natural comparison to 
theological speech. First, most of our theological predications are attempts to 
capture what is revealed in revelatory texts into discrete propositions. When we 
say, “God is transcendent,” we expect our use of this term to correspond to 
something about what God is like given the testimonies of those who 
encountered him and the narratives containing stories about him. I t is not that 
we expect these testimonies and texts to produce the kind of descriptive 
                                                 
53 Who counts as a religious authority will be addressed in greater detail below.  
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information about God that we can easily replicate by drawing on human 
experiences with the natural. Rather, the agents with these experiences know 
God is like that, and this is what we have dubbed “holiness,” “transcendence,” 
etc. Note that if a single report of religious experience in which God is described 
using the word “transcendent” turned out to be fraudulent, we would likely 
continue to think this term is meaningful. This is because the idea of 
transcendence is tied to many experiences of God in which agents describe him 
using the term “transcendent”; we have many paradigmatic examples of when 
God was like that.  
Another way in which we arrive at dogmatic propositions involving 
divine predication is through narrative. Divine texts often make use of stories 
instead of theological treatises to communicate ideas about God. Just as 
Zagzebski points out about moral terms, it may be the case that some features of 
God’s character or essence are more readily understood or described when 
exemplified in story. Eleonore Stump makes this very argument in her 
discussion of “Franciscan” or second-personal knowledge.5 4  Stump contends 
that there is a kind of understanding that cannot be relayed via philosophical 
methodology and definitions; rather, God’s answer to the problem of suffering 
and the nature of divine love require a kind of second-personal knowledge that 
is only available via second-person experiences and narrative.5 5  If Zagzebski and 
Stump are correct, narrative opens the door to knowledge of things that cannot 
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necessarily be defined, or at the very least, defined in full. Rather, narratives 
convey features of reality, especially features of persons, that we know only 
through exemplification. That we cannot define them, though, does not mean 
we cannot name them. Thus, some of terms, like “holiness,” may be knowable 
through stories of God in sacred texts and even meaningful though we cannot 
describe them: In this story, God is like that.  
It is possible that the theological predications we use can do more than 
just this. Perhaps embedding terms in narratives, like embedding terms in 
empirical theories, preserves a framework that is important to preserving the 
causal connections for a particular term. Zagzebski suggests this in her moral 
theory. As was mentioned above with reference “ren” and “sin,” moral terms 
without an easily accessible description are difficult to move from one linguistic 
network to another without being situated in a wider context.5 6  Narratives can 
illustrate the function of a term in the absence of an accessible description or 
paradigmatic example. Does this mean that some terms are incapable of being 
distilled into an authoritative description by experts in the linguistic 
community? Here I imagine the analogy with natural kinds and scientific 
methodology is likely to continue. It is possible that many theological terms that 
we cannot form a definite description of now are possible to articulate 
theoretically, but we simply lack adequate familiarity with God to appropriate 
the necessary information for the description. Conversely, some terms may be 
                                                 
56 2017, p. 27 -9; ch. 6. In some cases situating terms is impossible until the networks converge, 
meaning that one network cannot assimilate a term without breaking down its extension. I think 
it is easy  to recognize that such disparity can be found in (historical) scientific theoretical, 
cultural and moral frameworks, and theology.  
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persistently difficult to articulate in any way other than by means of a causal 
role imbedded in some kind of framework—I expect that this is perhaps the way 
many scientific experts think about terms like “space” or “time.” Finally, there 
may be terms that we simply lack the mental equipment to ever define, even 
though we can perceive phenomena sufficient to coin a term. Some indexicals, 
like “now,” seem to have this quality. 
To see how this theory might work out for religious language, it is useful 
to follow Alston’s lead and apply it to a variety of scenarios. First I will consider 
religious description and predication broadly construed; in the following 
section, I will take up the cause of specific predications. 
Case 4: 
 Jon, Rob and Mel each have a genuine experiential encounter with God 
in a forest. Mel, however, bumps into a witch and priest on the way home and 
errantly infers that God must be the same as R’hllor, the god described by the 
witch and priest’s religion. Jon, on the other hand, reflects back on his 
experience and infers that God is transcendent based on his perception of God. 
Further, he now believes God has compassion because God told him this very 
thing during his religious experience. Finally, Rob walks away from the 
experience and infers God is menacing as he reflects back on his experience. 
What are we to make of these different descriptions of the same God 
derived from genuine religious experience? On a direct reference view, we go 
about verifying the descriptions in a way not dissimilar to our way of going 
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about our understanding of natural or moral kind terms. Whether these 
descriptions of God become an accepted part of our definition of who God is will 
depend in part on whether we believe those who report their experiences are 
reliable sources. Supposing we take our sources to be reliable, we might further 
evaluate the grounds upon which they ascribe certain features to God. God’s 
own testimony about himself (in this case, that he is compassionate) might be 
more readily believed than any inferences made. We might also consider if there 
were any circumstantial reasons that an otherwise reliable source might have 
come to the wrong conclusion in their understanding of their own experience. 
(Perhaps Rob was treating a wound with opium and was therefore not in full 
possession of his senses!) Finally, we might wait until we have further 
information about God to see if it confirms or contradicts the reports of Mel, 
Jon, and Rob, just as we might wait to hear multiple reports of the same natural 
phenomena if the first few reports are entirely unique to the linguistic 
community. 
One last note about this particular case is in order. It may turn out that 
the descriptions applied to God are in fact baptisms of new words. It may be 
that prior to Jon’s experience, no one had reported that God is transcendent  or 
holy despite the fact that the word for God existed and, assuming Jon is right, 
the word “God” has always meant someone who is transcendent  (among other 
things). The referent of the term “transcendent”  would just be like that, that 
being what Jon has designated as a feature of his experience of God. God would 
be the paradigmatic bearer of transcendence, and if classical theism is right, it 
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just turns out that he is also the only bearer of this trait.5 7  Relatedly, it may turn 
out that a predicate with an established sense, like “compassion,” actually refers 
to something different when applied to God. Just as the term “jade”  was long 
used for both nephrite and jadeite because the differences in their underlying 
structures were unknown, the referent for the term “compassion,”  when applied 
to God, may only superficially resemble the compassion we find humans, and 
thus the terms maybe confused. If it turns out that the reality of God’s 
compassion is entirely different from human compassion, the word 
“compassion” that is transmitted from Jon’s baptism of the term will have 
always meant what it turned out to be in virtue of its referent. 
Case 5: 
Jon believes in the Seven-Faced God, and Brienne believes in the Red 
God.5 8  Imagine that (in their fictional universe) these two gods are in reality one 
and the same because the source of their respective religions are baptisms of 
names used to refer to actual experiences of God and their tradition has 
continued to be sustained by genuine experiences, and (as we have already 
established) this is sufficient to fix the meaning of the names for a community. 
What are we to make of their differing theological descriptions? The theological 
descriptions and definitions describing the deity would be subject to the same 
scrutiny described in case 4. Presumably the descriptions passed these tests 
                                                 
57  For the moment I am leav ing aside the fact that God is the only  bearer of his attributes, and I 
am also remaining neutral on any  metaphysical distinctions between trait, attribute, property, 
feature, etc. 
58 These deities are the object of worship in the fictional world of Game of Thrones. 
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within their communities, and this is why they each have the religion that they 
do. Nevertheless, it is still possible that one community has better reason to 
trust their inferences over the other, or that they have sufficient experience with 
God to reason away the other doctrine. In the absence of discriminatory 
evidence, though, it may turn out that interreligious dialogue reaches a 
standstill until further information can be acquired. More cheerful to 
contemplate is the possibility that the communities find no reason to reject each 
other’s descriptions, and upon properly understanding the claims of the 
respective theologies, can simply augment their knowledge. When theologies 
are radically different, though, establishing that both baptisms for God were the 
product of references to the same being will prove difficult, as we typically 
expect continuity to surface when we have identified real phenomena (i.e., we 
expect things to behave as they are and to manifest essential features). 
Case 6: 
This final case is drawn from an example raised by Eleonore Stump.5 9  
She mentions the difficulty of identifying the “true Church” and, therefore, the 
authoritative arbiters of true doctrine according to the meta-theologies of many 
Christians. If we identify true doctrine by deferring to Church authority, we 
have no way of determining the truth of competing doctrines when they arise 
within the Church (as they often do). Stump mentions the Donatists, a 4th 
century heretical sect that taught that members of the Church must be 
completely morally pure, and that only those who have not sinned (in 
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particular, wavered under persecution) could administer the sacraments.  
Stump points out that at the time of the Donatists, there was not necessarily any 
way to determine whether the Donatists were in fact the true Church, and if 
their opponents were the heretics. If the Donatists were the true Church, then 
the true Church accepted their doctrines. If those opposed to the doctrines were 
the true Church, then the true Church rejected their doctrines:  
The changes were acceptable to the Donatists and not acceptable to 
others. Unless we know which group comprised the members of the 
Church, we can’t tell whether the Donatist changes were acceptable to the 
members of the Church. And no amount of historical scholarship could 
possibly tell us whether the Donatists or their opponents counted as 
members of the true Church without using the test of doctrine, But, of 
course, if we use the test of doctrine to determine the true Church, and 
use the true Church as the test of doctrine, our tests will run in a very 
small circle.6 0   
 
Unless we know which group is the true Church and therefore the bearer of 
Church authority, then, we have no clear means by which to deal with schism 
and heresy.  
 Direct reference is of use here, too. According to direct reference, it is not 
Church authority per se that allows us to adjudicate between contesting 
doctrines in the Church. Rather, we deal with differences in doctrine based on 
our best understanding of what God is in fact like. This may sound trivial, but it 
is not. Direct reference explains what the Church already does: It takes its most 
trustworthy experiences, paradigmatic examples and understanding of God and 
his features, and it comes up with the best assessment it can to determine 
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whether the novel view is consistent or in some way amenable to the existing 
understanding. It also takes into account the source of the information and 
whether or not there is reason to think that source is/is not reliable.  
 The virtue of this interpretation of schisms is that it not only makes sense 
of extant practices, it also makes sense of times when the religious community 
has changed positions. For example, many of the doctrines of the Protestant 
Reformation were at one time considered heresy, and some argue that the 
ecumenism forwarded by Vatican Council II amounts to a change in the position 
of the Church. If the Church has in fact changed positions, this would not be 
surprising on a direct reference view of theology. These changes would simply 
be the symptoms of improved understanding of many of the existing doctrines.6 1  
Theology would then be a somewhat tentative project, like the sciences; it would 
also be forward looking, as terms would be used in hopes of humankind one day 
understanding much of what God is like. Finally, as I mentioned on the outset, 
this view only works on a realist conception of theology. If there is no actual God 
to fix the reference and properties ascribed to him, theology is a fool’s errand 
and direct reference offers nothing to those who use religious language.  
VI. Direct Reference and Classical Theism 
 If the above account is right, there are several desirable consequences for 
proponents of classical theism. For one, direct reference allows us to identify 
                                                 
61  They  could just as well be mistakes in our understanding of doctrinal propositions. Doctrine, 
like science, could possibly take some wrongheaded detours on the path to better 
understanding. Hopefully, though, v icious misunderstandings of doctrine (such as  those 
resulting in terrible abuses) would be explainable as perversions and breaks with genuine 
predications, and not just “misunderstandings.”  
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kinds and properties without any antecedent commitment to precisely what 
constitutes a kind or property. Unlike traditional theories of predication that 
rely upon particular conceptions of essence, accidents, species, and properties, 
direct reference allows an agent to speak meaningfully of God while leaving 
much of the semantic content of her predications open to further discovery. She 
is only committed to there being something like that exemplified by God 
through an experience or narrative. 
Further, the theist can remain metaphysically neutral about the 
constitution of God’s attributes while still being able to individuate particular 
qualities of God. Just as a speaker can say that compassion is like that, and that 
courage is like that, while not necessarily being committed to a discrete 
propositional definition of these virtues, so a theist can individuate between 
holiness being like that and mercy being like that without having to explain in 
virtue of what this difference obtains. It just has to be possible that some 
authority, whether Moses or a trusted mentor, has the ability to identify God or 
a particular attribute somewhat reliably when he or she experiences it, and the 
speaker is properly connected to the expert in her religious community.   
It may yet be possible that members of a religious community can 
successful refer to attributes that they cannot cognize. Some accounts of 
holiness and transcendence simply rely on these qualities being completely 
other from human experience. Suppose for the sake of argument, though, you 
ascribe to a view of transcendence such that God is so unlike anything else that 
by definition humans’ finite capacities for perception and thought entail that 
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they cannot have any notion of what God is like. This confounding idea of God’s 
nature has resulted in some rather difficult theological positions, such as via 
negativa (predication by negation), and the transcendental theology birthed by 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. According to direct reference, humans can still 
inherit terms they do not understand. If God tells humans that he is 
transcendent, holy, etc., God himself has fixed the designation. Humans can still 
use these terms and mean something despite the fact that they cannot possibly 
know a definition or even approximate description of these terms because of 
their relationship to linguistic authorities; in this case, the authority is God. 
Let us return to the predications of aseity, impassibility, and 
immutability that were discussed in section II. Aseity is the idea that God exists 
in and of himself, and nothing contributes to or sustains God’s existence. 
Immutability captures the idea that God is unchanging. Impassibility is the 
claim that God cannot be affected by or acted upon by anything. Recall that 
these attributes are extremely difficult to reconcile with our very notions of what 
it means to be a person or act. Further, they seem in direct conflict with 
passages of Scripture in which God is described as thinking, speaking, and 
reacting to humans. 
 It is my contention that a remaining virtue of theological predication via 
direct reference resolves some of the thorniest difficulties with classical 
predications like those just listed. It remains to be described exactly what kind 
of predications the descriptions made by direct reference amount to; that is, 
when Jon says, “God is compassionate,” how is he using this term? Since such 
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terms refer directly to God regardless of the psychological content in Jon’s head 
(recall that this is the semantic externalism that results from Kripke’s and 
Putnam’s direct reference theories), these terms are univocal. Jon intends this 
word to apply directly to whatever God is actually like; the intension and 
extension of the term is set by the metaphysical reality of God’s likeness. In this 
way, “compassionate” is just as univocal as the word “tiger” or “water.” 
Perhaps most importantly, unlike predications made via analogy or 
metaphor, the terms we use to describe God do not make their human 
counterparts linguistically prior. There is no presumption that our predications 
derived via direct reference have their basis in natural experience. When I 
observe that God is like that in his judgment of the kings of Israel, and I call this 
“merciful,” my understanding of human mercy is not necessarily shaping the 
divine predicate. Rather, it is a reference to a genuine experience of God, a word 
given by God, or the second-personal knowledge of what God is like 
communicated through narrative. For example, when Moses tells us that God is 
abundant in lovingkindness, we inherit a term, “lovingkindness,” that is 
informed by Moses’ encounter with God himself.  
It may turn out, as many theologians have speculated, that human 
lovingkindness (perhaps of the sort described by Zagzebski’s virtue theory) is in 
some way related to divine lovingkindness. In fact, I am rather inclined to think 
that if God exists, something like her Divine Motivation Theory is right. 
However, even if this is the case, our lovingkindness would be parasitic on God’s 
lovingkindness. The metaphysical priority of the terms belongs with God 
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himself, and not with us (regardless of whether our lovingkindness came before 
our knowledge of God’s, epistemologically speaking). As far as I know, this is a 
new form of predication, one that I have dubbed attributive univocal 
predication given the metaphysical priority given to God as the source of the 
term. 
 Further, if God is in fact holy  and transcendent, the attributive and 
univocal aspects of our predication result in God’s attributes being rigidly 
designated along with God himself. Since “compassionate”  means like that, and 
like that is just whatever God turns out to be like at the moment of that 
particular baptism or naming ceremony, we have stated what is necessary for 
something to count as compassionate. It will be the same in all possible worlds. 
Given that holiness and transcendence entail that nothing else has ever or will 
ever be like God, compassionate is rigidly designated. Furthermore, God’s 
attributes function something like a name. The term “compassionate,” so used, 
will never fail to pick out God. This should be exactly the result we expect: God 
is the same in all possible worlds. 
The applications to classical predications extend yet further. Since my 
predications are univocal and unique to God, it is unsurprising that attributes 
like aseity, impassibility, and immutability have certain incompatibilities with 
my creaturely notion of what it is like to act, speak, and engage with fellow 
persons. I do not even have to work out the exact difference between God’s 
manifestation of his attributes and similar human attributes to competently use 
a term. In addition to standing in the proper relation to the term in a causal 
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chain or linguistic community, I may even grasp a stereotype of God’s 
compassion: like human compassion, but compatible with the other divine 
attributes. This is not predication by analogy, because the analogy I draw here is 
simply a useful stereotype; it only gives a superficial description of what the 
divine “compassion” term in fact means. 
That God is asei, immutable, and impassible also has some interesting 
implications for theology via direct reference. Since God is immutable and 
outside of time on a classically theist view, our references to God rigidly refer in 
the most absolute way imaginable. When terms are baptized, it is only by mere 
appearance that like that counts as God exemplifying a particular attribute like 
compassion at the time the term is coined. In reality, God continues to 
exemplify that attribute at all points in time, in his eternal present. In 
ostensively identifying a particular divine attribute then, there is a sense in 
which the identifying person refers to all compassion, at all times, in every 
expression of it. 
VII. Some Consequences 
As the prior discussion indicates, theories of direct reference as applied to 
both natural and moral kinds are committed to there being facts of the matter 
about what counts as a paradigmatic example of a particular property or kind—
instances of a kind are not determined based on private observations or by 
majority, but by those who are better at distinguishing what counts as an 
exemplar and what does not. Authorities need not be inerrant any more than 
scientists are, but it is assumed that the experts are engaged in making 
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observations about the world (or at least people in the world) that can falsify the 
claims of others. 
Likewise, it is important for my theory that there exist religious experts 
in the linguistic community who can function something like scientific experts 
in that they can spot counterfeits and perverted uses of predicates.6 2  This is 
exactly what most religious individuals appeal to when sorting out matters of 
doctrine. Authoritative texts, traditions, and interpreters help sort out and are 
given the final word when it comes to theological difficulties. Experts like 
theologians, textual scholars, and saints are entrusted as guides and teachers to 
vernacular users of religious language. Just as in the natural sciences, the 
religious faithful look for features like continuity with prior theory (doctrine) as 
a sign of truth and indication that something real underwrites designating 
terms.  
For natural kind terms, the natural world is the “robust phenomena” our 
terms track with continuity—the world provides input and restricts our use of 
terms in cooperation with the rules of our language. For Zagzebski’s 
exemplarism, the faculty of admiration allows us to identify honest-to-goodness 
exemplars of virtue—in this way, admirability is anchored in what a good person 
is, the way the properties of a tiger, so long as they are features only of tigers, 
are anchored by the existence of real tigers. Theoretically, we would only know 
about such properties by observing and investigating tigers; their properties are 
known to us a posteriori. Likewise, good persons are our means by which we 
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discover admirability as they are our sole source of contact with this particular 
set of properties.  
Religious language depends upon on revelation of some kind, although it 
is not necessarily the case that all revelation is a posteriori. I suppose it is 
possible that facts about God are known a priori; there is certainly a tradition 
among philosophers to this effect. However, it does not seem to me that this 
particular theory of religious language has implications for theology of this kind 
one way or another. So far as I can tell, it only depends upon God disclosing 
himself to people and these events being transmitted via language. 
This tenet of direct reference has considerable philosophical payoff for 
theists who ascribe classical attributes to God, though, even if it is neutral on the 
subject of a priori attributes. Recall the earlier stated incentives against 
importing metaphysical assumptions about God’s attributes. Classical theists 
would be unhappy if it turned out the claim that God is asei was merely the 
product of human imagination. If our metaphysical apparatus is mistaken and 
we allow this to inform our theology, it is possible that we have made mistaken 
inferences about God’s nature. On a direct reference account, this need not be 
the case. The meaning of the terms we can articulate are limited by what 
actually obtains: For natural kinds, the distinctions and properties the world 
gives us (gold could not be H2 0 but it could be identified with the real 
underlying structure of gold, or one of the structures should there be more than 
one), and for God’s attributes, authoritative religious experience and with it, 
human theology, is fixed by the way God actually is. 
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To see the upshot of this position, consider how a theist  might interpret 
variations in the extension of a single term in different belief systems or 
cultures. There may also be a schism among believers of a religion that 
recognizes many truths about God and descend from an accurate identification 
of God and baptism of theological terms. This may be due to one community 
taking a different path with an extension than another. On a direct reference 
view of natural kinds, should linguistic communities take diverging paths 
regarding a natural kind (community A decides jade is only jadeite, and 
community B decides jade is only nephrite), we would still end up with all kinds 
and properties accounted for once we have a “completed” science. All that has 
happened is that one community made a different decision than another 
regarding exactly what to give theoretical priority in their science. Something 
similar can be imagined as happening concerning theology: One community 
emphasizes one attribute or act of God, but that is not to say that another 
attribute is not present, whether implicitly coexisting (but not contained in the 
meaning of the term) in the object to which the term refers or as a different 
attribute altogether. It could also be the case that the term “good” does not map 
onto something as distinct as a natural kind like water or even a genus like canis 
(where specific types of goodness that emerge in communities are species like 
canis familiaris, canis trans and canis rufus), but rather something unlike any 
features of the natural world that we now know. 
This outcome for theological speech need not be an obstacle to my view 
for a realist. A theist has every reason to hope that theological terms will be like 
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natural kinds and that imperfect human theorizing about God will not 
ultimately prove problematic. Given the dearth of understanding among 
humans when it comes to a divine being, it should be unsurprising that such 
conflicting extensions arise in various contexts and cultures. Theists should seek 
out the theology that seems to have the most promise and evidence on its side; 
they may nevertheless find out that other cultures and religions may have 
enough understanding of God to successfully refer to him, even when they get 
things wrong. It also may turn out that our culture could have easily prized 
upon some other real feature of God’s character than the one we in fact did. Just 
as we do not find ourselves disquieted about difficult or even conflicting data 
among the sciences when very little is known about the subject (but rather use 
this as impetus for further investigation), so theists should remain untroubled, 
especially when they carry the hope of further revelation from God that might 
close the epistemic (and likewise linguistic) gap.  
This is not to say that direct reference applied to God leads to religious 
pluralism. Proponents of direct reference allow that individuals who are not 
experts sometimes corrupt the meaning of terms by promoting improper use of 
the terms, e.g., Marco Polo and “Madagascar.” Just as there are “quacks” in 
science and ethics, there may be heretics or apostates in theological semantics 
that impede or even derail entirely the meaning of a theological term. In the 
latter, more extreme situation, it seems to me that proponents of direct 
reference would say that the term has changed its meaning—that it now tracks a 
different (or imaginary) referent. 
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 Finally, the greatest recommendation for this theory is that I believe it 
allows God himself to set the agenda for theology. In Alston’s words, religious 
language that begins with description allows our conceptions of attributes to 
“call the shots.” If something does not have the attribute in our description of 
God, it is not God: “[W]e set the requirements for being God.”6 3  Conversely, if 
religious experience and divine testimony is basic, the object of experience is 
God—whether or not he has all the attributes we expect (or in the way we 
expect). It could also mean that world religions have more in common, as they 
may have the same object of experience, even if their descriptions are radically 
different. My hope is that the theory espoused in this essay will make it clear 
that meaningful theological language need not be a mere chimera, or at least 
significantly weaken this chimera’s ability to breathe fire on statements of 
religious doctrine. 
  
                                                 




Hectoring Hector:  
A Thoroughgoing Critique of Hectorian Semantics 
I. Introduction 
Divine predication has long proved a problem for theologians and 
philosophers of religion. Religious speech acts are difficult to explain, as many 
doctrinal propositions seem to run aground on the metaphysical implications of 
divine reference and predication. Determining how words refer and describe 
God is difficult when one considers the attributes that God is purported to have: 
transcendence, simplicity, incorporeality, and holiness, among others. Consider, 
for example, the notion that God speaks. What could it mean for God to speak, 
since God is incorporeal? All of our ideas of speech involve action in time and 
space, but God is outside of time and immaterial. Since God is transcendent and 
holy, it is hard to imagine that any descriptions of God would be comprehend by 
creatures with finite minds, so what kind of things could God tell us about 
himself that would increase our understanding of him? 
Theology just is the practice of explaining the nature of God in terms 
humans can understand, and yet God’s nature seems to imply that human 
language will forever be inadequate to the task of divine description. Attempts 
to explain theological language have made use of metaphorical, analogical, or 
univocal predications; each of these forms of predication, though, pose their 
own unique problems. More recently theologians and philosophers have 
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resorted to explaining how theology might be worthwhile even when one 
accepts that humans cannot, in principle, accurately speak of the divine.6 4   
Kevin Hector’s recent project, Theology without Metaphysics, is an 
attempt to restore theological speech acts’ status as meaningful and intelligible. 
Hector makes use of Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s respective works in 
direct reference and semantic externalism, but he also incorporates the views of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Barth to create a theory of speech acts that is 
entirely his own.6 5  His work has been well-received by theologians and 
philosophers alike, but it is not without its critics.  
In this paper, I defend Kevin Hector's Theology without Metaphysics 
against Sameer Yadav's criticisms of the way semantic externalism features in 
Hector’s theory. However, I ultimately argue that Hector's account of 
theological language fails. This is in part due to his rejection of what he calls 
“essentialist-correspondentist” metaphysics. This eschewal of metaphysics 
shapes Hector's position, but unfortunately he has misidentified essentialist -
correspondentist metaphysics as the source of the problems with which Hector 
is concerned. Further complications with Hector’s forays into philosophy of 
                                                 
64 See, for example, Wittgenstein (1966, 1984, 1995), Patrick Sherry (1972), and Mikel Burley  
(2012) for Wittgensteinian takes on this position. John Hick, of course, is notable for forwarding 
his pluralistic theory of religion and religious language (1977, 1989).  
65 See Donnellan’s “Reference and Definite  Descriptions” (1966), “Putting Humpty Dumpty  
Together Again,”  (1968), “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,” in The Semantics of 
Natural Language  (1972) and "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms" (2012); Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity (1980) and Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures (2013); 
and Putnam’s “Meaning and Reference” (1973), and Mind, Language, and Reality (1975). See 
also Barth (1940) and Wittgenstein (1966, 1980). While I am not competent to judge Hector’s 
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mind, particularly when it comes to mental content and the role of inference in 
the development of religious concepts, profoundly undermine his theory. 
My essay takes the following structure: First, I recount Hector’s 
particular brand of semantics and explain precisely what metaphysics Hector 
rejects and why. Second, I will address Yadav’s criticisms. This will require 
significant detangling of some confused metaphysical theories that are woven 
throughout both Hector’s and Yadav’s respective writings. Finally, I will turn to 
the implications Hector’s theory of religious language have for the philosophy of 
mind and explain why we should find these consequences undesirable.   
II. Hectorian Semantics 
Kevin Hector’s  opus, Theology without Metaphysics, made waves in 
theological and philosophical circles because in it Hector attempts to explain the 
linguistic facets of the theological project while rejecting the metaphysics that 
often complicate religious speech acts. Instead of expecting our language and 
mental content to factively correspond (whether by representation, 
propositions, etc.) to something in the word like essences, Hector contends that, 
when employed in language, a concept is a norm that humans employ that 
merely “orders the manifold of one’s experience, and one does so by judging 
certain aspects of that experience to be relevantly similar to other aspects.” 6 6  
Hector stipulates that such concept use requires that agents have the intention 
to follow linguistic precedence. Having the appropriate intention in word use 
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involves two mental acts6 7  on the part of the linguistic agent: First, the agent 
must recognize important linguistic precedents and authorities for the concept 
in question, and second, that concept use requires mutual recognition of 
concepts from one’s community, according to which concepts are always being 
revised. Hector’s notion of a concept bears some superficial resemblance to 
theories of direct reference, as it appears Hector is here involving public use (or 
“intersubjective recognition,” in Hector’s words), and recognized authorities as 
a source of linguistic norms.6 8   
The definite relationship between Hector’s concepts and semantic 
externalism will be evaluated in more detail in a later section. For now, though, 
note that Hector is distinguishing concepts from word use: The concepts 
moderated here are not synonymous with word intension or meaning per se, but 
rather with “that which orders the manifold of one’s experience,” something 
that Hector considers to be an act of judgment. Further, Hector does not think 
the content of concepts are set by application to anything in created reality, nor 
does he think it makes sense to talk about concepts having meanings. Concepts 
do not “contain” their extensions, and they are not necessarily uniform or 
predictable.6 9  Rather, concepts are part of a social process; they are informed by 
a community, and this information might be new and surprising. 
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Theological language, then, demands a particular set of rules when it 
comes to concept use. Christ functions as the authority and establishes rules of 
precedence, and the Holy Spirit “normatizes” intersubjective  recognition 
through the tradition of the church. Religious concepts have a particular 
trajectory, and this trajectory is appropriated by a the Holy Spirit, guaranteeing 
that they apply properly to their objects. Meaning, says Hector, is a product of 
this trajectory, and like the trajectories, meanings are constantly changing. 
Thus, while a concept does not have a meaning, it does have meanings. 
According to Hector, such a view both deflates what is required of theological 
language by not demanding that our concepts truly capture the reality of God’s 
transcendent nature and sets the high demand that theological language be 
traceable back to Christ through the tradition of the church.  
What Hector has in mind in appealing to trajectories is the inferentialism 
of Davidson and Brandom.7 0  Inferentialism is a view of concepts that results 
from Wittgensteinian rule-following ideas about language when combined with 
the thesis that concepts are parasitic upon the appropriation of language. On an 
inferentialist view, concepts are more than mental representations, but also 
must involve the ability to make inferences and sophisticated discriminations 
about the concept (an ability usually demonstrated through the use of 
language). Inferentialist theories of meaning follow Wittgenstein in the sense 
that they take rules of inference and the use of proofs to constitute linguistic 
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norms, and the meaning of concepts is just is whatever these rules of inference 
pick out (via the expression of these concepts in language).   
Despite his appeal to inferentialism, Hector’s view bears certain 
similarities to semantic externalism. Hector draws heavily upon semantic 
externalism’s advocates (like Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke, and Keith Donnellan) 
in his description of theological reference.7 1  The reason we can be sure that our 
words refer to God in the absence of fixed, accurate meanings that belong to our 
concepts is that our words are fixed by direct reference. Just as direct reference 
has shown that definite description secure reference, our concepts are not what 
secure religious reference. Rather, our references to God are secured via a series 
of links back to when someone, like the biblical figure Abraham, actually picked 
out God via ostension.7 2  These links are described as both causal in nature, as 
Kripke would have it, and as a social function, similar to Putnam’s view. In any 
case, Hector insists that religious concepts do not have a veridical relationship 
to something like God’s essence does not undermine his theory because this 
amounts to relying on description. Instead, theological speech acts can 
successfully refer to God via direct reference, even in the absence of meaningful 
concepts.  
III. Yadav’s Objections and Varieties of Externalism 
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This referential dimensions of Hector’s theory make it sound as though 
he is integrating semantic externalism and direct reference with his inferential 
view of concepts and concept meaning. Sameer Yadav points out, 
[…]Hector’s proposed therapeutic alternative is “anti-metaphysical” just 
insofar as it denies semantic internalism and embraces semantic 
externalism. If objects can figure into thought as a causal basis for our 
inclinations to respond in some ways and not others, and if our 
discursive norms precipitate out of those responses, then we will have no 
need to suppose that objects figure into semantic content via concept-
free representations, because objects don’t enter into thought at all 
(whether by way of resemblances, forms, essences, etc.). Our relation to 
mind-independent objects is not intentional and  mentalistic but causal 
and dispositional. Such a conception allows us to picture the causal 
relation between thought and the world as direct and the intentional 
relation as irreducibly normative. Our God-talk, therefore, can be seen as 
directly responsive to God’s presence and agency in the world as 
exhibited in the Church’s evolving intersubjective recognition of the 
normative Spirit of Christ.7 3  
 
On this point, Yadav invokes an objection made by John McDowell in 
philosophy of mind: Simply appealing to a causal relationship between the 
mental and the empirical is not enough to set a normative trajectory for human 
thought about God.7 4  Such an account is in danger of Moore’s naturalistic 
fallacy or Sellar’s myth of the given, insofar as the view contains assumptions 
either about the empirical itself or the sensations “given” to us by the world (or 
in this context, God or the Church). In both cases, it is taken for granted that the 
important empirical facts about cognition are inherently normative when in fact 
there is nothing to establish normativity. Experience gives us sensation, and 
                                                 
7 3 “Therapy  for the Therapist: A McDowellian Critique of Semantic Externalism in Kevin 
Hector’s Theology without Metaphysics, ” p. 124. 
7 4 McDowell 1994, pp. 14ff. 
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sensation gives us knowledge. The unwarranted assumption in this picture is 
that relationship between these things just are immediate and veridical, without 
any intermediary mental processes. The causal relationship between objects of 
experience and the resulting concepts is enough to show that these things are 
normative in nature. Yadav argues,  
The point is that while reliable dispositions to differentially respond to 
our environment might constitute a causal constraint on thought and 
language, they also strongly encourage us to picture our experiences as 
entirely free of normative constraint by reality. But normative constraint 
is just the kind of constraint we need if the meaning, reference and truth 
of what we think and say is determined by the external world itself and 
not merely by us.7 5  
 
Hector disputes Yadav’s characterization of his theory of theological 
language. First, he contends that his invocation of “Gefühl,” Friedrich 
Schleiermacher's idea that humans exist in a kind of harmony or oneness with 
their environment, eliminates the supposed gap between the empirical and the 
mental.7 6  Further, whereas Yadav insists that Hector’s objection to the 
imposition of human concepts on concept-free essences entails an objection to 
internalism, Hector denies that internalism is unavailable to him.  According to 
Hector, he can assume that mental content bears some kind of resembling or 
right-making feature with causally-responsible reality that generates those 
thoughts necessary for internalism to obtain while also denying that theological 
claims necessarily involve imposing human conceptual restraints on “essences.”  
                                                 
7 5 Ibid 126. 
7 6 “Responses to JAT’s sy mposium on Theology without Metaphysics,” 144-45. 
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For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to chart out the logical space for the 
variety of philosophical externalism and internalisms relevant to the above 
comments, especially given how much both Hector and Yadav rely on these 
terms. Put briefly, semantic externalism is the view that meaning cannot be 
identified with psychological states or, as Putnam famously put it, meaning 
“ain’t in the head."7 7  When an agent uses the word, the meaning of the word is 
not set by the agent’s notion of the word. The intension of the word—that is, 
qualities of the word that determine what kind of things belongs to the set the 
word designates—is set by whatever paradigmatic examples count as an 
instance of the word.  
For illustrative purposes, imagine the following example involving proper 
names. When Brienne uses the word “Jaime,” the intension of “Jaime” is not 
anything in Brienne’s head. The intension of “Jaime” was set whenever a person 
was christened “Jaime.” Whatever facts about Jaime actually make Jaime who 
he is—that is, the metaphysical reality of what it is to be Jaime—sets the 
intension of “Jaime.” In turn, the intension determines the extension of 
“Jaime,” which will just be a set containing only this person named “Jaime.” 
Consider another example regarding kinds: What water actually is was 
determined whenever humans decided that stuff (that is, paradigmatic samples 
of water) is water. The metaphysical facts about the constitution of water 
(water’s microstructure, or that it is H2O) sets the intension and, subsequently, 
extension of the word “water.” Regardless of whether Aristotle knew this 
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microstructure of water, the meaning of “water” was the same because he 
intended to designate the same thing that we now know is H2O. Necessary and 
sufficient conditions for what it is for something to be water, or even a definite 
description, were not necessary for Aristotle to succeed in his use of the word 
water. His meaning was not a function of any ideas Aristotle had about the 
nature of water; rather, the meaning tied to his word use belongs to something 
outside of his head. 
Semantic externalism is ultimately the view that the meaning of words 
can be set by factors external to the linguistic agent; conversely, semantic 
internalism is the view that meaning is set solely by internal factors, such as the 
linguistic agent’s intentions, beliefs, and mental representations. When asked 
what do you mean, the answer concerns what the speaker in question intended 
to communicate, or what ideas or propositions they have in mind when they 
uttered words. When an agent remarks, that is a pomegranate, they declare 
that that is whatever they take to be a pomegranate: The meaning of the word is 
set by certain psychological states in the agent’s mind, perhaps reddish round 
thing with a hard exterior and fleshy seeds.   
Note that so far we have only talked about semantics. What is internal or 
external in these two views is the meaning of words. The remaining positions to 
discuss follow along a similar pattern; however, they concern significantly 
different subject matter and involve decidedly different metaphysical 
entailments. Semantic externalism’s important bedfellow, mental content 
externalism, does not concern the meaning and reference of words, but rather 
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what it is that determines mental content itself. Mental content externalists hold 
that the content of certain psychological states are determined by things 
external to the mind. It is often taken to logically follow semantic externalism: If 
what I mean by “water” is determined by what water actually is (and not just my 
description or idea of water), then the content of my cognition—my intention to 
designate water through a speech act—is actually not just internal to my mind, 
but also external. Mental content that is determined by things external to the 
mind of the agent is called wide mental content (as opposed to narrow content, 
content that solely consists of psychological states). 
In the case of mental content, most philosophers agree that the facticity 
of truth-evaluable claims about reality are at least partially determined by 
empirical facts. The belief a dog sits on the patio is one such belief: Whether or 
not my statement is true depends upon whether a dog does indeed sit on the 
patio. However, mental content externalists contend that at least some 
intentional mental states and beliefs that we normally do not perceive as 
depending upon external facts for their veridicality are in fact determined by 
external factors, e.g., the true nature of the external object that is the subject of 
one’s mental state. These externalists argue that two thinking agents can have 
type-identical mental states that result in differing truth-conditions as the result 
of environmental or social factors. 
In contrast, internalists believe that only the internal states of an agent 
determine mental content, e.g., how an agent describes, represents, or reasons 
about the subject of her thought. Regardless of how the meaning of my words 
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apply, when I think about water, my mental content is made up of psychological 
things like beliefs and representations. While this content might be informed by 
information that is the result of my perceptions of things external to me, the 
mental content itself has no external features. 
There can be considerable slippage between semantic externalism and 
mental content externalism, and the same is true for the corresponding 
internalisms. This is no doubt because mental content externalism rose to 
prominence on the basis of Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment,7 8  and 
Putnam himself was an externalist about mental content.7 9  Since meanings are 
not in the head, Putnam posits that thought must also be a “world-involving 
function” of the brain.8 0  Just as semantic externalism is limited to word 
meaning, so mental content externalism is limited according to Putnam. For 
example, while Putnam clearly holds the position that thought and concepts are 
external, he leaves the subject of perceptual content to be determined by 
cognitive science.8 1  These theses are closely related, but they are not identical.8 2  
Given the proliferation of externalisms and internalisms in analytic 
philosophy, it is important to get clear on what exactly is at issue in Yadav’s 
criticisms of Hector. Yadav uses nonspecific language and seems to be 
                                                 
7 8  Putnam (1973). 
7 9 Putnam 1981, ch. 1. See also Putnam (2013).  
80 Putnam 2013, p. 201. 
81  Ibid, pp. 201 -202. See also Putnam 1981, ch. 1 . 
82 Y et another form of externalism and internalism has to do with epistemological justification, 
but it is not necessary to define these here.  
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conflating semantic externalism and mental content externalism. This is clearly 
the case when Yadav insists that human thinking must have to accurately 
represent or reflect the empirical cause if we are going to have genuine semantic 
content and avoid the “two-ply” objection (in which causal relations between 
empirical causes and the thinking agent, as you will recall, are the only thing 
guaranteed in human linguistic processes, and thus mental content for type-
identical beliefs in different agents can be nearly anything and radically 
dissimilar). Likewise, Yadav remarks, “the externalist’s key philosophical 
scruple is to claim that our words and concepts do not represent reality by any 
mentalistic internalization of our causal relations to reality.”8 3  A more accurate 
statement would be that the semantic externalist’s key philosophical scruple is 
to claim that the meaning of words8 4  does not rely on representations to 
determine intension, nor are the meaning of words reducible to representations 
of reality by any mechanism, causal or otherwise.  
Semantic externalism, while thought by some to imply mental 
externalism, makes no such explicit commitments on the subject of mental 
content. Semantic externalism merely secures the meaning of a term by 
appealing to the ostensive origin and trajectory of a particular term when it is 
employed in language. It may guarantee certain that properties (such as water 
turning out to be H20) are always involved in what we mean when we say a 
word, even if they are yet unknown to us. In fact, arguably semantic 
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externalism’s clearest consequence for philosophy of mind is what is not 
guaranteed by the meaning of a term: Semantic externalism shows that there 
does not necessarily have to be anything in particular in the head of the agent in 
order to successfully refer so long as they stand in the proper social relationship 
to experts in their linguistic community. Particular varieties of semantic 
externalism make certain mental states a condition of successful word use in 
addition to external conditions, like the intention to continue in a certain social 
chain related to the word, or the grasping of a stereotype.8 5   In and of itself, 
though, the semantic externalism thesis only commits one to the public use and 
meaning of the word; how this is cashed out in terms of mental content is 
contested. At bottom, semantic externalism is only a thesis about what is not in 
the head, and not the other way around. 
Colin McGinn8 6  and Tyler Burge8 7  famously extended the arguments of 
semantic externalism to mental content in addition to Putnam; however, Paul 
Boghossian,8 8  proponents of two-dimensionalist semantics like Brian Loar,8 9  
and internalists like Gabriel Segal9 0  dispute that the arguments leveraged in 
favor of semantic externalism transfer to mental content externalism. Scott 
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Soames9 1  contends that while the direct reference claims of semantic 
externalism may be sufficient to determine the trajectory of a word’s public use, 
it does not seem possible to show that semantic content is metaphysically 
dependent on mental content. If meaning is not constituted by mental content, 
it is unclear how facts about semantic content, i.e., that it is external to minds, 
can transfer to mental content. Further worries, like the competence conditions 
that many philosophers have found necessary to build into direct reference (e.g., 
the ability to grasp certain descriptions) and the intuition that brain states must 
have some kind of type-identical relationship with mental content, have made it 
clear that the continuity between these two externalist positions should not be 
taken for granted.  
Hector is clearly externalist about semantics. He rejects descriptivism,9 2  
the thesis that meaning is determined by definite description, and he points to 
chains of references inherited by linguistic communities in the Scripture (such 
as “the God of Abraham”) as evidence for his account.9 3  However, as the above 
discussion has shown, semantic externalism does not entail that our mental 
states cannot share some informatively robust and normative relationship with 
the external world. It only shows that word meaning does not necessarily share 
an informatively robust and normative relationship with mental states; in other 
words, the meaning of words is not always transparent to competent speakers. 
It does, however, show that word meaning, properly understood, has a 
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normative, even necessary  by some accounts, relationship with the world when 
words are the product of direct reference. 
It still remains to be seen what we should make of Yadav’s conceptual 
and mentalistic worries about Hectorian semantics. Just because he is wrong in 
conflating semantic externalism with mental content externalism does not mean 
that Hector does not turn out to be externalist in all the relevant ways. If he is, 
perhaps his mental content externalism is sufficient to justify Yadav’s concerns . 
I will turn to this very matter in the next section. 
IV. Hector and Mental Content 
Hector provides no explicit account of mental content, and to be fair, 
such is rarely given in accounts of religious predication. Hector comes close to 
discussing the mentalistic dimensions of cataphatic language, though, when he 
briefly addresses intentionality. Analytic philosophers use the term 
“intentionality” to categorize those thoughts, beliefs, and claims characterized 
by aboutness; that is, humans possess the capacity to have object-directed 
mental content wherein an agent has thoughts about or represents some 
subject. Recall this is where Hector locates many of the metaphysical problems 
that plague theology. According to Hector, philosophers presume that the 
mental content that precipitates meaningful theological language requires 
human conceptual apparatus that is incompatible with the nature of God. 
Hence, we have a problem with theological predications of God. 
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At bottom, Hector’s solution to this problem is that God mediates both 
perception and concept application.9 4  Remember that Hector subscribes to an 
inferentialist view of concepts. Exactly what constitutes a concept on 
inferentialism is sticky, but at the very least inferentialism attributes the 
normative constraints on concepts to the rules of inference exhibited in the use 
of language. This is not enough, though, as most inferentialists think that some 
mental states are involved, such as an attitude, phenomenal states, or complex 
representation that allows for the assimilation of inferential rules.9 5   
Thankfully, Hector provides additional information about his idea of 
concepts to help fill out this picture. As was cited in section II, Hector states that 
concepts are “that which orders the manifold of one’s experience” through the 
faculty of judgment. The “meaning” of concepts, which clearly amounts to 
something different than meaning of the semantic externalist variety here, 
varies over time and among individuals. By the word “meaning,” Hector seems 
to indicate what most philosophers mean by conceptual content, even though he 
would reject any notion of concepts that likens them to containers.  
Describing concepts as something that orders experience sounds tellingly 
like a psychological state, although Hector falls short of explicitly making this 
claim. Elsewhere, Hector speaks of concepts necessarily applying to 
perception.9 6  In order to address his position with regard to the essentialist-
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96 Ibid pp. 187 -89. 
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correspondentist thesis, Hector specifies that concepts (and, subsequently, 
language) do not mediate human cognition in a way that should trouble us 
because concepts apply immediately to perception. Surprisingly, Hector argues, 
against mainstream inferentialism, that concepts are not the product of nor 
inextricably tied to inference.9 7  Concepts are learned, but once they are acquired 
from authorities, they are applied non-deliberatively, without the use of 
inference. Since some concept use is a variety of “seeing as” and not the result of 
human deliberation, it does not count as mediate.9 8    
This does not mean that inference never occurs. Hector describes a world 
where agents go about feeling out and revising their concepts.9 9  Solipsism, for 
example, is not supposed to be a problem for Hectorian semantics because 
linguistic agents are constantly testing the way the concepts of others map onto 
their  own concepts and world. The result is that concepts are always 
dynamically related to one’s environment and other minds. 
Taken as a whole, Hector seems to be ultimately committed to narrow 
mental content. That is, while conceptual content is always in flux and changing 
due to our ever-changing interaction with the world, concepts still are just 
                                                 
97  Ibid p. 187. 
98 Hector writes, “So then: when one has become reliably disposed to respond non -inferentially 
to certain objects by applying the appropriate concepts, one automatically perceives such objects 
as thus-and-so, without having to deliberate about what concept to apply. Because certain 
concept applications have become second nature, one sees certain marks as letters, sees letters 
as words, sees strings of words as making a claim, and so on...Once one has mastered a concept, 
accordingly, the appearance of whatever  it applies to causes one non-inferentially to apply it, in 
consequence of which one need not think of concept application as introducing an intermediate, 
inference-like step between an object’s presence and one’s perception of it” (pp. 188 -89). 
99 Ibid pp. 192-94. 
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something I have, something that occurs in the mind in reaction to my linguistic 
community and the world in which I am involved. While linguistic norms and 
my intention to defer to authorities determine word use, and while they offer 
norms by which my concepts can be governed, at the end of the day external 
factors do not directly determine my conceptual content in a way consistent 
with mental content externalism.  
It is important to clarify that Hector’s invocation of “seeing as” does not 
make mental content broad. Even if agents are unconscious of their concept use 
or if concept deployment somehow inheres in perception itself, this is not 
sufficient to make mental content broad. Mental content externalism only 
obtains if the content of my psychological state is somehow determined, at least 
in part, by factors external to one’s mind. In other words, it has to be possible 
that two individuals can have type-identical mental states but think about two 
different things based on their relationship to the world. This does not obtain 
just because concept deployment is automatic or occurs coextensively with 
perception; all this can be the case all while the relevant concepts and 
perceptions consist entirely of mental states. Without some element of his 
theory that necessitates that concepts or other psychological content is directly 
determined by things external to the mind, Hector’s theory of mental content 
seems internalist even while the trajectory that determines word meaning is 
external to the mind.   
V. Problems with Theological Applications of Hectorian Semantics 
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With these ideas cleared up, we are free to at last turn to the unique 
puzzles posed by theological speech acts. Hector elaborates on the way his 
theory applies to items of religious language. Concepts can be rightly employed 
with reference to God when: 
…(a) such concept-use is itself God’s work, (b) one can become reliably 
disposed to respond to God’s presence by applying the proper concept, 
and (c) perception is not relative to incommensurable conceptual 
schemes.1 00  
 
That agents can use a concept in a way that qualifies as “God’s work” is 
established, according to Hector, by the normative work of the Spirit and the 
agent’s expectation that her use of a concept like “love” is traceable to its 
authoritative baptism (say, Saint John’s revelatory statement that “God is love” 
in the gospel bearing his name), whatever this may mean for the trajectory and 
ultimate definition of the term.1 01  The fallout of this orientation of theological 
terms is that concepts and the norms by which one assesses her concept use are 
internal to God1 02  because cataphatic words are coined through divine 
revelation, and successful uses of these words depend upon the power and 
authority of the Spirit.  
So then, Hector thinks his view dodges problems posed by traditional 
views of divine predication: Our finite human predications do not involve the 
mediation of inadequate concepts because the concepts we deploy originate 
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1 02 Ibid. 
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with and depend upon God himself. It is not that his view avoids the application 
of concepts to God, nor is it that our language describing God lacks origin in 
human experience. Our theological language is rooted firmly in human 
experience, whether theophany, the teachings of the incarnate Christ, or the 
testimony of prophets and disciples who themselves received revelation by some 
means or another. According to Hector, he can affirm the role of experience as 
well as the deployment of human concepts all while insisting that human minds 
need not make contact with something like essences, or that human concepts 
come between humans and God. 
I have argued elsewhere that I think semantic externalism deserves 
attention as a theory of theological language; however, my view departs from 
Hector’s due to weaknesses surfacing at the nexus of thought and language.1 03  
The problem is threefold: The first is one that Hector himself acknowledges in 
his discussion of Barth concerning the inadequacy of human ideas; the second 
concerns the formation of concepts; finally, the third has to do with description. 
In his discussion of Barth, Hector acknowledges the problem that 
motivates much of the philosophical discussion about divine predication: In all 
of our theological efforts, we must not take God to be accurately reflected in our 
pitiful ideas of him.1 04  Before I proceed to my criticisms of Hector, though, it 
will help to get clear on terms. Until recently philosophical literature on the 
topic of divine predication consisted almost entirely of medieval writings. Most 
                                                 
1 03 See chapter one of this dissertation, “Div ine Predication, Direct Reference, and the Attributes 
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1 04 Ibid 126ff. 
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medieval philosophers divided predications of God into two categories: 
metaphorical and literal.1 05  According to the most common medieval taxonomy 
of terms, metaphorical predications are the most remote forms of predication. 
These include anthropomorphisms as well as comparisons of God to other parts 
of creation. Since God is compared to things with essential qualities that are 
incompatible with God’s nature (such as being extended, temporal, imperfect, 
finite), these predications tell us the least about what God actually is like.  
Literal predication, the category of greatest concern for my purposes, 
includes univocal, equivocal, and analogical forms of predication.1 06  Scholastic 
philosophers tended to favor analogy since it did not commit them to attributing 
creaturely properties to God. Candidates for predication include proportional 
analogy or “proper” analogy, attributive analogies, and analogies of imitation or 
participation.1 07  Proportional analogy takes mathematic and logic as models for 
divine analogy. Attributive analogy is an analogy of metaphysical dependence, 
according to which one constituent in the analogy is metaphysically prior to the 
other and the source of the qualities that form the basis of the analogy. 
                                                 
1 05 Freddoso n.d. 
1 06 When we predicate univocally of God, claims such as “God has knowledge like man has 
knowledge” mean that God has knowledge of the same species or kind that the term 
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designates homonyms such as “the bar” that exists fo r the purpose of drinking away graduate 
student woes and “the bar” that two which lawyers are admitted when they show themselves 
qualified to practice law: Finally , analogical predication is employed when what is predicated is 
not identical in two propositions but importantly related in some way . If we predicate 
analogically of God, then when we say  “God has knowledge like man has knowledge” we are not 
signify ing the same form of knowledge that humans have (as is the case with univocal 
predication); instead we are claiming that while God’s knowledge is somehow significantly 
related to man’s knowledge, the two terms “knowledge” are not identical.  
1 07  Ashworth 1999 
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Analogies of imitation or participation take attributive analogy one step further 
so that the quality or qualities that are the subject of the analogy are actually 
shared between the two constituents rather than just in a dependency relation. 
Aquinas argued in favor of using attributive analogy to predicate things of God, 
arguing that our ontological dependence on God necessitates that our words for 
attributes like “good” indicate a posterior-prior relationship (following 
Aristotle). In contrast, Cajetan contended that (with the exception of the term 
“being,” which was properly an attributive analogical predication) most 
theological predications of God should be thought of as proportional 
predications.1 08   
There is an obvious parallel between Barth’s objection and the worries 
that motivated medieval philosophers to favor analogical theories of divine 
predication. Barth thinks our human words, thoughts, and ideas are inadequate 
simply due to the transcendent nature of God, and it seems to follow that even if 
God enables us to use such language by his grace, our words are nevertheless 
empty when so divorced from their typical, world-derived meanings. If God has 
to intercede and elevate our language in order to make it appropriate for 
discourse about the divine, we nevertheless do not understand whatever it is we 
are saying so long as our earthly ideas remain in their bereft state in respect to 
the nature of God.  
If we take Barth’s critique of theological language to heart, the 
problematic gap between a human agent’s theological language and God himself 
                                                 
1 08 McIrney 2011 
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reemerges in Hector’s theory. Even the normative trajectory of words guides 
concept use, and even if the concepts themselves are subject to external norms 
established by this trajectory, my concepts are merely informed by this 
trajectory as I interact with the world; these norms are not constitutive of my 
mental content when it comes to concepts. I may inherit the concept of the God 
of Abraham from an authoritative source, however, this does not guarantee that 
the concept I inherit is not in some way limited by facts about human cognition, 
nor does it mean that errors human inference will not in some way damage the 
concept as I navigate the world. 
Hector further relies on Barth in defending his view of theological 
language from Barth’s objection. When our language serves a theological 
purpose, these words maintain some continuity with their worldly uses, and in 
being elevated to theological status, the “use and meaning of ordinary concepts 
are fulfilled by their application to God” and “restored to their original object” 
(italics original).1 09  In other words, Hector argues that Barth affirmed theology 
by the analogy of attribution.1 1 0  Hector likens Barth’s version of analogy to the 
Christian doctrine of justification: We predicate only by God’s gracious 
willingness to apply human concepts to himself, and we do so by faith that these 
inadequate theological concepts are on the right trajectory. Barth’s version of 
analogy is importantly different from someone like Aquinas’s by Hector’s lights, 
because this way of looking at predication is not a departure from ordinary 
                                                 
1 09 Ibid pp. 130-31. 
1 1 0 Ibid p. 140. 
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human word use.1 1 1  Both theological and ordinary concepts have this forward-
looking orientation in a semantic externalist view; it is not that the relevant 
theological and ordinary terms stand at a distance, with only attributive analogy 
linking the two. There are not sets of “idea-like meanings” for terms like “wise” 
or “loving” that are merely connected by analogy; human concepts are applied 
to God with the expectation that they will be corrected and fulfilled by the very 
thing that grounds them: God himself. 
The problem with Hector’s explanation of attributive analogy is that it 
fails to be substantially different from previous accounts of analogy despite 
being embedded in semantic externalism. If Hector does indeed take his view to 
employ analogy of attribution, Hector is indeed positing a metaphysical 
relationship between human ideas of theologically-relevant terms (e.g., wisdom) 
and what these terms actually signify when predicated of God. That is, to say 
our human concepts can be applied to God because God is their cause, they  are 
only derivatively applied to creatures, and these facts manifest a relationship 
between the two concepts that enable us to meaningfully predicate of God, is to 
reinstantiate the gappy metaphysical framework that Hector finds so 
unappealing. Let me explain how. 
As I have repeatedly stated, Hector’s worries about traditional accounts 
of theological language have to do with the way our ideas stand at a remove 
from God and the empirical subjects of our language. Hector patently rejects 
what he identifies as “essentialist-correspondentist metaphysics,” the notion 
                                                 
1 1 1  Ibid pp. 141 -42. 
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that our minds must accurately represent mind-independent essences with 
ideas and concepts, and  he thinks that the best way to do this is to deflate the 
metaphysical commitments of theological terms.1 1 2  He thinks classical ways of 
construing concepts are little more than a fantasy, anyway,1 1 3  and advocates 
instead for a rule-following, inferentialist view of concepts. 
Contra Hector, though, if one is a theological realist, semantic 
externalism  is “correspondentist” and “essentialist” on his rendering. If the way 
we can be sure our human concepts successfully allow us to speak meaningfully 
of God is due to God’s position as the ultimate cause or that from which our 
relevant traits are derived, we are making the metaphysically-robust claim that 
there is something that God-in-himself is like, and this is what our words refer 
to despite that fact that we do not have ideas or concepts of God himself. 
Analogy of attribution only dodges criticism’s like Barth’s by denying that our 
earthly concepts are not themselves applicable to God. Rather, our concepts 
must bear some important relationship to God insofar as our wisdom, 
goodness, etc., is attributable to him as the ultimate source of these things.  
Neither semantic externalism nor Barth’s particular form of analogy save 
Hector’s view from the metaphysical problems found with classical notions of 
analogy. Even if Hector protests that, unlike classical theologians, semantic 
externalism offers a forward-looking trajectory for words like “wise,” and on his 
account it is a trajectory that is no less than safeguarded by the Spirit, 
                                                 
1 1 2 Ibid pp. 14-16, 45-46. 
1 1 3 Ibid pp. 49-52. 
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essentialism is still implicit in his view. This is because semantic externalism 
only guarantees reference: When an agent says, “God is wise,” she can 
successfully refer so long as she is complicit in public use and the authoritative 
tokening and understanding of that word. On Hector’s view, the agent can 
successful attribute a property to God by merely meaning, “Moses said God has 
some property x where wise is property x.” So far so good. What is not 
guaranteed on semantic externalism is that agent using a term have any 
understanding of what the term itself means or that he has any particular 
mental content that reflects the object of reference. At best, on some iterations 
of semantic externalism, the agent is expected to grasp a stereotype and have 
the right intention. A stereotype does not amount to an accurate description 
though, and that there is a precondition of grasping a stereotype does not tell us 
how such a stereotype can be acquired in the first place.   
The fact that the terms are protected from being woefully misused or 
dramatically changing by the Spirit does not supply users of the term with 
helpful conceptual content; it only guarantees future reference. Even if we claim 
that such terms will have their “fulfillment” in God as Hector does,1 1 4  semantic 
externalism does not supply us the content we need unless we first have some 
sense of what it is that is signified by the word we should expect to be fulfilled. 
Essentialism in itself, though, is not so bad. Essentialism in its most basic sense 
is merely the thesis that individuals have an identifying characterization or, in 
laymen’s terms, that to be something means that there is something it is like to 
                                                 
1 1 4 Ibid p. 142. 
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be that thing. Removed from the technical uses of the term outside of specific 
metaphysical doctrines, there seems no incentive to deny essentialism in itself. 
Semantic externalism was intended, in part, to explain the process by 
which humans identify kinds. Implicit in a meaningful reference (say, to water), 
is a commitment to its public use: Whatever that is, it is what we call “water.” If 
scientists discover that is H2 O, I can identify H2 O with my reference to water 
because semantic externalism presumes that meaningful talk takes place in a 
linguistic community with experts. I may not have been able to provide a 
description of water at the time, but the meaning of the word “water” includes 
H20 regardless of the state of my mind. Somewhat notoriously, natural kind 
terms turn out to be necessary on semantic externalism: The moment a term is 
coined and baptized via ostension, its meaning is determined by the stuff that is 
that.  
Relatedly, one would expect that whatever it is for God to be wise is 
determined by when we receive its authoritative tokening in revelation: The 
metaphysics of wisdom is set, and we may not know yet how to define the term 
“wisdom.” Regardless of the state of our minds, we can refer to God’s wisdom  
and intend for our term to be defined by whatever God’s wisdom actually is. We 
expect our words to correspond to the fact of the matter about what God is like, 
and although word use requires that one stand in proper relationship to that 
tokening via chain of transmission or linguistic community consisting of 
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experts, one can successfully refer without being committed to what the object 
of one’s reference will turn out to be, metaphysically speaking.1 1 5   
Strangely, though, this metaphysically neutral position is not the one 
Hector adopts with regard to what actually corresponds to our words and ideas 
for the divine. By adopting attributive analogy in response to Barth’s objection, 
Hector seems to have robbed himself of what it is that makes semantic 
externalism so helpful in the first place. Instead of appropriating semantic 
externalism’s forward-looking, agnostic position, Hector reintroduces 
predication by analogy to finite human concepts at this juncture. Such a move is 
not entirely unwarranted: One would imagine that God appropriated words 
signifying human concepts for a reason. However, in so doing, Hector can no 
longer make the claim that he is merely proposing a theory of “rule-following” 
rather than a traditional view of predication. 
To successfully engage in theological discourse, Hector’s agent must not 
only refer and follow rules, but also speculate on the metaphysical relationship 
between concepts like human wisdom and God’s wisdom. Theological words 
maintain some continuity with both their earthly uses and the human concepts 
these words signify, and in being elevated to theological status, the “use and 
meaning of ordinary concepts are fulfilled by their application to God” and 
“restored to their original object” (italics original). If this is the case, “theology 
without metaphysics” fails to be a new theory at all. Like classical theologians 
                                                 
1 1 5 See Hector on Janet Martin Soskice’s use of direct reference and, by extension, Kripke and 
Putnam, on pp. 169 ff. 
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before him, Hector is forced to rely on positing a metaphysical relationship 
between finite human concepts and what they might correspond to in their 
divine fulfillment in order to show that that human concepts are indeed 
appropriate for theological use. 
Traditionally, attributive analogy presumes a prior-posterior 
metaphysical framework. Following the metaphysics of Aristotle, classical 
theologians claimed that effects always resemble their causes, and since God is 
the ultimate cause of his creatures, we can expect humanly wisdom to resemble 
its cause, divine wisdom. This is the basis for the claim that our earthly concept 
for wisdom is appropriate for application to God: We predicate wisdom of God 
only with respect to the prior-posterior relationship and resemblance that we 
expect obtains between the two. 
This seems to be the kind of analogy Hector has in mind.1 1 6  Hector quotes 
Aquinas on God’s precedence as the cause and existential ground of creaturely 
attributes. One can see how this might fit nicely with Hector’s insistence that his 
theory of theological language is more causal and dispositional than intentional 
and mentalistic: God is the ultimate cause of all the empirical causes that result 
in us having the reliable responsive dispositions that are the bread and butter of 
Hector’s theory. But this too is a position that is unavailable to Hector, for in his 
rejection of other forms of analogy, he makes the puzzling claim that all forms of 
analogy are inadequate for divine predication because analogy itself is a 
                                                 
1 1 6 Hector explicitly rejects the other main form of analogy, “proper” or “proportional” analogy, 
in which the relationship between human predicates and the div ine is thought to be scope, 
degree, or proportion (see p. 140). 
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creaturely word.1 1 7  Indeed, the attributive aspect of attributive analogy 
represents a robust metaphysical claim about existence, causes, and substances 
that someone like Hector should want to avoid if he wants keep his theory free 
of “metaphysics.” Nevertheless, it is analogy itself that draws Hector’s concern. 
Resultantly, Hector does not posit any particular relationship between 
theological and mundane predicates and our ideas of them except to state that 
the relationship between them most closely resembles justification of the sinner 
solely through faith.1 1 8   
It is difficult to imagine what Hector might intend by  this description. 
Perhaps he means that God extends grace in permitting the predicating human 
to speak of the divine even though the agent herself is inadequate to the task. 
The agent has faith that her terms  succeed in referring to God and her earthly 
descriptions do in fact describe God, even though it is not in her power to 
accomplish on her own. One expects, though, that the classical theologians 
likewise thought it was through grace and faith that we speak of God; this still 
does not answer how and in what way our terms apply.  
Perhaps instead Hector means to indicate a more modest position than 
this: We do not know the nature of the relationship between our human 
concepts to God’s actual likeness, but we can have faith that they do apply in 
some way given the mysterious way God’s justification applies to us. But this 
means we do not necessarily have any understanding of what God is like at all; 
                                                 
1 1 7  Ibid p. 140. 
1 1 8 Ibid pp. 139-142. 
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we cannot even posit the causal and resemblance relationships advocated by the 
Medieval, and we certainly do not have any mental content by which we 
represent him since human concepts themselves are unfit for description of 
God. Hector’s theory of theological predication begins to look like apophaticism 
or agnosticism. 
Perhaps Hector did not intend to deny analogy of attribution but only 
intends his comments about justification to bolster his view. In either case, our 
efforts at divine predication are as gappy as ever: Either we successfully refer, 
with no hope of ever obtaining the mental content that allows us to have some 
idea of what God is like (because of Barth’s transcendence objection to human 
concepts and ideas, including analogy, still hold), or I can predicate of God via 
attributive analogy and inherit all of the classical “essentialist-correspondentist” 
problems that come along with it.  
So much for Barth’s novel solution to the transcendence objection to 
divine predication. This leaves the reader with yet two more problems: Hector’s 
account of the formation of concepts and the nature of description. Turning to 
my second point, Hector thinks his view benefits from “seeing as” theories of 
concept use: Since the agent is not making a conscious inference in their 
theological thinking, but merely “seeing as,” there is no mediation between God 
himself and our language: 
...a community of skilled musicians, for instance, can hear certain sounds 
as a particular combination of notes; a community of baseball umpires 
can see certain pitches as balls or strikes; a community of wine-drinkers 
can taste a wine as of a certain variety— such that members of these 
communities apply the relevant concepts without having to think about 
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doing so. So then: when one has become reliably disposed to respond 
non-inferentially to certain objects by applying appropriate concepts, one 
automatically perceives such objects as thus-and-so, without having to 
deliberate about what concept to apply...in the vast majority of cases, 
merely paying attention to an object causes one to apply the relevant 
concept. Once one has mastered a concept, accordingly, the appearance 
of whatever it applies to causes one non-inferentially to apply it, in 
consequence of which one need not think of concept application as 
introducing an intermediate, inference-like step between an object’s 
presence and one’s perception of it. (Ibid p. 189) 
 
It is possible, goes Hector’s argument, for one to see God “non-
inferentially” through the Holy Spirit, much in the way one unconsciously tastes 
a great glass of wine as a Bordeaux or sees teal instead of blue. This gets 
inference out of the way, removing an opportunity for human reasoning to 
interject itself between an experience of God and one’s mental content of God.  
Contrary to Hector’s supposition, this only further complicates the 
problem, and it is not due to the threat of relativity or solipsism.1 1 9  Even if we 
assume with Donald Davidson that the world is friendly enough to give us 
adequately similar conceptual schemes, there is still a problem with Hector’s 
account of inference. The most pernicious issue is whether Hector ’s agent has in 
fact avoided inference at all in her act of seeing as. Research demonstrates that 
our brains have many such shortcuts that abridge inferences acquired at some 
point in long form.1 2 0  Instead of consciously working through lines of reasoning, 
our brain engages in “system 1” thinking that allows us to reach our conclusion 
more quickly with relative success. The fact that Hector’s agent is not aware that 
                                                 
1 1 9 See Hector’s defense against this objection on pp.192ff.  
1 20 Kahneman 2011. 
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she is engaging in inference in the moment does not entail that seeing as is not 
predicated upon such inference or perhaps even being processed unconsciously.  
Further, the problem for divine predication is not with inference per se, 
but rather the finiteness and inadequacy of human cognition. Even if an agent 
does not engage in any kind of inference in her seeing as, on Hector’s scheme 
she is still bound by concepts formed and taught to her by other humans. Hector 
himself acknowledges that many of our mastered concepts are indeed taught. 
Such concepts will still be inadequate to the task of thinking and talking about 
God simply due to the gap between God’s transcendence and our finite 
cognition. Further still, concepts themselves are not the only problem but 
creatureliness broadly construed. Even in perception, the agent is bound by her 
creatureliness: All finite processes are potential restraints to her attempts to 
meaningfully  predicate of God.  
In any case, whether he realizes it or not, Hector is ultimately in 
agreement with many classical theists in their theories of human cognition. 
Hector’s agent requires concepts, and those concepts are human in nature 
simply in virtue of being realized in the form of a human mental state. If we 
cannot see God without prerequisite concepts that are part of our cognition, we 
cannot identify when our perception ends and our conceptual reconfiguration 
begins. God himself belongs solely in a noumenal-like realm to which we have 
no access; it is difficult to see how  Hector is in any position to  disagree with 
John Hick and his quasi-realist claims. Surely the humans relaying our 
theological concepts can be in error, or we may fail to correctly acquire an 
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important concept, and thus create an even greater gap between God-as-he-is 
and our clouded understanding of him. And unconscious uses of such concepts 
may very well employ inferences that we are simply unaware of, as so much of 
our cognition may be. 
Let me summarize: So far I have shown that Hector’s use of analogy 
either eliminates meaningful God talk, or requires him to adopt a metaphysical, 
“gappy” stance that is problematic for his overall project. I have also shown that 
Hector’s use of concepts is gappy, as human inference and limitations restrict 
the ways God can be the subject of human intentionality. Hector can maintain 
that language plays a role in the formation of human mental content, but his 
view of concepts leaves us with (a) the interjection of human inference 
mediating our ideas of God, and (b) arguably no sense of what it is about human 
concepts (e.g., wisdom) that finds its fulfillment in God. 
My final comments lay at the junction of analogy and inference in 
Hector’s theory. As stated above, Hector seems to both deny and embrace 
attributive analogy. Nowhere is Hector’s employment of analogy of attribution 
more significant than his discussion of attribution and description. Here he 
claims that descriptions of God are indeed possible, the “guiding principle of 
which is that God’s attributes must be understood in light of God, rather than 
God being understood in terms of antecedently constructed categories” and the 
subject must precede the predicate.1 2 1  
                                                 
1 21  Ibid p. 135. 
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I have already discussed problems with the predicates and their related 
concepts that are necessary for human description of God. If we do grant that 
such description is consistent with Hector’s overall view and humanly possible, 
it still has the result that the theologian cannot extrapolate from divine 
descriptions because such extrapolation would make the created the guide for 
our reasoning rather than the Creator. Hector distrusts inference, and even 
logical constructs like analogy are too pitiful for theological use. By what 
grounds, then, do we arrive at extra-biblical doctrine? 
We would have cause to be very uncertain of many of Christian theology’s 
principal claims and bulwarks against heresy, as these proceed from revelatory 
statements to conclusions that are guided by our common, everyday inferences. 
After all, these terms begin as references in which the Church commits to a 
trajectory of the term. When it comes to fleshing out the term into anything 
conceptual, inferences are viewed suspiciously on Hector’s account, and they 
are the sort of things that create a gap between our language and what God 
himself is like. Statements about God that are derived from inference, such as 
the doctrine of simplicity, immutability, and timelessness, are not the well-
founded formulations of God’s nature we make them out to be. So goes natural 
theology and classical theism. 
VI. Conclusion 
My discussion of Hector in the prior section brings into focus a series of 
questions. First, predication is not just a problem of language but also mental 
content. Human mental content is just as limited and finite as human language. 
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A theory of divine predication, then, must address the following concern: How  
can we have divine mental content, and what theory can satisfy our theological 
desires and needs? 
Finally, it is difficult to deny the role of inference in the formulation of 
the attributes that make up many of the classical doctrines central to the major 
monotheistic religions. One only need to pick up a copy of Summa Theologica 
to see how Aquinas would have us work out our understanding of God with fear 
and trembling. When the Church commits itself to doctrines and creeds, it takes 
itself to be clarifying and spelling out what is already contained in and entailed 
by the terms we already employ. Is this really a product of inference? If so, is 
that truly so bad?  
Cognitive science and philosophy of mind, then, may prove useful 
resources for philosophers or religion and theologians alike. Theologians have a 
stake in theories of mental content and intentionality. Future research that 
brings these respective domains together has the potential to yield considerable 





Metaphor and the Mind of God in Nevi’im 
I. Introduction 
In The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, Yoram Hazony contrasts the 
uses of metaphor in Nevi’im and the New Testament. According to Hazony, 
metaphor is employed by Jesus to obscure teachings, but the prophets of the 
Hebrew Scriptures use metaphor to make teachings intelligible.1 2 2  Hazony’s 
treatment of Nevi’im is arguably the most influential assessment of the 
prophetic writings as a means of philosophical argument. However, his 
understanding of metaphor is too simplistic to capture the scope of 
metaphorical statements made by the Hebrew prophets. In the first section of 
this paper, I explain why Hazony’s characterization of Nevi’im fails to 
adequately address the unique contributions of these writings as a genre. I 
consider three types of passages that appear incompatible with Hazony’s 
framework. Ultimately, I think the prophets intend rather to build upon what is 
already recognized as the path to the good life by providing further insight into 
yet a deeper and more complex facet of morality. Prophetic instances of 
metaphor are used not merely to generate moral teachings about the good life 
and the consequences of human behavior; they are also used to describe the 
motivations and dispositions of God.1 2 3  Indeed, these metaphorical statements 
                                                 
1 2 2  See pp. 84-85 in The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (2012).  
1 2 3  E.g., Jeremiah 3:1 , 6- 13; Isaiah 49:15-16; Hosea 1 -2. 
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often occur in texts that also describe God with what I will argue are non-
metaphorical terms signifying emotions like ָרַחם (compassionate) and ָכַעס 
(angry).  
In the section that follows, I give my alternative to the position that the 
prophets meant to convey moral imperatives and a theory about the good life. 
Often the prophetic texts purport to give us insight into the reasons why God 
acts as well as the responses from God we should anticipate given the ethical 
decisions made by humans. Many of these passages can be construed as a kind 
of moral psychology of God. While Hazony’s and Eleonore Stump’s respective 
works on the uniqueness of Hebrew narrative and second-personal knowledge 
emphasize that narrative is uniquely suited to speak to us about certain aspects 
of God’s nature, a detailed treatment of prophetic writings as a source of 
second-personal knowledge has not yet been articulated.1 2 4  I suggest that an 
important set of philosophical arguments are advanced by the prophets in ways 
not captured by current interpretive methodologies: The prophetic writings 
reveal important moral facts about God via metaphor and univocal descriptions 
of God’s point of view. One consequence of this view is that, against Hazony, I 
contend that some prophetic language is intentionally opaque. By employing 
metaphor and univocal descriptions of God, the prophets disclose information 
about God’s nature and the ways in which we should respond to him in both 
action and emotion.  
                                                 
1 2 4  Scripture and the Authority of God by  Y oram Hazony (2012), and Wandering in Darkness 
by  Eleonore Stump (2010). 
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If Dru Johnson’s account of biblical epistemology is correct, the sort of 
knowledge advocated by Scripture involves reliance on authenticated 
authorities and participation in ritual.1 2 5  Additionally, Stump contends that 
Franciscan knowledge is an important type of knowledge that involves “social 
cognition or mind reading.”1 2 6  Appealing to the works of Johnson and Stump, I 
argue that the Hebrew prophets may in fact be advancing certain arguments 
about the emotions and motivations of God that are instructive to readers.1 2 7  A 
moral psychology of God is especially well-suited to promote the moral 
development of individuals. Drawing on Linda Zagzebski’s divine motivation 
theory and recent work on exemplarism,1 2 8  I contend that the prophetic writings 
serve the important function of allowing us to see into the ethical life of God. 
Zagzebski persuasively argues that God reveals both motive and emotion 
through the Incarnation; in my paper, I augment this claim to include the 
revelation of the Father through the prophets. Through the prophets, God 
functions as an exemplar for those receiving the words of the prophets. 
PART ONE 
II. Hazony, Metaphor, and the Prophets 
                                                 
1 2 5  Biblical Knowing (2013), pp. 47 , 140-149. 
1 2 6  Wandering in the Darkness (2010), pp. 71-73. 
1 2 7  However, I anticipate that one consequence of my  v iew is that some moral instruction 
contained in the prophetic writings will only be accessible to readers with important 
corresponding dispositions and inaccessible to those without them.  




In his recent work on the Hebrew Scriptures, Hazony elaborates on the 
various types of philosophical arguments given in the Hebrew Scriptures. These 
arguments roughly correspond to the genre of the biblical work. For example, 
narratives make arguments via contrasts or typologies; in contrast, the 
prophetic writings primarily employ metaphor.1 2 9  He illustrates how one might 
exegete particular arguments and philosophical positions through a series of 
case studies. From what I can tell, Hazony does not take himself to be giving an 
exhaustive list of the ways arguments might be articulated in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. Given the way Hazony aligns argumentative strategy with particular 
rhetorical modes, though, and the fact that these rhetorical modes occupy the 
vast majority of the texts, I would be surprised if Hazony did not think that his 
taxonomy accounts for the greatest plurality of arguments that appear in the 
Tanakh.1 3 0  
 For my purposes, it is best to focus on Hazony’s treatment of the 
prophets. According to Hazony, the prophets typically advocate for particular 
views or actions in ways that encourage the reader to extrapolate from the 
prophet’s words and take a larger view of the prophet’s topic.1 3 1  The 
                                                 
1 2 9  Hazony  2012, p. 66, 68. 
1 3 0  See p. 66, where Hazony  aligns modes of argument to particular genres of writing i n the 
Hebrew Scriptures. His discussion the purpose of the Hebrew Bible is similar div ided along 
lines of genre (pp. 47 -65, especially 63ff). On p. 84, he introduces the discussion of techniques 
unique to the prophets as grounds for interpreting them as making particular arguments. Here 
again, genre is tied to argumentative methodology in a way  that suggests while other modes of 
argument may  exist in the Hebrew Scriptures in addition to those Hazony discusses, the very 
genre on the texts necessitate that they will be flush with the modes of argument Hazony  
describes (should he be correct in his analy sis).  
1 3 1  Ibid p. 84. 
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contemporary reader has trouble identifying these arguments because of the 
way they are conditioned to approach the Hebrew Scriptures. Today’s readers 
do not recognize the way these ancient writers make arguments, and the poetic 
form of the prophets is foreign to many of those who want to understand their 
messages. Further, prophets are assumed to be engaged in some form of future 
telling or “the revelation of secrets.”1 3 2  Perhaps most frustratingly for Hazony, 
readers even expect the prophets to obscure their own meaning and use 
metaphors to conceal their messages. Hazony calls this “esotericism,” a 
disposition to the texts for which the writers of the New Testament (and their 
depiction of Jesus) are at least partially responsible.  
Jesus’s use of parables in the New Testament should instead serve as 
contrast to the prophets, as he is depicted “speaking in parables whose meaning 
is hidden so as to be inaccessible to many or most of those who hear them.” 1 3 3  
Hazony writes,  
...the association of biblical metaphors with parables and riddles 
provided a part of the explanation for why the prophetic orations 
of the Hebrew Scriptures seem, to many readers, to be something 
quite different from reasoned discourse. But there, too, what is 
involved is the importation into the older Hebrew texts of 
purposes that are quite alien to them. As far as I can tell, the use of 
metaphor to obscure God’s teaching from certain segments of the 
population occurs rarely, if at all, in the orations of the prophets of 
Israel...Indeed, the constant reliance on metaphor in the Israelite 
prophetic orations seems to have precisely the opposite purpose: 
Its aim is to make difficult subjects easier to understand for the 
                                                 
1 3 2  Ibid p. 86. 
1 3 3  Ibid p. 84. 
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broad audiences to whom prophetic oratory was, in the first 
instance, intended to appeal.1 3 4  
 
While the prophets’ respective audiences might find ethical theory and 
abstract reasoning challenging, the prophets render these ideas intelligible in 
their orations by translating important thoughts into the language of analogy 
and metaphor. The prophets draw on things familiar to their audiences in an 
effort to place important moral arguments within their reach, where, to apply 
Hazony’s thinking to Isaiah 5, the common sight of a vineyard might stand in 
for the people of Israel, and the relatable vineyard owner for God.1 3 5   
 So far Hazony and I are in agreement. I agree that contemporary 
audiences are naive to the genre and aims of the prophetic writings. They seem 
to be aimed at making timely indictments and exhortations to the people of 
Israel far more than they are engaged in future-telling or mystical teaching. Like 
Hazony, I think that metaphor is often used to generate moral teachings in the 
prophets, and I concede that many of these instances of metaphor are intended 
to render teachings intelligible to their audience. Hazony and I must part ways, 
though, when he begins his exegesis of the book of Jeremiah.  
It is helpful to frame what follows in a comment Hazony makes about all 
of the prophets: “What they are searching for is, in fact, lawfulness, in moral 
order--those laws that are God’s will, in the sense that they lead, naturally and 
                                                 
1 3 4  Ibid p. 85. 
1 3 5  Ibid p. 85. 
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reliably, to the life and the good.”1 3 6  Hazony’s point here is that the underlying 
assumption implicit to all of the prophetic writings is that there is some kind of 
moral law at work. The prophets expect there to be consequences following 
deeds: deleterious consequences to immoral actions, and whatever 
consequences amount to the good life following those who embrace the moral 
law.  
In a section tellingly called “Profit and Pain,” Hazony writes,  
If the laws given Israel by God are the natural law for men, then 
these laws will teach us what we must do if we want to attain life 
and the good, as individuals and as nations, By the same token, if 
we do not obey these laws, we will quickly begin to feel the pain of 
disintegration and collapse that will naturally follow.1 3 7  
 
The picture painted by Hazony in his exegesis of Jeremiah is of a 
consequentialist or at least teleological moral theory emerging from the 
reasoning of the prophet. Jeremiah uses a term, יָָעי, which is often translated 
profit, benefit, avail, and gain. Moral laws are what men need to survive and 
thrive; ignoring the moral law will result in disastrous consequences because 
humans need to do what is right just as they need water for survival. The moral 
imperatives in the prophets are natural laws that benefit humankind. Turning 
from wrongdoing and living in obedience to God leads to a state of flourishing. 
The prophetic writings exist to illuminate this important relationship between 
morality and human nature; thus Jeremiah describes the pagan gods that have 
                                                 
1 3 6  Ibid p. 89. 
1 3 7  Hazony  p. 177. 
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no benefit to humankind and the way in which God is like water to his people. 
Jeremiah’s warnings amount to an argument about those things that profit 
humans and those that do not.  
The centrality of this argument to the text is illuminated by a 
fundamental misunderstanding Hazony identifies in relation to his point about 
natural law and human benefit: The common prophetic phrase many translate 
as the “in the end of days” in fact means “in the course of time.” According to 
Hazony, passages frequently construed as pertaining to apocalypse or judgment 
are really just about how things turn out, the moral order of things, and the way 
moral laws order the world so that certain actions produce certain states of 
affairs.1 3 8  It is unclear in exactly what way Hazony intends us to interpret “in the 
course of time.” He does not specify whether the natural law is good for man 
because it consists of those things that contribute to human flourishing given 
the way God made humans, or if God intends humans to enjoy a good life, and 
he therefore advises a natural law that will result in their good. In other words, 
it is not apparent whether Hazony reads Jeremiah as making a consequentialist 
argument about what is beneficial to man, or if he thinks Jeremiah has a 
eudaimonist view about what it means to be flourishing humans. In any case, 
what is clear is that Hazony thinks the prophets are primarily concerned with 
axiomatic principles and how they contribute to human wellbeing of some kind 
or another. 
                                                 
1 3 8  Ibid p. 89. 
96 
 
Indeed, Hazony’s position is rather strong compared to those with less 
optimistic positions (say, a fideist or skeptical theist) concerning the way evils 
affect humans in the world. He thinks the ills that befall trespassers of the law is 
sufficient to show that the law is the “path of what is beneficial and good.”1 3 9  
Jeremiah’s argument is interpreted as the thesis that “pain and hardship” follow 
the violation of God’s law.1 4 0  These consequences are not merely external. 
Ignoring or rejecting the teaching of God and the moral law has psychological 
consequences, among them the distortion of human thought. The human mind 
is what Hazony calls “arbitrary,” his translation of לב שרירות , where arbitrary 
means the tendency of the human mind or heart to “walk away from those 
things that are true human ends rather than towards them.” 1 4 1  Humankind is 
bad at identifying the good and those things that are in our best interest. 
Hazony’s Jeremiah argues that violation of the moral law and false ideas about 
the good render one progressively more insensitive to the truth about the good. 
Remember, though, that this moral devolution is not the result of an act of God 
per se, but rather the native consequences that follow false understanding and 
                                                 
1 3 9  Ibid p. 177. 
1 4 0  Ibid p. 181. 
1 4 1  Ibid p. 171-2. 
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wicked deeds.1 4 2  The word of God, delivered through the prophets, serves to 
correct such errant thinking and behavior. 1 4 3   
 Perhaps the above summary is too drastic a characterization of his 
position. It is unclear, after all, whether Hazony’s claim is that pain and 
hardship follow the deviation from God’s law necessarily, and following God’s 
law only makes such terrible events less likely, or if he holds the stronger view 
that lack of pain, as well as blessing, necessarily follow obedience to the law. If I 
my prior summary of Hazony is too radical, it seems Hazony is at least 
committed to the claim that obedience to the natural law diminishes the 
occurrence of pain and provides some benefits, and that disobedience results in 
at least some negative consequences, such as a decreased ability to recognize 
what is beneficial for humans. In my view, this is also the most charitable 
reading of Hazony for another reason; namely, the theodicetic elements in 
Hebrew Scriptures do not endorse a consequentialist ethics such that the moral 
law is constituted of whatever ultimately leads to our good. Arguably, it does not 
even endorse the eudaimonist perspective that habituation into good actions 
                                                 
1 4 2  “One of the more remarkable aspects of Jeremiah’s theory of knowledge is the emphasis the 
prophet places on consequences of maintaining false opinions Jeremiah repeatedly tells us that 
false opinion has painful consequences, which bear down upon and punish those whose 
understanding is false” (Hazony p. 183).  
1 4 3  “Here, then, is Jeremiah’s answer to the question of whether we can escape the false words 
and false understanding that result from the arbitrariness of our minds. True, the mind is 
deceitful, and when it fixes on a mistaken way  of seeing things, even painful consequences will 
not suffice to shake them loose. But God’s word is like a hammer that shatters rock. It enters the 
world and takes on a reality so overwhelming that false conce ptions, no matter how tightly we 
cling to them, are destroyed before it. Once freed from these false conceptions, a new 
understanding can arise in the minds of men, one that reflects the truth. Knowledge, then, may 
elude the men of a given time and place. But it is coming. And all men, it would appear, have a 
chance of attaining it ‘in the end’” (Hazony  p. 186 -7). 
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leads to the good life.1 4 4  (More on this later.) However, it does emphasize 
painful consequences that follow from the rejection of God and his commands, 
and it discusses at the length the errors in judgment that lead one to forsake 
God’s way for idolatry and wickedness. 
Such means-ends reasoning certainly does permeate the prophets, but 
even still I am skeptical that this really characterizes the chief aims of any of the 
prophets, much less Jeremiah. Most of biblical literature includes the theme of 
moral lawfulness and the importance of obedience to God’s will (save, perhaps, 
Esther and Songs). On Hazony’s view, the prophets continue to ponder God’s 
will and the path to the good life, perhaps making these ideas more salient to 
the people of Israel by driving points home with graphic poetry, personalized 
rebukes, and often scathing first-personal style.  
However, there seems to be ample evidence that explorations of the 
consequences that follow actions are not the central focus of prophetic writings.  
The next section examines three types of passages that are not readily 
reconciled to Hazony’s framework. For one, prophets often pronounce detailed 
criticisms of behavior after judgment is already declared and sometimes even 
after the judgment has already occurred. If the central aim of the prophets is to 
make moral order and natural law intelligible to their audiences, it seems they 
undermine their own purposes by addressing those who are too late to turn 
from their ways and avoid the terrible consequences. Further, things do not 
always turn out the ways we expect when we examine them as Hazony exhorts 
                                                 
1 4 4  See, for example, the books of Job or Ecclesiastes.  
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us to, “in the course of time.” The prophets describe at length individuals whose 
treatment does not obviously match their moral status, a strange state of affairs 
for those who would argue that benefit and harm are closely related to the 
natural law. Finally, the prophets put much of their writings to the use of 
exploring how things are for God and not how they are for man. While 
discussion of God’s perspective on the state of his relationship to people is 
certainly interesting, it does not directly contribute to one’s understanding of 
the natural law.   
I will briefly address my first two objections before describing the third at 
length, as I think the final category of passages turns out to be the most 
interesting for the philosophy of the Hebrew Scriptures. This is because it 
appears that the prophets build upon what their audience should already 
recognize as the path to the good life by providing further insight into yet a 
more profound and complex aspect of morality. They illuminate the emotional 





III. Textual Evidence from Nevi’im 
If prophetic utterances are intended primarily for the moral instruction 
of its audience, the timing of many prophetic texts undermine the prophets’ 
purposes. (I will focus my comments on the book of Jeremiah since this is the 
prophetic text chosen by Hazony; however, I think most if not all of the 
prophetic writings contain content relevant to at least one of my objections.) 
Prophets often deliver censure once judgment has already been determined and 
there is no possibility of God relenting if the people repent. For example, God 
appears to give terms according to which he will rescind his judgment in 
Jeremiah 3, but Jeremiah appears to be so persuaded that judgment will come 
that he even accuses the Lord of deception (4.10). The picture painted by the 
prophets is often that of immediate judgment, such as in Jer. 2 and 6. In fact, in 
the case of Jeremiah, the explicit expectation is that his audience will not heed 
his warnings about the dire consequences of their actions; in Jer. 7.27-29, we 
see that Jeremiah will declare God’s words to the people, but God advises the 
prophet in advance that the people will not listen to him. God even goes so far as 
to tell his people to not bother with praying because he will not listen (11.14).1 4 5   
Perhaps Hazony takes these writings to serve future audiences who will 
reflect back on the events leading to God’s judgments. This strikes me as 
                                                 
1 4 5  See also Jer. 13, in which Jeremiah destroys a belt to reflect the current state of affai rs for 
Judah; Jer. 15.2 in which judgment appears settled; Ez. 2 -11 , in which preaches judgement on 
Jerusalem and its leaders. In this last passage, the purpose of the book cannot be to bring about 
repentance in Jerusalem because Ezekiel is not even in Jer usalem, but far away in Baby lon, and 




unlikely for two reasons. First, we would need to ignore the explicit claims the 
prophetic writers make about their intended audiences. In the case of Jeremiah, 
orations are often preceded by statements about who the prophet is expected by 
God to address (e.g., Jerusalem in Jer. 2.1). Second, while the absence of any 
statement concerning future audiences may not be compelling evidence in itself, 
the prophets were likely familiar with the historical writings of the Hebrew 
Scriptures. In some cases, prophets may have even written portions of these 
historical chronicles.1 4 6  The historical writings, as Hazony himself notes, make 
use of a unique rhetorical style not employed in the prophetic writings (except 
in brief digressions, such as Jer. 21 and Is. 36, wherein the latter case Isaiah 
even appears to draw on the actual relevant historical passages as a source or 
vice versa), and further contain statements indicating that they were intended to 
function as a written history for the future people of Israel. Given the change in 
style and absence of any indication that these works were intended for a future 
audience (both of which were likely deliberate choices on the part of the 
prophetic authors), we should err on reading these texts as being directed at 
those explicitly mentioned in the text. 
Even if the prophetic writings are intended for future audiences and not 
for the prophets’ contemporaries, there are other passages that are not 
obviously amenable to the framework recommended by Hazony. If Hazony is 
correct, then the prophetic writings are intended to demonstrate what actions 
                                                 
1 4 6  For example, Ezra was long thought to author parts of First and Second Chronicles, First and 
Second Kings is traditionally attributed to Jeremiah, and the Talmud describes Samuel, Nathan 
and Gad as authoring First and Second Samuel.  
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lead to the good life and those actions that result in God’s judgment. However, 
there are many prophetic passages that resemble the seemingly unjust state of 
affairs in Job more than the teleological teachings of Hazony. Often 
consequences do not match behavior in the prophets. Jeremiah himself suffers 
alongside the objects of judgment in Lamentations even though he is an obvious 
case of someone who has God’s approval in his life and conduct. In other 
passages, God kills the obedient prophet Ezekiel’s wife and children (Ez. 24), 
and yet in the same book God promises rescue and assistance to those who had 
not yet repented (Ez. 34). The book of Hosea is a tragic case of suffering, and the 
good prophet Hosea’s misery is used to demonstrate that God will woo and love 
those who are yet unworthy, adulterous, and vile (Hosea 2). Even if one excuses 
the sufferings of the prophets as a special case, there is ample textual evidence 
of other incongruous consequences that are not unfortunate exceptions, but 
deliberate acts of God. In Ezekiel 37, God announces through the prophet not 
that he will rescue those who repent, but rather that he will rescue the wicked 
from their own sinful backsliding (v. 23).  In Ez. 21, God uses wicked Babylon as 
his sword and gives them Israel and Judah as plunder. Elsewhere in Jer. 25.9 
and 25.27, God calls Babylonian leader Nebuchadnezzar “my servant 
Nebuchadnezzar”1 4 7  when he was very wicked and idolatrous.1 4 8   
 So while there are many passages that are consistent with Hazony’s 
argumentative structure, there is an abundance of passages that cannot be 
                                                 
1 4 7  Unless otherwise stated, all quoted Bible passages are from the English Standard Version.  
1 4 8  Is. 44.28 includes a similar statement regarding the pagan king Cy rus. 
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interpreted using his framework. Hazony’s moral-instruction view may be a 
useful tool to understand a particular passage, especially when the author gives 
a direct indication that he is presenting his view for a contemporary audience 
within reach of the prophet, or when he indicates that deleterious consequences 
can be avoided through repentance. But this tool cannot be applied to large 
swaths of prophetic literature, and moreover, it cannot be derived from the 
entire rhetorical structure of the prophetic writings because too much of the 
content is incompatible with Hazony’s v iew. As I mentioned above, though, 
there is still another dimension prophetic discourse that is not easily subsumed 
under Hazony’s argumentative structure.  
This leads to my final objection to Hazony’s assessment of the 
philosophical status of Nevi’im. The most dramatic and unique contribution of 
the prophetic writings is undersold by Hazony. Large portions of Nevi’im are 
dedicated to  revealing a God’s-eye-view perspective on human events, whether 
or not this perspective will be of any help to the prophet’s stated audience. By 
God’s-eye-view, I mean to single out passages that seem dedicated to revealing 
God’s motivations, assessments, or even emotions. This also includes passages 
where God singles out the nature of the relationship between man and himself 
rather than the state of affairs between men. For example, in Jer 2.27, Jeremiah 
reports God’s disapproval that the people have “turned their backs to me and 
not their faces,” and in Jer. 2.31, God reflects on how the people have forgotten 
how he has treated them with the rhetorical statements, “Have I been a desert to 
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Israel or a land of great darkness? Why do my people say, ‘We are free to roam; 





IV. God’s Perspective in the Prophets 
 Given the variety of passages that do not neatly fit into Hazony’s 
description of the philosophical aims of the prophetic writings, it is worthwhile 
to look elsewhere for an explanation of what the prophets intended to achieve. 
The last category of passages discussed, those containing a “God’s-eye-view,” 
deserve closer attention as a unique contribution of Nevi’im. I contend that they 
should feature significantly into our attempts to understand the arguments of 
the prophets. In the sections that follow, I describe these passages at length and 
propose that they serve a unique rhetorical function in furthering a distinct 
philosophical position. More specifically, I explain how these passages provide a 
moral psychology of God and why such a moral psychology would be especially 
beneficial to Nevi’im’s audience.  
One feature of passages containing a God’s-eye-view is that God often 
invites people to reason from his perspective and not their own (Jer. 5.7-9). 
Surprisingly, when God does so, he does not say, as Hazony’s interpretation 
would indicate, look where your actions will lead you but instead look where I 
stand in relation to you. The word “unfaithful,” one indicating the state of a 
relationship between parties, is used repeatedly, indicating that one’s standing 
to God is at issue and not consequences to oneself.  
While subtle, it is important to stress that this is no trivial distinction. 
The difference between these two approaches to moral failing can be 
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illuminated by comparison to human relationships. Consider a parent who tells 
a child who recklessly texted while driving, “You could have died.” Such an 
indictment invites the child to consider the consequences of her behavior. 
Should the child change her behavior based on this reasoning, the motivation 
would presumably be to avoid future harm. In contrast, consider the parent who 
tells a child, “I am disappointed in you.” This statement does not necessarily 
invoke any deleterious potential consequences to the child. Should the child 
care about her parent’s opinion of her, then perhaps there is a negative 
consequence to the child involved. However, the child can just as readily decide 
that she does not care what her parent thinks (as I imagine many a teenager 
does) and eschew any negative consequences to herself. Should the child be 
moved by her parent’s judgment, it is likely because of the harm that has come 
to their relationship: An expectation or trust has been violated, and now the 
affective state of the parent has changed toward her child. If the trespass is large 
enough, it will change the way the two parties interact, as well as the way the 
parent views the child. By acknowledging and changing her bad behavior, the 
child is moving towards reconciliation or improved standing with her parent.   
Consider yet another case that is perhaps even more similar to the 
language used in the prophets. Suppose a parent prohibits a particular item or 
activity for a child and does so because it is in the child’s best interest. However, 
the child ignores her parent, and instead listens to a friend who recommends 
that which was prohibited. The child ultimately comes to harm. A parent might 
have two concerns. First, the parent might be concerned that if the child 
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continues in this behavior, she will come be harmed again in the future. The 
second and arguably the more important concern is that the child did not trust 
her parent over her friend.  
The latter concern might be more troubling because it stands to 
undermine other things the parent might do in the interest of the child. Further, 
it may cause the parent to wonder about the state of the relationship between 
the parent and child given where the child directed her trust and attention. 
Rather than merely be concerned about obedience, the wise parent would also 
worry that the child does not adequately know the parent and the extent of the 
parent’s devotion and wisdom. Similarly, when God’s people repeatedly ignore 
his commands for them, he begins to question whether the people know him at 
all. This lack of knowledge of God’s character is frequently brought up in 
relation to the immoral acts of humans. There are many calls to know God in 
the prophets, and proclamations of judgments often seem to boil down to God’s 
frustrations that his people do not know him (Jer. 2.5,8, 31; 4.22; 9.24).  
Even the descriptions of wrongdoing are frequently parsed in relational 
terms, as in 6.16-19 where God proclaims the people “have not listened to Me, I 
said and they ignored” (liberal paraphrase). Moreover, he gives reasons for his 
acts of judgment and appeals to examples to illustrate his previous actions 
based on such motivations (e.g. Jer 3,4, and 7.12). In Jer. 14.10, God explains 
why he is not answering prayers. Jeremiah goes so far as to invite his audience 
to imagine what it would be like to be God when he records God as asking his 
108 
 
people to contemplate his reasoning about coming judgments in 9.7, 9, “What 
else can I do but refine and test them? Should I not punish them?”  
Additionally, emotional terms are predicated of God throughout the 
prophets. His fierce anger is described in Jer 4.8, 5.1, 12.13, and 15.14. The 
people are accused of provoking God to anger in 7.18-19 and 8.19. The people 
are called God’s beloved in 11.15, and “the one I love” in  12.7-13. In the latter 
passage, God states that the people who were once the object of his love are now 
the object of his hatred. The anthropomorphisms of Jeremiah are laden with 
emotionally charged language, such as in 14.17, where God cries out, “My eyes 
overflow with tears, my virgin daughter, my people” and 15.1, where God 
announces that “my heart will not go out” to the people and that he has  
withdrawn love and pity from them.1 4 9  Ezekiel also uses emotional terms like 
jealous  wrath, burning zeal, and concern (e.g., Ez. 36).   
Even when passages do not explicitly use terms signifying emotion, they 
still use emotionally-laden imagery: Jeremiah 2.32 uses a vivid bridal metaphor, 
and 3.1ff compares the people to a prostitute with many lovers. The language 
used by the prophets invokes a sense of intimacy and relationships that are 
characterized by intense passion and emotion, such as a divorced man and his 
remarried wife in Jer. 3.3,4; sexual imagery in 3.6,19ff; and a grieving father in 
3.4, 19. The repeated appearance of metaphors that evoke a visceral emotional 
response in the reader suggests that strong emotion is an intentional theme of 
                                                 




God’s relationships to his people and that the passionate nature of the human-
God connection is what the metaphors are meant to recommend to the 
audience. 
It is this particular facet of the prophetic writings that I argue should at 
least be an important lens through which we read the prophetic genre, if not the 
lens. Note that many other types of passages can be subsumed under the idea of 
a God’s-eye-view: Hazony’s moral-instruction passages indicate what leads to a 
worthwhile life in the eyes of God, if not always in the eyes of man, and the sort 
of man and actions that amount to the truly good life. Descriptions of the 
ethically normative dimensions of human events are made salient by God’s 
interjections about how he responds to the decisions of man, articulated 
through the voice of a prophet. Such passages serve something like a helpful 
epilogue when the narrator helpfully summarizes the principal lessons in a 
morality tale or fable. Even when earthly consequences do not seem properly 
related to the moral qualities of human actions, as in the examples mentioned in 
my second objection, we can read these passages as expressing what God thinks 
ought to follow such actions or why such suffering is being admitted on the part 
of his chosen representative. In other cases, God oftentimes mentions purpose 
for which he is withholding judgment from the wicked, even if just for a season.  
If my assessment is correct, the entirety of the prophets serves as a 
portion of Scripture in which the prophets relate the words that God, as 
Jeremiah said, “put in [my] mouth” and felt like a “burning fire” that “I cannot 
(contain)” (Jer. 1.9, 20.9). Jeremiah’s feelings of unworthiness, much like 
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Moses’s trepidation to relate God’s words to the Hebrews and pharoah, as well 
as the experience of purification related by Isaiah, reflect the significance of 
their respective callings as vehicles for a unique expression of God’s perspective 
(Is. 6, Jer. 1). A possible exception is the book of Habakkuk, in which the 
prophet argues with God about apparent injustices. The book also serves as a 
vehicle for many of Habakkuk’s thoughts. However, many of the prophetic 
writings reflect similar anxieties and protestations (e.g., Lamentations) of God’s 
judgment, and significantly, Habakkuk also relates God’s responses to his 
prayers, in which God provides his motivations and sizes p the inadequacies of 
Habakkuk’s appraisal of human circumstances. Even this unique contribution 
to Nevi’im, then, manifests an emphasis on literature that describes a God’s-
eye-view. 
  Before continuing to why I think this aspect of prophetic literature is 
important to recognize for those engaged in the philosophy of Hebrew 
Scriptures, there is one more worry worth addressing here: Maybe I am making 
too much out of something that is only trivially true. One might protest that all 
of the Hebrew Scriptures purport to show a God’s-eye-view, if only by 
recounting the experiences of those wrestling with God, like Jacob. One might 
think that pointing out the presence of this element in the prophetic writings is 
not instructive because it does not show us anything that is uniquely true about 
Nevi’im from which we can derive interpretive principles.  
It may very well be the case that all, or at least most, of the Hebrew 
Scriptures are intended to tell us something about what God is like and his take 
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on human affairs, whether via pronouncements through Abraham or the 
philosophical derivations of Solomon as he reflects on the nature of life in 
relationship to the existence of God. My claim that Nevi’im provides a God’s-
eye-view is not trivial, though, because of the scope and function of the God’s-
eye-view provided. Prophetic literature is singular in its expression of intimacy 
with God’s thoughts and (so will I argue) emotions. The prophetic writings  
consists of thoroughgoing recordings of God’s words which are often declared 
by the prophets as their reasons for writing anything at all, and they are 
transcribed in a first-personal way that only appears in short passages of other 
genres. The scope of these descriptions have an important function; my next 
sections are devoted to establishing what this function is. For all of these 
reasons, I contend that the reader ought to consider this dimension of prophetic 
literature as importantly unique, and therefore worthy of consideration as to its 
aims and whether such aims might merit inclusion in our interpretative 
strategies.  
Whether or not my reader agrees that this aspect of the prophetic 
literature deserves to be our primary framework for reading scriptures in the 
prophetic genre, I hope that I have convinced her that it at least consumes a 
considerable portion of the literature and is therefore deserving of the attention 
of philosophers and theologians reading the Hebrew texts. If she is yet 
unconvinced, perhaps a discussion of what such passages are intended to reveal 
might serve as further persuasion. 
V. God’s Perspective and the Language of Divine Emotion 
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I mentioned before that this last set of passages expressing a “God’s-eye-
view” (that is, those in which God expresses his perspective on human states of 
affairs) turn out to be the most interesting for the philosophy of Hebrew 
Scriptures. When engaging in the philosophy of Hebrew Scripture and 
approaching these books as works of reason, I think an important question to 
ask is why writers choose to employ the particular genres they did. After all, the 
narratives of the Hebrew Scriptures can be read as parables; the prophets could 
have recorded morality tales that would have just as easily relayed moral 
principles and engaged in the search for truth Hazony finds so salient in the 
prophets. This is not to say that I think Hazony is wrong about the way 
prophetic works are suited to show how God’s word cuts through the 
“arbitrariness” of the human mind. But if this is the central purpose of the 
prophets, it is puzzling why the prophets frequently purport to record God’s 
voice and inner experience. For example, Jeremiah gives many of his orations 
from his own perspective (e.g., Jer. 10.17-25, 14.17-22). One could arguably omit 
entire sections which occur in the voice of God and lose nothing on Hazony’s 
view. 
 So far as I can tell, the inclusion of the passages upon which my third 
objection is built accomplish something that none of the other passages in the 
Hebrew Scriptures are equipped to do. The contribution of these sections 
provide yet further important moral information that many of the prophets 
seem to think we need when meditating on the laws of God and the way of man. 
God’s motivations and dispositions are not deemed irrelevant by the prophets, 
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but rather recorded alongside other orations. They certainly must have 
possessed incentive to not use such language! I imagine these passages--that for 
simplicity I will henceforth call “Godview passages,” despite all of the term’s 
theological infelicities--would be the most daunting to write, as failing to 
truthfully articulate the perspective of God would be a damning task indeed. 
And yet here we find them running parallel with more comfortable  passages 
about our human error and immorality. Surprisingly, we find orations from God 
himself that are in some ways remarkably similar to our own inner experiences 
of emotion and cognition.  
As the above passages illustrate, many of the descriptions of God in the 
prophets are metaphorical. These are easily recognized by the use of 
anthropomorphisms (e.g., Jer. 9.12 where God is described as having ה  a ,פֶּ
mouth). I am not aware of any contemporary philosophers or theologians who 
read these passages as anything other than metaphorical (although I am sure 
they are out there). Even Aquinas and Hazony are in agreement on the need to 
interpret anthropomorphisms as metaphors--a sign of facticity if there ever was 
one. When we read passages about God’s frown or staff or hand, it is doubtful 
that we should understand the text as making a metaphysical assertion about 
God’s constitution and whether he exists as an extended being, and whether 
God really does have a celestial staff as Zeus was thought by the Greeks to 
possess a shield. There is significant disagreement about the exact linguistic 
function of metaphors, but at the very least they serve to elicit a particular 
response in which the audience is invited to think of the subject as in some way 
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similar to otherwise dissimilar object. In the case of Jer. 3.12, the mention of a 
physical organ like a mouth is intended to bring to mind speech familiar to 
humans and make a comparison to what God might have done for the people of 
Judah. The point of the sentence is not the metaphysical constitution of God, 
but rather whether man understands God. The idea of a human mouth is 
invoked simply to this end. 
It is in this spirit that many passages attributing emotion to God have 
been interpreted. To gloss over a complex history for the sake of brevity, the 
medieval philosophers, following a subset of Hellenistic thought from ancient 
Greece, considered “the passions” to be a physical phenomenon. The early 
modern philosophers followed suit, with thinkers like Kant making a sharp 
division between reason and the lower bodily faculty of emotions. In any case, 
emotions were tied to bodily states, such as the flushing of the face when one 
feels shame, or the burning sensible experience accompanying jealousy. 
Further, God’s emotions appear to change, and this could not be an accurate 
literal description of God given the widespread conviction that God is 
immutable. Emotionally-loaded passages, like Jer. 7.18 in which God is 
described as ָכַעס, angry or Jer. 12.15 in which God is described with ָרַחם, 
compassion, were thought to be metaphorical. 
At the very least, then, we are given some descriptions of what God is like 
via metaphor, and it is language about God in a unique context: God’s self-
descriptions of his engagement with the moral facets of human experience. 
Metaphorical language is vague and unwieldy, but if we take the prophets at 
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their word, these metaphors are how God would have us think of him when we 
wonder how he looks upon us in our most backslidden or oppressed states. At 
most, though, these metaphors function as epistemic placeholders for what God 
is really like.  
Even if one does not find such anthropomorphism instructive, I have yet 
to argue my most controversial point: It is wrong to treat all of these statements 
as though they are metaphorical. Some are not metaphorical, but literal and 
possibly even univocal, and these passages provide important information about 
God’s moral psychology. First, though, some philosophy of language is in order.  
It is helpful to consider the linguistic reasons why emphasis has not been 
placed upon the Godview texts I find so important, despite the fact that they are 
plentiful in Nevi’im. As I mentioned, metaphorical language is not terribly 
informative. It would be difficult to forward an argument about what God is like 
on metaphor alone. It is unsurprising then that those who take prophetic 
language to be largely metaphorical do not recognize that arguments about 
God’s moral psychology occur in the text. Take, for example, the account of the 
prophetic works we recently examined in the first part of this paper. Most of 
Hazony’s positions on language about God rest on a central assumption about 
divine predication: 
Theologians have long been of the opinion that human categories cannot 
describe God directly, so that all of our terms for describing God are 
necessarily metaphors— terms drawn from other domains and used with 
reference to God by way of analogy. This is not merely an opinion of later 
theologians. We can easily see that the prophets and scholars who 
composed the Hebrew Bible were aware that all terms for God are 
metaphors from the fact that they freely use multiple and shifting 
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metaphors for one and the same aspect of God’s actions in the world. 
Indeed, we can say that the Bible relies upon “mixed metaphor” as 
perhaps the principal means by which human beings can approach a 
knowledge of God!1 5 0  
 
Hazony’s description of theological perspectives on metaphor is 
mistaken. There is by no means consensus among scholars of Scripture about 
the nature of divine predications. While this is not the venue to settle the matter 
about what forms of predication are available to finite humans who intend to 
truthfully describe God, I want to at least make the case that we can by no 
means assume all of this language is metaphorical by way of a more detailed 
overview of the philosophy of language concerning theistic predication.   
First, metaphorical predications have a long history of being rejected by 
philosophers and theologians for many descriptions of God in the Scriptures. 
The medieval writers divided language about God into two categories: 
metaphorical and literal.1 5 1  Metaphorical predications were the most remote 
forms of predication. As is likely clear from the discussion in the prior section, 
metaphors included the anthropomorphism of God (“God’s hand,” “God sits on 
his throne”) as well as comparisons of God to other parts of his creation (“God is 
a lion,” “God is our rock”). Since the objects to which God is compared in these 
statements were thought to be things with essential qualities that are 
incompatible with God’s nature (such as being extended, temporal, imperfect, 
                                                 
1 5 0  “The Question of God’s Perfection,” 2015.  
1 5 1  Freddoso (n.d., n.p.).. 
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and finite), philosophers thought these predications tell us the least about what 
God actually is like.   
Despite the mention of essences that Hazony would likely reject, the 
motivations for the metaphorical views of the medievals seem similar to 
Hazony’s: They thought that God’s transcendence was so great that anything a 
human could be acquainted with (and thus attribute to God) would be so 
imperfect and distant from his actual nature that the proposition would be no 
more than a metaphor. However, unlike Hazony’s assessment of contemporary 
theologians, the medievals did not universally embrace metaphorical language. 
For example, Maimonides recognized the use of metaphor in Scripture, but he 
still rejected metaphor and analogy as means of speech about God.1 5 2  The most 
significant objection to metaphorical forms of predication is that it does little to 
provide us with any real understanding of God’s nature and may  even amount to 
agnosticism. Once metaphorical language is determined to be the only method 
for talking about God, it becomes difficult to see how we could know anything 
about what is salient in our metaphors in helping us to understand God. Many, 
like Maimonides, came to embrace negative theology because of this very 
problem.1 5 3  
One alternative for the medievals was literal predication, which for them 
included univocal, equivocal and analogical forms of predication. Because of a 
widespread misunderstanding of literal predication that I will turn to in a 
                                                 
1 5 2  See Benor (1995)  and Lahey (1993) in the bibliography.  
1 5 3  Broadie 1987, p. 1 59. See also Buijs (1998) in the bibliography.  
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moment, it is worth discussing the history of literal predication in more detail. If 
we take the view of the medieval philosophers, univocal predication is the 
strongest form of predication. When we predicate univocally of God, claims 
such as “God has knowledge like man has knowledge” mean that God has 
knowledge of the same species or kind that the term “knowledge” signifies in 
our ordinary discourse about man’s knowledge.1 5 4  Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham both endorsed univocal predications of God.1 5 5   
Equivocal predication designates homonyms, such as “a bow” worn by 
the neighborhood hipster and “a bow” such as the one Katniss Everdeen used to 
kill President Coin. This sort of predication uses a single term to signify two 
distinct things. Finally, analogical predication—historically one of the most 
popular positions on divine predication—is employed when what is predicated 
is not identical in two propositions but importantly  related in some way. If we 
predicate analogically of God, then when we say “God has knowledge like man 
has knowledge,” we are not signifying the same form of knowledge that humans 
have (as in univocal predication); instead we are claiming that God’s knowledge 
is somehow significantly related to man’s knowledge, but the two terms 
“knowledge” are not identical.1 5 6   
Analogy was thought to be a stronger form of predication than metaphor 
because the nature of the relation standing between the two subjects could be 
                                                 
1 5 4  See Freddoso (n.d., n.p.) in the bibliography. 
1 5 5  See Langston (1979) in the bibliography.  
1 5 6  For more, see Freddoso (n.d., n.p.) in the bibliography.  
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specified. Scholastic philosophers recognized multiple forms of analogy. An 
analogy based upon proportions was referred to as a proportional analogy or 
“proper” analogy.1 5 7  This was contrasted with attributive analogies. Attributive 
analogies distinguished terms on the basis of priority. Aristotle gives an example 
of attributive analogies when he describes the relationship between various 
terms related to health (Metaphysics 3.2). “Healthy diet”, “healthy complexion” 
and “healthy person” are all distinct terms, and yet the sense in which diets or 
complexions are healthy is dependent upon the idea of a healthy person. In this 
sense “healthy person” is prior to the terms “healthy diet” and “healthy 
complexion.”1 5 8  Finally, medieval philosophers identified an analogy of 
imitation or participation. This form of analogy indicated that the terms were 
related by a kind of likeness unique to that between God and his creatures. The 
attributes of humans are analogically related to God’s insofar as they reflect God 
or participate in his qualities. Aquinas argued in favor of using attributive 
analogy to predicate things of God.1 5 9  Cajetan further elaborated on Aquinas’s 
                                                 
1 5 7  Ashworth 2011 (n.p.). 
1 5 8  Ashworth provides a helpful summary of Aristotle, who was largely responsible for 
introducing the distinctions between forms of literal predication: “The Categories opens with a 
brief characterization of terms used equivocally, such as ‘animal’ used of re al human beings and 
pictured human beings, and terms used univocally, such as ‘animal’ used of human beings and 
oxen. In the first case, the spoken term is the same but there are two distinct significates or 
intellectual conceptions; in the second case, bo th the spoken term and the significate are the 
same. We should note that equivocal terms include homonyms (two words with the same form 
but different senses, e.g., ‘pen’), polysemous words (one word with two or more senses), and, for 
medieval thinkers, proper names shared by different people.”  
1 5 9  Ashworth (1999, n.p.) helpfully explains Aquinas’s reasons for embracing attributive 
analogy : “Against this background, Aquinas asks how we are to interpret the divine names. He 
argues that they cannot be purely equivocal, for we could not then make intelligible claims about 
God. Nor can they  be purely univocal, for God's manner of existence and his relationship to his 
properties are sufficiently different from ours that the words must be used in somewhat 
different senses. Hence, the words we use of God must be analogical, used in different but 
related senses. To be more precise, it seems that such words as ‘good’ and ‘wise’ must involve a 
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version of analogy by expounding on the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction of 
analogical predications.1 6 0  
 VI. Predicating Emotions of God in Contemporary Philosophy 
 This discussion of medieval views of predication is instructive not just as 
evidence that the relationship between metaphor and literal language is grossly 
oversimplified in modern discourse. As William Alston points out in Divine 
Nature and Human Language, the term “literal” is often conflated with 
“univocal” and “empirical” language. Analogical language can arguably be 
                                                                                                                                               
relationship to one prior reality, and they must be predicated in a prior and a posterior sense, 
for these are the marks of analogical terms.... he came to place much greater emphasis on agent 
causation, the active transmission of properties from God to creatures, than on exemplar 
causality, the creature's passive reflection or imitation of God's properties. In this context, 
Aquinas makes considerable use of his ontological distinction between univocal causes, whose 
effects are fully  like them, and non-univocal causes, whose effects are not fully  like them. God is 
an analogical cause, and this is the reality that underlies our use of analogical language.: For 
more on this, see Ashworth in the bibliography.  
1 6 0  Cajetan thought that the forms of analogical predication can either indicate that the subject 
of the predication has the attribute intrinsically as a real feature of the subject, or that the 
subject of the predication only can only be said to have the attribute extrinsically, meaning that 
the subject can only be said to possess the attribute “by reference” to some other being. 
Attributive analogy, according to Cajetan, predicates features of God like goodness or knowledge 
intrinsically, and creatures possess these attributes extrinsically, due to their ontological 
dependence upon God for these features. This is because God has the position of ontological 
priority in attributive analogy, while creatures are ontologically posterior. In contrast 
proportional analogy predicates some attribute intrinsically to both subjects of the predication—
both can rightly be said to possess the attribute in and of themselves, and not just to possess an 
important relationship to a prior being. What distinguishes the two subjects is the difference in 
degree, amount, etc., as two mathematical figures may  have proportional relationship to each 
other. Cajetan contended that (with the exception of the term being, which was properly an 
attributive analogical predication) most theological predications of God should be thought of as 
proportionally predicating of God. As has been pointed out by Ralph McIrney (2011), Cajetan 
criticizes Aquinas on the grounds that his analogy of proper proportionality requires univocity. 
While the extrinsic/intrinsic denominations of attributive analogy permit one to claim that what 
we predicate of both God and his creatures are of a different kind or species, proper 
proportionality when applied to God requires that we attribute things intrinsically. If we 
predicate things of God and man intrinsically we must mean that there is not merely a 
relationship between God and goodness, and man and goodness, that is preserved by the 
analogy . Goodness must be found in God and in man—goodness merely differs in degree. 
McIrney thinks Cajetan is wrong in his criticisms of Aquinas and that one can make 
proportional analogies while still maintaining that one subject’s predicate is of the extrinsic 
denomination, while the other is of the intrinsic denomination. For more, see Ashworth (1999), 
Osborne (n.d.), and McIrney (2011) in the bibliography.  
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literal, and the idea that literal language must be empirical, that is, derived from 
creaturely experience in the natural world, only follows if we are also committed 
to empiricist theories of meaning (according to which all human experience and 
cognition features the physically sensible world alone).1 6 1  Theists do not have to 
embrace such theories, and indeed many do not: One might embrace sensus 
divinitatis (the idea that humans have a specific faculty for perceiving the 
divine), or like Alston dispute that human experience is confined to the natural. 
One can also contest the theories of language that rule out literal predications 
and, like Richard Swinburne and Kevin Hector, maintain that it is public use 
(and not features of mental representation and experience) that determine 
whether language is literal. 
 For my purposes, I am not sure that it matters which form of literal 
predication one embraces, but I am inclined to think my reading of the prophets 
is more suited to one of the stronger analogical positions (e.g, attributive 
analogy) or univocal predication. I myself have argued in favor of univocal 
predications following William Alston elsewhere, so it is from this perspective I 
am going to proceed.1 6 2  
 Theologians and philosophers often take terms signifying emotions and 
affective states as metaphorical, while not doing likewise for terms like wisdom 
and goodness, because of what is thought to be entailed by particular terms. 
Often proponents of analogy and univocal predication think that wisdom can be 
                                                 
1 6 1  Alston 1989, p. 25. 
1 6 2  See the final chapter of this dissertation. 
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so predicated of God because they think there is not anything in the ontology of 
wisdom that entails properties or states antithetical to the nature of God.1 6 3  
While wisdom, so far as we understand it, is realized in humans in a way that 
requires its subject to possess particular traits, there is nothing about wisdom 
per se that entails that it cannot be realized in an immaterial, immutable being 
(or so the argument goes).  
Wisdom, goodness and perfection, when predicated of God, entail 
different things than when they are predicated of humans. If one is a proponent 
of analogical predication, she might argue that God’s wisdom is metaphysically 
prior to human wisdom, and while God is so transcendent that we cannot 
fathom what his wisdom is like, we can at least say that our wisdom is 
dependent on God’s wisdom for its existence. Conversely, if one is a fan of 
univocal predication, she might instead argue that wisdom is being used in the 
same sense regardless of whether it is predicated of God or man and that 
differences in logical entailments do not amount to a difference in sense because 
the entailment is a product of the meaning of the word God rather than the 
predications themselves. In Revelation, Richard Swinburne makes a similar 
argument in favor of univocal predication for some predications of divine 
attributes: “God is wise” entails that God is essentially wise (whereas “Socrates 
is wise” does not) because we are antecedently committed to certain facts about 
God: “’x is God’ by itself entails ‘x is essentially wise’, or...it entails ’if x is wise, 
                                                 
1 6 3  See, for example, Swinburne 2007, p.227ff. 
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then he is essentially wise.’”1 6 4  Put succinctly, suppose that we are committed to 
all of God’s properties being essential properties. Or suppose we take the word 
God to necessitate certain perfections. Swinburne thinks these commitments do 
not affect the sense of the word wise itself.1 6 5  They only affect the sense of the 
word God. It turns out that when we say God is wise, he is essentially wise, etc. 
This is a function of either the sense of the word God, or it is a result of what is 
entailed by two independent premises, neither of which relies on the sense of 
wise having any unusual properties.1 6 6  
Those who deny univocal predication is suitable for statements about 
God often do so in virtue of God’s transcendence. The idea is that the vast 
                                                 
1 6 4  Ibid, p. 227. 
1 6 5  This is because Swinburne argues that words coined in the context of mere human 
experience can be employed in “new circumstances” while retaining their normal sense (p. 225). 
Swinburne mentions two examples of such circumstances: a) when the word “diameter” is used 
for both the 1  metre diameter of a ball and the 300,000 lighter -year diameter of a galaxy, and b) 
when the word “cause” is used in say ing that an explosion causes the collapse of a galaxy and a 
chatty individual causes those around him to be annoyed. Similarly, just because we use the 
word “wise” of a dramatically different subject (God) than we would in our mundane uses of the 
word, does not imply that the word “wise” has undergone any change any more than “cause” or 
“diameter” has undergone change. The fact that their predicate schemes are preserved shows 
that the senses are the same. 
1 6 6  Here it is helpful to see how Swinburne’s v iew comes apart from more traditional v iews like 
Aquinas’s. Aquinas denied that doctrinal terms should be understood univocally because of this 
metaphysical commitments concerning properties. According to Aquinas, if we predicate 
univocally of God, claims such as “God has knowledge like man has knowledge” mean that God 
has knowledge of the same species or kind that the term “knowledge” signifies in our ordinary 
discourse about man’s knowledge (Freddoso). (Once again, we find Hazony  and Aquinas in 
agreement, if albeit for very different reasons!) This understanding of univocal predication 
commits theists to attributing undesirable properties to God, and for this reason Aquinas 
rejected the notion that we can make univocal predications of God. On Swinburne’s v iew, the 
theist is obligated to no such metaphysical positions when she makes univocal predications: 
“Words which denote properties in beings of different genera may be univocal (in my  sense of 
‘univocal’), and how we derive our understanding of the sense of a word does not have such a 
direct relation to what that sense is. We may  learn what a word means by  learning the syntactic 
criteria for its application and observing objects to which it paradigmatically applies; and this 
may  allow us to ascribe it in the same sense to objects which we cannot  observe” (p. 228). 
However, it is not clear that Swinburne can use a word univocally while remaining so agnostic 
about the metaphysical implications of the word.  
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difference between God and His creation is sufficient to undermine our ability 
to know sufficient truth-conditions for univocal predication and the content of 
words applied to God. Swinburne argues, contra advocates of analogical 
predication, that the human inability to “know what it is like to be God, how 
God knows things, or from which (if any) deeper properties of God his wisdom 
derives” does not put any constraints on our ability to predicate univocally of 
God.1 6 7  He denies that such lack of knowledge affects our ability to know the 
relevant truth-conditions for predicates like wise. Further, we commonly make 
predications of creatures whose experiences are very remote from us: We do not 
know what it is like to be a bat, but we still say bats perceive, intending the 
sense of perceive to be univocal with humans perceive.1 6 8  
Whether or not one agrees with Swinburne’s account of univocal 
predication, his arguments concerning terms like wisdom have similar 
consequences for terms signifying emotional states.1 6 9  As I mentioned in the 
prior section, emotions, according to a long history of theologians and 
philosophers, are necessarily physical, and thus disqualified from any literal 
forms of predication. However, things are not nearly this clear cut. For one, 
even our application of everyday predicates to material, empirical objects is 
incredibly complicated. To use Swinburne’s above example, it is not obvious to 
                                                 
1 6 7  Ibid p. 229. 
1 6 8  Ibid. 
1 6 9  Swinburne is not himself an advocate for univocal predications of e motion to God. He 
explicitly argues against univocal predications of emotions for reasons similar to those I will 
address in this section; as a result, I think his argument fails.  
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me that we do use perceive univocally when we say that bats perceive. Consider 
a more dramatic example: the caterpillar perceives the leaf, or the lobster 
perceives the boiling water. In these cases, words that seem obviously univocal 
given our contact with these animals, upon closer examination appear to be 
used in an analogical sense. This is because caterpillars and lobsters have 
radically dissimilar nervous systems from humans. Much of what we think are 
the relevant states of affairs for determining the truth-values for uses of 
perceive involves certain assumptions about what is required for mental states. 
In the absence of specific metaphysical commitments to things like caterpillar 
souls, the fact that caterpillars and lobsters possess different nervous systems 
(and in the case of lobsters, lack brains altogether) casts considerable doubt on 
whether such animals perceive in the same sense that humans do.  
Returning to the example of bats, the sense in which we use perceive for 
life forms that share similar but not identical anatomy is at the very least 
ambiguous. There is very likely significant disagreement and linguistic 
ambiguity on exactly what perceive, so applied, entails for bats. Those more 
optimistic about animal intelligence or animal souls might be willing to affirm 
the exact same predicate entailments for both bats and humans; however, it 
seems just as possible that a large (if not majority) segment of the linguistic 
community might think there is only some overlap in our uses and 
understanding of human and bat perception. They would argue that perceive 
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has two senses or that we are using perceive analogically.1 7 0  Additionally, the 
scope of dissimilarity between humans and bats may turn out to be trivial 
compared to the dissimilarity between humans and a transcendent God.  
Even if we can use “perceive” univocally of bats, using mundane words to 
predicate of God seems an entirely different matter. Humans and bats share 
important features: Bats are spatially and temporally situated; aspects of their 
anatomy are similar to ours; and they manifest certain behaviors that resemble 
our own. It is possible to predict certain implications of a bat perception given 
these shared features. However, it is difficult to see how we can anticipate the 
implications of God’s wisdom given our own experience of wise humans. We 
observe wisdom obtaining in a human agent in spatiotemporal contexts: 
Wisdom produces certain results over time, implies certain things about their 
cognitive abilities, etc. We know none of these things for God.1 7 1  
 Nevertheless, many of us do not want to abandon literal forms of 
predication in favor of metaphorical predication for reasons already mentioned. 
Rather, it seems that at least one of our reasons for discounting terms signifying 
                                                 
1 7 0  Disagreements about bat perception highlight two important problems for Sw inburne’s 
account. What facts are relevant to establishing the sense of a word? Swinburne’s use of 
predicate scheme is promising, but the synonyms, antonyms, determinates, and determinables 
of a given word are not clearly delineated. When we say  that a bat  perceives, does our sense of 
“perceive” include the idea “realized in x brain state”? Does “perceive” entail that perceiving 
comes with a certain set of phenomenal qualities? Swinburne would certainly say no. However, 
if the sense of a word merely depends on publically agreed upon criteria, it could turn out that 
the sense of “perceive” carries with it these metaphysical implications.  
1 7 1  Swinburne may  just deny that any of these things are relevant to the meaning of “wise” and 
insist that the dissimilarity I just described only affects the sense of the word “God” and not the 
word “wise”. But when making distinctions between analogical and univocal predications, 
Swinburne helps himself to metaphysical implications that it seems he should ignore if he is to 
remain consistent with the v iew he expresses here.  
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emotion--our familiarity with emotions being realized in a very specific way in 
humans--is not a good reason to draw a distinction between it and other terms 
thought to be literal, like wisdom and goodness. Whether perceives and wisdom 
are analogical or univocal predicates, they share the propensity to be recognized 
in subjects that might realize these predicates in significantly different ways. 
Returning to the claim that terms like angry are metaphorical because 
they are marked, in part, by their physical manifestations in humans,1 7 2  this 
could be merely a function of how emotion realizes itself in humans and not a 
feature intrinsic to emotion itself. Given that we deny that the physical 
implications of a bat perceiving has bearing on the sense of the word perceives, 
we can also deny that the physical implications of a human’s experience of anger 
has any bearing on the meaning of anger itself, and thereby apply it to God. 
More to the point, why can we not say that anger is like wise: It is not that the 
sense of anger changes when we predicate it of God, it is that the meaning of 
God and human entail different things about anger obtaining in God and 
humans respectively. Conversely, if bat perception is only perception in the 
analogical sense of the word due to how it is realized, God’s anger should be 
understood as analogical as well (albeit of a different scope).  
To successfully deny that the physical dimensions of emotion are 
essential, or to use a less metaphysically-loaded word, central, to the sense of 
                                                 
1 7 2  Swinburne argues that the words pity, love, and anger all include desire and bodily 
sensation in their meanings: “No one is really angry or feels pity or love unless they feel these 
things in their stomach or breasts or bowels or behind the eyes, and have an urge, hard to 
control, to vent their anger or show their pity and love” (230).  
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emotion, one would need some kind of evidence that physical states are tied to 
emotions ontologically.  This is not consistent with current thought on 
emotions, though; most recent work on emotion affirms the plausibility of my 
position. Contemporary research on emotion is not in agreement on the 
relationship between bodily states and emotions even so far as humans are 
concerned. While some philosophers and scientists do indeed consider bodily 
states to be an essential component of emotions, others dispute this claim, 
arguing that different emotions can produce identical physical reactions and 
that this is evidence that the bodily manifestations of emotion are not identical 
to the emotions themselves.1 7 3  Linda Zagzebski famously disputed the long-
observed distinction between cognitive and emotional states, arguing instead 
that emotions should be defined as a state that has inseparable cognitive and 
affective content, and further, made the case that emotions play a key role in 
moral judgment.1 7 4  Psychological studies seem to indicate that humans identify 
identical physiological states with different emotional states depending on what 
beliefs or intentional objects correspond with the physiological state in 
question, suggesting that the emotional content is something over and above a 
physical state.1 7 5  There is at least reason to doubt that the physicality of 
emotions is inseparable from emotions themselves rather than the way in which 
they are realized in humans. 
                                                 
1 7 3  See de Sousa (2003) in the bibliography.  
1 7 4  Zagzebski 2003. 
1 7 5  Barrett 2006. 
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Turning back to the question of divine emotions, if emotions are not 
necessarily physical as was assumed by the Ancients, Medievals, and Early 
Moderns, there is no compelling reason to rule them out as divine predicates. It 
is possible that God has emotions much like we think God has thoughts; his 
emotions simply do not entail those aspects of emotion that are perceptible in 
human expressions of emotion but incompatible with his nature. A similar 
argument is made by Zagzebski: Zagzebski contends that so long as emotions 
are an aspect of our personhood and not of our nature as humans, it is possible 
that God has (perfect) emotions.1 7 6  She contends that emotions need not imply 
passivity or change; rather, Zagzebski contends that godly emotions can be 
understood much like we understand godly thoughts or beliefs. Many of the 
qualities of thoughts and beliefs that seem incompatible with divine attributes 
apply to emotions as well. Thoughts and beliefs strike us as time-bound and 
mutable just as feelings do, and yet we can imagine God has knowledge that is 
immutable and eternal. Affective states could likewise be immutable and 
eternal. She writes, “It can be shown that God has seemingly mutable emotions 
in the same way that he has seemingly mutable knowledge.”1 7 7  If Zagzebski is 
right, there is no reason to object to statements describing divine emotions, and 
our traditional reasons for reading such statements metaphorically should be 
reconsidered. In the absence of textual evidence suggesting prophetic authors 
intended to speak metaphorically, interpreters of Nevi’im can read Godview 
statements containing emotion as literal. 
                                                 
1 7 6  Zagzebski 2004, p. 204ff. 
1 7 7  Ibid pp. 208-9. 
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VII. Zagzebski and the Emotions of God 
 Zagzebski’s work on emotion turns out to be extremely important for her 
ethical theory, and it is this theory that provides insight into why the prophets 
may have included so many Godview passages in their writings. Zagzebski’s 
divine motivation theory and exemplarist virtue ethics describe a moral 
psychology in which emotions play a key role. We are indebted to exemplars for 
our moral education. These exemplars evoke our admiration when they embody 
the virtues, and it is through this emotional response that we begin to identify 
what is good about exemplars and understand the virtues.1 7 8  This emotion of 
admiration is central to our ability to make moral judgments. Furthermore, like 
other virtue theories, Zagzebski expects the habituation that is part and parcel 
of virtue acquisition to shape the emotions of the virtuous. Since moral 
judgment involves beholding an intentional object through the valence of 
emotion, those who are truly virtuous will stand in the correct emotional 
relationship to that which is good and that which is bad. They will feel pity when 
someone deserves pity; they will feel anger when states of affairs call for anger. 
When we emulate exemplars and attempt to acquire the virtues they exemplify, 
we do more than copy those we admire; we try to assimilate both the actions 
and motivating emotions into our life.1 7 9  
 Given the role of such internal states for moral formation, accounts that 
give us insight into the inner life of moral exemplars are mentioned as an 
                                                 
1 7 8  Zagzebski 2017. 
1 7 9  Ibid pp. 219-20. 
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important source of moral understanding.1 8 0  Among these accounts are 
biographies, fictional narratives, and studies that rely on data from interviews 
and diaries. In the Christian predecessor to Zagzebski’s exemplarism, Divine 
Motivation Theory, Zagzebski suggests looking to Jesus Christ as the ultimate 
moral exemplar.1 8 1  The doctrine of the Incarnation provides an unusually fitting 
candidate for this kind of exemplarism because the moral perfection of the 
divine is manifested in human psychological states. Biographical content about 
the life of Christ contributes to our moral education because it permits us to 
imitate him. His emotions and actions serve as a model for how we should 
respond to objects of moral evaluation in our lives. 
 In one explanation of divine motivation theory, Zagzebski makes the 
interesting claim that God’s motivational states are the ontological and 
explanatory basis for moral properties.1 8 2  According to this view, our motives 
should resemble God’s motives. This does not mean that the set of virtues for 
humans and God will be identical.1 8 3  Some of our virtues are related to our 
creaturely nature and therefore inadmissible as virtues of God. Nevertheless, 
God serves as the basis for all that is good in us; Lev. 19.20 says something to 
this effect when it exhorts us to be holy as God himself is holy.  
                                                 
1 8 0  Ibid pp.104-111. 
1 8 1  Zagzebski 2004, ch. 6. 
1 8 2  Zagzebski 1998, p. 539. 
1 8 3  Ibid p. 548. 
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 To see how this theory might apply to the genre of prophetic writings, 
consider Nevi’im in light of Zagzebski’s account of moral formation. Passages in 
which the prophets relay a Godview of human matters, particular those of moral 
significance, give the reader an idea of God’s perfect emotions and motivations. 
Take, for example, a passage from Jeremiah: 
Thus says the Lord,  
“What wrong did your fathers find in me that they went far from  
me, 
and went after worthlessness, and became worthless? 
They did not say, ‘Where is the Lord who brought us up from the  
land of  
Egypt,  
who led us in the wilderness, in a land of deserts and pits,  
in a land of drought and deep darkness, in a land that none 
passes through, where no man dwells?’ 
And I brought you into a plentiful land to enjoy its fruits and its  
good things. 
But when you came in, you defiled my land and made my heritage  
an abomination. 
The priests did not say, ‘Where is the Lord?’ Those who handle the  
law did not know me;  
the shepherds transgressed against me; the prophets prophesied  
by Baal  
and went after things that do not profit. 
“Therefore I still contend with you, declares the Lord, 
 and with your children's children I will contend. 
For cross to the coasts of Cyprus and see, or send to Kedar and  
examine with care; see if there has been such a thing. 
Has a nation changed its gods, even though they are no gods? 




Be appalled, O heavens, at this; be shocked, be utterly desolate, 
 declares the Lord,  
for my people have committed two evils: 
they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters,  
and hewed out cisterns for themselves, broken cisterns that 
can hold no water. (Jer. 2.5-13, ESV) 
 
In this passage, note that God takes issue not only with the actions of his people, 
but the way in which his people seem to view him. The reasons for God’s 
“charges” against his people are given in explicit terms. They neglected to ask, 
“Where is the Lord?” Even those who should have been experts when it came to 
knowledge of God did not know him. By posing the rhetorical question, “What 
fault did your fathers find in me?”, God makes it clear that he has been faultless 
in his dealings with his people, and yet they have failed in their part of the 
relationship. God has been good, a “fountain of living waters” in the desert, and 
yet his people prefer corrupt nations and idols to him.  
 That God gives an account of the reasons for his judgment is incredibly 
important. Like the parent whose child heeds the guidance of a friend over 
parental instruction, knowing why God acts is morally informative. A parent 
who is merely concerned with the obedience of her child will not attempt to 
amend her relationship with a teenager who is beginning to trust friends over 
her parents. If she can coerce her child into correct behavior through 
punishment, her goal will be achieved. However, a parent who uses such an 
incident to not only modify the behavior of her child, but help her child relate 
properly to those she should trust (i.e., those who have her best interest at heart 
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and the wisdom to guide her) is interested in more than the the actions of her 
child; she is interested in whether her child has certain affective states. Further, 
the parent’s interest in her child’s inner life manifests aspects of her own 
affective states; namely, it shows what she values and finds to be morally 
significant. The prophetic writings make it abundantly clear that God is not 
merely interested in getting his people to “behave”; he is interested in being 
known by his people and relied upon by them. God contends such a relationship 
will be like a spring of living water to his people; he wants them to continue to 
draw from this relationship rather than turning to other relationships that will 
ultimately destroy them. When God acts in judgment, this passage tells us that 
at least one reason he does so is because of a damaged relationship. 
 Consider nearby verses in which God describes his people as a bride who 
is no longer devoted (Jer. 2.2), or as a donkey in heat (2.23-25), or as a 
disgraced thief (2.26). Such language gives us insight into how disobedience and 
idolatry are perceived by God. As an object of moral evaluation, God sees his 
people like we would see such a bride, donkey, or thief. These examples elicit a 
sense of betrayal and disappointment, revulsion at unbridled lust, and 
frustration and indignation. This is in addition to passages like Jer. 7.20 and 
14.17, in which God expressly attributes emotions like anger and grief to 
himself. 
 In these passages God models perfect dispositions towards the subjects 
of his contemplation. The prophets show us the perfect being’s side of his 
relationship with us, making it clear that he is not unaffected by our moral 
135 
 
states. They allow us to know God as more than just the law giver; we gain 
perspective on the intensely personal way God is connected to his people. This 
psychological language serves another closely related function. It models for us 
how we should respond to our own moral transgressions and the transgressions 
of others. When we or others cheat the poor, the proper response is intense 
anger (Jer. 2.34-35). When we fail to seek God, we should feel as though we 
have neglected or betrayed someone as close to us as a spouse (2.1 -3). While 
some of these responses will be modified due to the unique relational demands 
God can make of us versus those we can ethically make of each other, many of 
God’s self-descriptions can readily be understood as exemplifying the way a 
perfect agent evaluates human action on a cognitive and emotional lev el. 
In many ways, this position is in harmony with recent works on biblical 
epistemology and narrative. Eleonore Stump emphasizes the usefulness of 
biblical narrative (and narrative in general) in addressing ethical questions 
(such as the existence of suffering) not easily answered by other realms of 
thought.1 8 4  She argues that narratives dealing with personal relationships have 
the capacity to confer what she calls Franciscan (elsewhere dubbed “second-
personal”) knowledge. This knowledge of persons is not reducible to 
propositions, and it “enables a person to know the actions, intentions, and 
emotions of another person in a direct, intuitive way analogous in some respects 
to perception.”1 8 5  Read in this light, by second-personal knowledge we share in 
                                                 
1 8 4  Stump 2010, p. 26. 
1 8 5  Ibid pp. 41 -2, 47-8, 81 . 
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the explanation God gives to Job, and we know something of what Abraham 
knew when God gave back his heart’s desire, none of which can be stated in 
propositional form.1 8 6  
 One way of understanding my reading of Nevi’im is as augmenting the 
claims of both Zagzebski and Stump. In response to Zagzebski, I suggest that 
Christians should learn from what I loosely call the moral psychology of God as 
revealed by the prophets. This moral psychology has important differences from 
the one provided by the Incarnation: The example of Jesus provides all the 
virtues realized in human form, and it is therefore more easily observed and 
emulated. Jesus’s life also provides important context for how the virtues are 
enacted through duties and habits. He “emptied himself, taking the form of a 
servant” as it says in Phil. 2, and he modeled obedience to his Father and the 
devotion of a faithful Jew.  
 In contrast, many of the emotions of God in the prophets would be 
inappropriate for human emulation, as it would often be prideful to treat a 
fellow sinner with wrathful anger because of our status of moral equals. The 
nature of our allegiance to God far outweighs any allegiance another might owe 
us, making God’s expressed feelings of indignation and betrayal 
incommensurate with those we might be tempted to feel. This does not mean 
that we can learn nothing from orations about God’s emotions and motivations. 
We see that God is willing to go to great lengths so that his people will know 
him, even allowing terrible suffering, demonstrating the importance of knowing 
                                                 
1 8 6  Ibid pp. 222-27, 307-8. 
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who God is and treating him accordingly. We also see those human actions that 
move God to act in anger, and learn in many cases what should disgust and 
inflame our moral sensibilities, such as pagan worship, corrupt leaders, and the 
abandonment of children and widows. We learn more than what we should do; 
we learn how we should behold certain actions and qualities,  and the 
motivating emotions that should ultimately compel us to act. 
 These passages have something important in common with the 
narratives mentioned by Stump. Their depiction of God’s “moral psychology” is 
a source of instructive second-personal knowledge that gives us insight into who 
God is. The judgments and complaints issued by God in narratives are made 
more comprehensible by the emotive orations in the prophets. Even the 
figurative language, such as that depicting God as an abandoned husband or 
nursing mother, has an undeniably emotionally-charged tone that makes more 
sense if we think that emotions are an important part of moral judgment and 
second-personal knowledge is morally instructive: There is something genuinely 
relevant about the emotions of earthly mothers and husbands that is relevant to 




VIII. Biblical Epistemology, Opacity, and the New Testament 
One consequence of my view is that not all readers will be able to grasp 
the entirety of important prophetic messages. This is because one’s 
understanding of the moral psychology of God will vary with one’s own moral 
development. Humans vary in their acquisition of virtues and their relevant 
motivating emotions. Some will need to practice and observe traits like 
compassion in others for some time before they have acquired it for themselves. 
They may be able to comprehend a propositional formulation of compassion, 
but until they have reflected on it in the lives of others, they will lack important 
understanding of what compassion is. They may gain yet greater knowledge 
when they become virtuous themselves. 
This consequence is in harmony with a biblical understanding how 
humans acquire knowledge. According to Dru Johnson, the Hebrew Scriptures 
take participation and practice to play a central role in human understanding. 
He forwards a theory of biblical epistemology in which deference to authorities 
and enactment are key components of what it is to know.1 8 7  Johnson makes an 
analogy between the acquisition of language and biblical knowledge acquisition: 
Ritualized practice, like that conducted when learning a language, opens the 
                                                 
1 8 7  Johnson 2013, 2016. Admittedly, Johnson focuses on connection between knowledge and 
the enactment of rituals, but it is impossible to ignore the parallels with Zagzebski and Stump, 
especially since the rituals in the Hebrew Scriptures have wisdom and moral qualities like 
thankfulness as their aims. 
139 
 
gateway to the recognition of truth and eventually what he calls “discernment,” 
a mastery or skillfulness in a domain of knowledge.1 8 8   
Consider how moral education might be understood along this 
understanding of biblical epistemology. On Johnson’s theory, practice of virtue 
would precedes one’s ability to recognize and understand many aspects of 
virtue. It follows that those with undeveloped moral sensibilities--who have not 
“tried” to be loving, compassionate, etc.--will not understand some salient 
aspects of God’s moral judgments. His statements will be opaque or unclear 
because such individuals lack the Franciscan knowledge and moral 
understanding necessary to fully comprehend the terms He is using. If I am 
right, it is not that God and the prophetic authors are intentionally making 
moral claims obscure; it is that they are intentionally making claims they  know 
will be inscrutable to some, and only partially available to others. 
In this way, the prophetic writings are “opaque” to some audiences. This 
explains why God might proclaim on the outset of a message that his words will 
not be understood or even heard by his people. If the point is merely to 
communicate instructions about the kind of life that leads to the good, it seems 
strange or even passive aggressive of God to dismiss his audience so 
immediately. However, if his point is to exemplify the perfect moral life of God 
in the way I have described it, these passages are not nearly as puzzling. When 
Jeremiah proclaims that the people cannot see or hear, it is unsurprising that he 
appears to draw a connection to stubborn and rebellious hearts (5.21 -25). No 
                                                 
1 8 8  Johnson 2016, p. 78-89. 
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one listens and ears are closed because they do not stand in the proper affective 
and cognitive state in relation to the word of the Lord; that is, they find it 
offensive and find no pleasure in it when instead they should love and relish it 
(6.10). Devotion to idols has so distorted the moral psychology of some that 
Isaiah compares them to the idols because they cannot see or understand 
(44.18ff). Such people are “ever hearing, but never understanding...ever seeing, 
but never perceiving” (Is. 6.9) because understanding increases with the 
acquisition of virtue and good (rather than vicious) habituated emotions.1 8 9  
That means that, by their own blindness, the morally corrupt cannot 
understand much of what God says, and the virtuous will understand more. 
This obscurity is built into the nature of ethics and the moral education of 
persons. 
 Interestingly, it is this passage--Isaiah 6.9--that Jesus quotes in Mark 4, 
and this passage has caused many to interpret Jesus’s teaching as mystical or 
obscure. Hazony apparently shares this view, or at least takes it to be the 
consensus among interpreters of the New Testament.1 9 0  If we take Jesus at his 
word, though, he intended to do something continuous with the Hebrew 
prophets. I see no reason why Jesus’s many comments about his audience’s 
inability to comprehend him should not be taken in the same vein as the saying 
of prophets like Isaiah. Like the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures, Jesus 
                                                 
1 8 9  This passage is interpreted by Hazony as “psy chological thesis” about  human’s lack of 
understanding obscuring  reality (87). His interpretation bears certain similarities to my own, 
but he fails to apply  it to his reading of the New Testament.  
1 9 0  Hazony  pp. 84-5. 
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employed language to make his moral teachings accessible. His moral 
instruction is filled with parables drawing upon the everyday life of his 
audience. He also built upon passages of the Hebrew Scriptures that would be 
familiar to the Jewish people. Why, if it is clear that Jesus meant to obscure his 
teachings, did Jesus make use of these rhetorical devices? Perhaps, like the 
prophets of Nevi’im, Jesus knew his words would both disclose moral truths to 
those prepared to hear them, while remaining challenging or even imperceptible 
to the hard of heart. 
 If my understanding of Nevi’im is correct, I have shown that the 
prophetic writings serve the unique purpose of providing a moral psychology of 
God. This means that the prophetic writings contain important moral content 
that should inform Jewish and Christian ethics. Further work would inv olve 
interpreting exactly what morally relevant psychological states are depicted in 
Nevi’im and which of these states might be applicable to a human audience. Of 
particular interest are those passages describing divine wrath that often frighten 
Christians, who sometimes find it difficult to reconcile wrathful descriptions of 
God with the example set by Jesus in the New Testament. I have some ideas 






Transitive Speech Acts and Melting Away Wax-Nose Anxieties  
in Wolterstorff’s Divine Discourse 
I. Introduction 
In Divine Discourse, Wolterstorff offers five patterns that interpreters 
can use to deal with problematic passages of Scripture.1 9 1  Problematic passages 
are those that seem inconsistent with what interpreters know about God’s 
nature or passages that appear to be in conflict with other portions of Scripture. 
When faced with the task of interpreting such a passage, the reader of Scripture 
may change the rhetorico-conceptual structure of a passage in order to 
understand the passage in a way that can be reconciled with other texts. A 
second strategy is to read the troubling passage figuratively rather than 
adopting the more difficult interpretation. Third, the reader may instead take 
God to be making a more general point in a passage and attribute unsettling 
aspects of a text (say, the instruction for women to remain silent or men to have 
short hair)1 9 2  to the specific context of the human author. According to 
Wolterstorff, the interpreter may even ignore problematic parts of a text 
according to his fourth pattern; however, readers may only do this if difficult 
aspects are in service of a main point that is more readily made consistent with 
                                                 
1 9 1  Wolterstorff 1995, pp. 203-16. 
1 9 2  See 1  Corinthians 11 and 14. 
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the rest of Scripture and/or the divine attributes. Finally, interpreters may 
construe the passage as what Wolterstorff calls “transitive discourse.” 1 9 3  
In each of the above cases, the interpreter is taking certain liberties with 
the text. Due to the perceived problems with the most obvious understanding of 
a portion of Scripture, the interpreter may have reason to believe that God may 
expect the audience to understand his speech as saying something different 
from what the human author of the text intended to communicate. However, 
anytime the interpreter takes these steps away from the most likely intended 
meaning given to the text by the human author, he leaves himself open to what 
Wolterstorff has dubbed “wax-nose anxieties.”1 9 4   This phrase is taken from a 
comment made by John Locke:1 9 5  
So the Scripture serves...like a nose of wax, to be turned and bent, just as 
may fit the contrary orthodoxies of different societies. For it is these 
several systems, that to each party are the just standards of truth, and the 
meaning of the scripture is to be measured only by them.1 9 6   
 
                                                 
1 93 1995, p. 213. 
1 9 4  Ibid p. 226. 
1 9 5  To say  that something or someone is a nose of wax is to state that they are easily moved, 
pliant, or untrustworthy. The origin of the phrase is unknown; however, a similar use of the 
phrase can be found in the famous 1670 trial of William Penn, in which Penn protests a judge’s 
refusal to recognize a not guilty verdict from a jury  by commenting, “If ‘no t guilty’ be no verdict, 
then y ou make of the jury  and the Great Charta [Magna Carta] a mere nose of wax” (Anthony 
1889, p. 372). Sir Walter Scott also employed the metaphor in in his novel set in the 1620s, The 
Fortunes of Nigel, writing, “I am neither an untrue man, to deny you the boon whilk I became 
bound for, nor an Ahab, to covet Naboth’s v ineyard; nor a mere nose-of-wax, to be twisted this 
way  and that, by  favourites and counsellors at their pleasure” (Scott 546).  
1 9 6  Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, sect. C, 295. See also 296-97. 
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Locke here acknowledges a problem that was recently revived by 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, as well as Richard Swinburne and Eleonore Stump.1 9 7  He 
is concerned with the way Scripture is interpreted—and possibly distorted—by a 
set of fundamentals or assumptions brought to biblical texts. Following John 
Locke, Wolterstorff describes wax-nose anxieties as the worry that we have in 
some way shaped the biblical text according to our preference, leaving it “turned 
and bent” according to our biases and cultural norms. Without something 
explicit in the text to anchor our interpretation, we may decide that God could 
not have said something simply because we do not want to attribute such 
speech to him—even if it is, in fact, what he means to communicate to human 
readers.  
For Locke, the answer is to do away with any such assumptions. He 
thinks that any reader who goes “to the Holy Scriptures, that true fountain of 
light” will not be hoodwinked by their bad assumptions, for the teachings of 
Christ and the Apostles will provide all the reader needs to properly interpret 
the text. Wolterstorff, in contrast, argues that interpretation is simply not that 
easy: No one can succeed in interpreting Scripture without any assumptions 
(such as that God will not contradict himself or lie).1 9 8  Wolterstorff maintains 
that the best the interpreter can do is minimize such anxieties by being 
thoughtful, cautious and epistemically humble in both the convictions with 
                                                 
1 9 7  See Swinburne (2007) and Stump (1994) in the bibliography.  
1 9 8  1995, pp. 226-9. 
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which one approaches Scripture and in the interpretative strategies one 
applies.1 9 9   
 Despite Wolterstorff’s best efforts to limit the threat to the text created by 
assumptions, some contend that Wolterstorff’s methodology actually worsens 
the interpreter’s situation.2 00  In a response to Wolterstorff’s book, Dutch 
theologian Maarten Wisse argues that two of Wolterstorff’s strategies, the 
changing of rhetorico-conceptual structure and the transitive discourse reading 
of texts, leave Wolterstorff especially open to wax-nose concerns.2 01  In what 
follows, I will recount both Wolterstorff’s view and Wisse’s assessment. I will 
then show that there is no plausible way to save Wolterstorff from Wisse’s 
criticisms and offer an alternative interpretative strategy for problematic 
passages that are often considered transitive discourse. I argue that one of 
Wolterstorff’s existing strategies is sufficient for dealing with problematic 
passages once proper attention is given to genre, and it does so without invoking 
transitive discourse readings or changes in rhetorico-conceptual structure. 
II. Divine Discourse: Reading the Work of Two Agents 
                                                 
1 9 9  Ibid pp. 236-39. This is actually not the entirety of what Wolterstorff advises. His final (and 
in my  v iew most important) admonishment is to know God well v ia all the way s God makes 
himself available to us through devotion and reflection (p. 239). Wolterstorff observes that just 
as we are often better able to understand the words of a well-known friend than a stranger, so 
we stand to improve our interpretive position if we come to know God better through means 
other than biblical interpretation. However, evaluating biblical interpretations on the basis of 
piety  does not lend itself to a philosophical paper, so I will be focusing on the ways of averting 
the wax -nose anxiety mentioned above.  
2 00  See also Levine (1998) in the bibliography. 
2 01  2002. 
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In Divine Discourse, Nicholas Wolterstorff identifies the complex issues 
surrounding our understanding of divine speech. In particular, Wolterstorff 
focuses on the problems that arise given the fact that divine speech is often 
communicated to those who would listen via the means of either a deputized2 02  
speaker or appropriated human speech. There are almost always, Wolterstorff 
points out, two agents involved in divine discourse. In the case of deputized 
discourse, the two agents are the divine agent and the human agent whom God 
deputizes to speak on his behalf.2 03  In appropriated discourse, the two agents 
are the human agent who authors the text and the divine agent who 
appropriates the text as his own. By appropriate, Wolterstorff means that one 
agent adopts another agent’s speech as his own so that the discourse counts as 
his discourse. Wolterstorff notes that given the diversity of the various texts that 
make up Scripture, it is possible that ways in which biblical texts are 
appropriated by God may differ from text to text. For example, it does not seem 
plausible that the prophetic declarations of Isaiah were appropriated in the 
same way as, say, the erotic poetry of Song of Songs.2 04  
Further complicating matters is the important distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, a feature of speech first observed by J. L. 
Austin. Put briefly, locutionary acts are the words spoken or inscribed in order  
                                                 
2 02  On deputation: “If one person is deputized to speak in the name of another, then t he 
deputy ’s discourse counts as the other person’s discourse” (1995, p. 186). The most obvious 
examples of deputized speech in Scripture are the writings of the prophets.  
2 03  Ibid pp. 5, 186. 
2 04  Ibid p. 186-7 . Wolterstorff notes that even if Scripture consists of varying kinds of 




to communicate an illocutionary act.2 05  This includes the syntactical structure, 
phonetic aspects and semantic content2 06  of the act. For example, consider the 
statements Katy writes philosophy and Katy is writing theology. We can 
recognize that these two phrases are two different locutionary acts because they 
have different syntactical structure, phonetic qualities and semantic content.  
Consider, in contrast, the illocutionary acts that locutionary acts convey. 
Illocutionary acts are the things speech acts (as well as other symbols like codes 
and signs)2 07  convey: asking, stating, commanding, declaring, promising, etc.2 08  
These modes are called the force of locutionary acts. The difference between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts is best conveyed by returning to the above 
example: One might state, Katy writes philosophy, but one might also warn, 
Katy writes philosophy. Notice that in both of these cases the locutionary act is 
the same. Both utterances (or inscriptions, etc.) contain the same content, 
structure, and phonetics. The acts committed when expressing in these 
locutions are different, though. In the first case, one merely describes a state of 
affairs (maybe providing information to a friend who does not know Katy well, 
                                                 
2 05  Ibid p. 13. 
2 06  What aspects of an agent’s use of language actually count as the semantic content is 
notoriously contested in the philosophy of language. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
consider semantic content to roughly correspond to propositions. For example, God save the 
queen and Dieu sauve la reine share the same semantic content in their respective languages 
(English and French). Sy nonyms that share the same definition and not merely the same 
designates (such as baby and infant, but not Hesperus and Phosphorus) also share semantic 
content, although they fall short of being full propositions. 
2 07  Wolterstorff gives “producing a blaze, or smoke, or a sequence of light -flashes” as examples 
of acts that could relay illocutionary content while not requiring an agent to resort to a 
locutionary act (p. 13). 
2 08  Ibid p. 13. 
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or letting her parents know how she is spending her time in college); in the 
second, one is advising caution (perhaps giving notice to a friend that Katy will 
be troublesome by engaging in characteristically philosophical behaviors, like 
asking an endless stream of questions).2 09  
The recognition of these distinctions raises questions for hermeneutics. 
Given that much of Scripture appears to be human discourse appropriated by 
God, we are left to wonder whether God intended to appropriate the intentions 
of the human agents, the sense of the agent’s words, or just the locutionary act 
itself independent from any sense or intentions belonging to the human agents. 
Further, did God intend to appropriate the locutionary act as it is situated in 
historical context? In other words, is the message God intended to convey 
through a human agent something that includes the implications and 
relationships the utterance had for its original audience? Or should we expect 
the implications and relationships to change over time?  
These questions only increase in complexity when we consider 
appropriated narratives. Do we think God endorses the historical details of 
these narratives or some more general message that we can extract? Does God 
mean for us to understand some of these narratives metaphorically instead of 
(or perhaps in addition to) univocally? If so, does God do this even in cases 
where the human agent took himself to be making univocal claims in his 
illocutionary act rather than metaphorical claims? These are just some of the 
                                                 
2 09  Austin 1975, pp.94-100. 
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problems that can arise when trying to understand an appropriated message, 
divine or otherwise.2 1 0  
In the aforementioned cases, we can have a variety of relevant speech 
acts that bear on the final understanding of texts or spoken words: The 
illocutionary act of God, the illocutionary act of the human agent and the 
locutionary act of the human agent (that God has appropriated to some end). 
Note that these aspects of a text or message must be settled in addition to 
establishing what Wolterstorff calls the noematic content. Noematic content is 
simply the semantic content2 1 1  plus the use (e.g., literal, metaphorical) and 
mode (e.g., asserting, promising) of illocutionary stance for a speech—act. It is 
only after these are established—a task challenging in its own right—that one 
can begin to make sense of the way in which the speech act is appropriated and 
the illocutionary stance of the one who does the appropriating, and finally the 
way in which all of these elements might work together to convey the final 
meaning of a text. 
                                                 
2 1 0  From this point forward I will often refer to the appropriating agent as the “divine agent” in 
my  analy sis even when the statement may be applicable to situations in which both the 
appropriating agent and original discoursing agent are humans. Since this paper concerns 
Scripture I will almost always be applying statements about appropriated discourse to cases in 
which God is the one appropriating a human agent’s (or angel’s) discourse. Statements which 
only apply  to a div ine agent or a human agent will be explicitly noted. 
2 1 1  See fn. 15. Wolterstorff states that the noematic content is the meaning shared between, say, 
successful translations of a speech act among various languages, as well as the sense in which 
the speech act is intended (p. 138ff). This includes modes like metaphor and literal (traditionally 
considered an aspect of use in philosophy of language) and the modes of illocutionary acts given 
above. It is helpful to think of a speech act as consisting of the categories semantic content, use 
(in the limited sense specified above), and illocutionary stance, and the noematic content as 
what fills these categories. 
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Of course these questions are of central relevance to the understanding of 
divine discourse in Scripture which we generally take to consist almost entirely 
of some kind of appropriated speech act(s). However, Wolterstorff argues that 
contemporary hermeneutics “resists” this kind of philosophical investigation.2 1 2  
Indeed, hermeneutics often bypasses the concerns expressed here and moves 
directly into interpreting a text with implicit assumptions about what parts of 
the speech act are relevant already built into the interpretative process. 
Wolterstorff criticizes this approach, arguing that so far as God appears to have 
used human agents to relay a message via Scripture, would-be hermeneuts must 
contend with questions about which aspects of the text God intended to 
appropriate. Note that this is not simply an issue of deciding which speech acts 
can qualify as divine speech. There remains a further question concerning what 
aspects of those speech acts constitute God’s message and which facts are 
relevant to our interpretation of his message. 
To this end Wolterstorff advises two hermeneutics. The first is to 
establish the noematic content of the discourse.2 1 3  This includes establishing 
which is the most likely intended meaning of a sentence capable of expressing 
multiple meanings; determining if the sentence is literal or a trope (that is, 
nonliteral, such as the metaphorical or ironic use of a sentence);2 1 4  determining 
the context and genre in which the sentence appears; evaluating the likely 
                                                 
2 1 2  Ibid p. 15. 
2 1 3  Ibid p. 189. 
2 1 4  For Wolterstorff, sentences are used as tropes if they  are intended to function nonliterally. 
This includes metaphor, hyperbole, irony, metonymy, synecdoche, personification, etc. (192). 
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intention and the illocutionary stance of the speaking agent; and identifying the 
likely objects of any ambiguous designative language.2 1 5  According to 
Wolterstorff, because of the way the noematic content is established, we cannot 
properly understand a passage of Scripture without some knowledge of 
historical facts related to the text, and “interpreters cannot function without 
beliefs about the discourser.”2 1 6  
The second hermeneutic is more relevant to the concerns I will pose here. 
It concerns the act of appropriation by the divine discourser. First, Wolterstorff 
takes for granted that at least some of the theological truths of the Bible are 
parasitic on the details of the text.2 1 7  Close readings and meticulous study of the 
Scriptures increase our understanding of God’s discourse as it is relayed 
through human agents. Importantly for our purposes, he also thinks that the 
minutiae of the text work as a kind of barrier to imposed readings. The more we 
can understand the subtleties of the text, the more difficult it will be to mold the 
text according to our biases because these details “resist imposed 
interpretations.”2 1 8  
Wolterstorff states at the outset that the default reading of appropriated 
discourse should be that the divine agent intended to appropriate the 
                                                 
2 1 5  Ibid p. 189-200. 
2 1 6  Ibid p. 196. 
2 1 7  Ibid p. 202. 
2 1 8  Ibid p. 202. 
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illocutionary stance and noematic content of the human discourse.2 1 9  However, 
one of the great challenges of hermeneutics is that sometimes the human 
discourse in question does not appear to be compatible with what we would 
otherwise think would be the sort of thing God would say.2 2 0  On occasions such 
as these, Wolterstorff advises the interpreter to look for the likeliest 
illocutionary stance and content we think God intended to take.  
There are a couple of ways the interpreter can come up with the most 
probable understanding of God’s appropriated discourse. Wolterstorff stresses 
the importance of considering the unity of the entire Bible as a way to come up 
with the sort of things God is likely to say.2 2 1  He also claims that there are 
certain assumptions that we can legitimately bring to the text to frame our 
readings, although he only explicitly endorses one such assumption (that God 
will not contradict himself).2 2 2  
Once the unity of Scripture and our legitimate assumptions are taken 
into account, we might still come across passages that lend themselves to 
undesirable readings. The illocutionary stance we perceive as adopted by the 
author may be one we are hesitant to attribute to God. On these occasions, 
                                                 
2 1 9  Ibid p. 204. 
2 2 0  Ibid. 
2 2 1  Ibid p. 205. 
2 2 2  Ibid p. 206-7. He lists some other possible candidates for assumptions that can ground our 
interpretations: that God will not say  something inconsistent with the mandate to love God and 
neighbor, and that God will not speak a falsehood and that God will o nly  speak on issues of faith 




Wolterstorff thinks we can employ certain strategies to see if there might be an 
alternate message conveyed by the text other than the one relayed by the human 
author’s combined illocutionary and locutionary act. Uncovering the divine 
speech conveyed through a human agent’s writing requires the use of certain 
“patterns” or procedures. Wolterstorff suggests five admissible patterns:2 2 3  
1. The interpreter can change the rhetorico-conceptual structure of 
the text so that the proper designees in the text are preserved. 
(E.g., “God, whom I serve with my spirit” becomes “Paul serves 
God with his spirit” instead of “God, whom God serves with his 
spirit”.) 
2. The interpreter may jettison parts of the text that are mere 
instruments to a larger point if we have reasons to think it is 
unlikely that God intended to endorse certain phrases that are 
mere means to communicate a main point that it seems he would 
endorse. (E.g., God appropriates the main point of “He has 
established the world; it shall never be moved” but not the 
particular phrases; God therefore affirms his own sovereignty but 
not false cosmology or astronomy.) 
3. When it seems the likeliest interpretation of a text, an interpreter 
may take God as speaking tropically even if the human author was 
speaking literally. (E.g., God intends to make a metaphorical 
statement about his opposition to those who harm Israel when he 
                                                 
2 2 3  Ibid p. 208-216. 
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appropriates “Happy shall they be who take your little ones and 
dash them against the rock” even though the author of this psalm 
was likely speaking literally.) 
4. The interpreter may deem it appropriate to understand a text to be 
transitive, defined as “one act of discourse on the part of a person 
counting as another act of discourse.”2 2 4  Not only may the human 
agent consider his words to be transitive (as when telling a parable 
or allegory), but God may appropriate a speech act that the human 
agent does not intend to be transitive and use it only in its 
transitive sense.2 2 5  (E.g., though the human author likely intended 
Song of Songs to be an erotic love poem, God appropriates the 
book only in its allegorical sense and not the illocutionary act by 
the agent that is an expression of erotic love.) In cases of transitive 
discourse, locutions are used in ways that resemble allegory; 
however, transitive discourse is different from allegory. What 
makes the speech act transitive is the illocutionary act rather than 
the explicitly stated use or genre inherent in the locution. Some 
examples might be illuminative on this point. Take, for example, 
the Song of the Vineyard in Isaiah 5. It is locutionary act that 
establishes the song as allegory; the semantic content makes it 
                                                 
2 2 4  Ibid p. 213. 
2 2 5  From this point on, I will focus on the latter kind of transitive discourse (in which the 
illocutionary acts of God and the original discourser diverge) rather than the former (in which 
the human discourser is already speaking transitively before God appropriates the speech act). I 
will simply  refer to this latter kind as “double agency transitive  discourse”, even though the form 
kind of transitive discourse is also a form of double agency discourse.  
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clear that the vineyard represents the people of Israel when it 
states, “For the vineyard of the Lord of hosts is the house of Israel, 
and the men of Judah are his pleasant planting” (v. 5).  Another 
example is quite different, though: Consider how the narratives of 
the Hebrew Scriptures might be transitive. While these books are 
not allegorical, the human author or God’s illocutionary act may 
be such that the speech turns out to be transitive. Perhaps the 
prophet Samuel compiled I Samuel in order to teach the people of 
Israel certain lessons, or perhaps God’s illocutionary stance is that 
he intended the history of Israel to function as a series of parables 
for the church. In both of these cases, there are two illocutionary  
acts: Samuel is declaring the history of Israel, but he is also 
teaching or moralizing because he intends this history to establish 
moral claims; in the latter example, Samuel is still declaring the 
history of Israel, but God is allegorizing or fabling. Notice that in 
these cases where there is more than one illocutionary act, the 
noematic content changes as well: The semantic content and the 
illocutionary stance are different when Samuel declares the history 
of Israel and when he is moralizing with it. Finally, sometimes 
both the locutionary act, illocutionary act of the human discourser, 
and the illocutionary act of the divine discourser make it such that 
a speech act is both allegory and transitive, or that both 
illocutionary acts are transitive. Wolterstorff offers John Bunyan’s 
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Pilgrim’s Progress and the book of Jonah as candidates for speech 
acts of this type.2 2 6  
5. The interpreter may judge that the speech act of a human author is 
more context-specific than God’s speech act in appropriating such 
a statement. (E.g., Paul may tell women to be silent in the 
particular context of the first-century Corinthian church, but God 
appropriates this text not to issue precisely the same injunction to 
all women in the church; rather, he appropriates Paul’s instruction 
in order to issue a more general principle about order in the 
church or disrespectful behavior.)2 2 7  
Wolterstorff cautions that we can depart from our original principle—
that God intended to appropriate the illocutionary stance of the human 
discourser—only if we have “a good reason for departing”: “Absent such good 
reason, we interpret the appropriator or deputizer as saying what the person 
whose discourse is appropriated or deputized said. Appropriation is not license 
for unbridled play of imagination on the part of interpreters.”2 2 8   
  
                                                 
2 2 6  Ibid pp. 213-14. 
2 2 7  Interestingly, Wolterstorff (unlike Richard Swinburne, Eleonore Stump and Hans Frei) does 
not think his methodology for interpretation need include an appeal to church tradition. Rather, 
Wolterstorff expects that his interpreter will (tacitly or otherwise) incorporate the traditions of 
the church in his interpretation when he considers which assumptions he will bring to the text 
prior to deciding which of the five patterns he will use (pp. 221-2). 
2 2 8  Ibid p. 237 . 
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III. Wisse’s Critique 
 Wisse criticizes Wolterstorff’s hermeneutics on two counts. Both concern 
the way in which Wolterstorff’s strategies allow the reader to change and 
reshape the text in the process of interpretation. First, as noted in (1) above, 
sometimes we have to change the rhetorico-conceptual structure of passages 
when interpreting discourse that is appropriated.2 2 9  But Wisse points out that 
some forms of literature in Scripture are not as straightforward as others when 
it comes to modifying the structure of a passage so that it makes sense that God 
appropriates it.2 3 0  While it may seem right to say that Paul’s claim to be God’s 
witness could be changed so that we understand it as something more like “Paul 
is my witness”, the designative content strikes us as largely the same: The state 
of affairs that x is a witness of y is, in both cases, true and meant to be 
understood as a claim underwritten by God. However, Wisse points out that this 
is a very simple form a speech, and there are other forms of speech that must 
also be restructured so that we can understand it as appropriated by God. 
However, these other forms (Wisse uses prescriptive and commissive acts as 
examples) are not so straightforwardly restructured. Attempts to restructure 
them seem to damage the propositional content (whether noematic, designative, 
or both) of the text or alter the illocutionary act.2 3 1  
                                                 
2 2 9  Ibid p. 209. 
2 3 0  Wisse 2002, p.  pp. 166-7 . 
2 3 1  Ibid. 
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Wisse also objects to Wolterstorff’s use of transitive discourse. Recall that 
transitive discourse ((2) above) includes methods of communication like 
parables and allegories.2 3 2  The idea is that in such forms of discourse, one 
illocutionary act “counts as” another. However, Wolterstorff does not elaborate 
on how exactly we should understand this “counting as” relation. Arguably, the 
meaning of the locution and the noematic content come apart: By telling a 
parable about the employees of the vineyard (the meaning of the discourse), you 
are also accusing the Pharisees of ungratefulness, for example (the use of the 
discourse, set by the noematic content, which is turn determined by your 
illocutionary stance). 2 3 3   
Discourse can be transitive due the illocutionary act and locutionary  act 
of a single agent. In the case above, Jesus likely intended his parable to be 
transitive. Both the meaning and noematic content are derived from what a 
single agent brings to the discourse. However, double agency can give rise to 
unique cases of transitive discourse, according to Wolterstorff. Recall that the 
definition of transitive discourse is such that the original agent’s illocutionary 
act that led to the locutionary act of recording a narrative or erotic poem may 
correspond to one set of noematic contents (those belonging to the human 
agent); however, God’s appropriation of it may lend it a second set of noematic 
                                                 
2 3 2  Wolterstorff 1995, p. 212. 
2 3 3  Wolterstorff thinks that sentences, including metaphors, have do not have a “metaphorical 
meaning” when used as a metaphor. In other words, a tropic statement does not have a 
metaphorical meaning in addition to a literal meaning. Rather, a sentence always has whatever  
meaning (or meanings, in the case that the sentence contains homonyms, etc.) it has based on 
the standing of the sentence within the public domain. It is the noematic contents of the 
illocutionary act that changes depending on how an agent uses the statement (ibid pp. 192-3). 
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contents if his illocutionary stance is different, making the discourse 
transitive.2 3 4    
Wisse argues that Wolterstorff’s idea of transitive discourse is especially 
vulnerable to wax-nose anxieties. He writes that Wolterstorff’s methodology is 
prone to interpretations that are “completely arbitrary and prone to ideological 
interest.”2 3 5  One problem, in Wisse’s view, is that Wolterstorff’s notion of 
transitive discourse is too broad. According to Wolterstorff’s definition, much of 
our everyday speech is transitive in nature. Wisse writes, “We constantly 
perform illocutionary acts in the context of which we perform other kinds of 
illocutionary acts. For example: We describe a situation before we give 
instructions (briefings in a military context).”2 3 6  In order to narrow the category 
sufficiently so that it is meaningful, Wisse argues that the term transitive 
discourse should be used for speech acts made by a single agent only when one 
factual claim is being used to make another factual claim. (Wisse uses the 
example of John Bunyan making a claim about a house in order to make 
another claim about a soul.) These instances of single agency discourse are 
notable because it is the illocutionary act that makes these claims tropic. On this 
view, parables and other fictional stories that are used to make a point would 
not be considered transitive, as they do not involve two factual claims, and it is 
not the illocutionary act that makes them tropic. 
                                                 
2 3 4  Ibid pp. 213-4. 
2 3 5  Wisse 2002, p. 160. 
2 3 6  Ibid p. 168. 
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 Wisse also criticizes the transitive category because the transition 
between the two illocutionary layers of the discourse is unclear.2 3 7  This, I 
believe, is what is primarily at issue when Wisse talks of transitive discourse 
giving rise to wax-nose anxieties. Wisse acknowledges that the illocutionary acts 
of two agents will sometimes come apart in cases of double agency discourse 
involving the appropriation of a speech act. However, Wisse shows that the 
exact relationship between the illocutionary act of the human author and that of 
the divine appropriator is unclear. Beginning with Wolterstorff’s default 
position, we can assume that God appropriates both the locutionary and 
illocutionary act of the human agent. Of course, this is precisely what we are 
trying to avoid by invoking the category of double agency transitive discourse in 
the first place. It is intended to be an account that makes sense of passages that 
are otherwise bizarre if understood as God’s speech.2 3 8  Wisse demonstrates this 
problem with Song of Songs: If we interpret Song of Songs as an expression of 
Christ’s love for the church, following the tradition of many in church history, it 
does not seem suitable to say that God also appropriated the author’s expression 
of erotic desire for his bride. Similar problems arise when we consider transitive 
discourse interpretations of angry psalms or historically inaccurate passages. 
 Wisse considers an alternative account of transitive discourse that might 
save Wolterstorff here. Suppose instead that God appropriates the locutionary 
act alone when engaged in double agency transitive discourse. The view still 
                                                 
2 3 7  Ibid. 
2 3 8  Ibid p. 169. 
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goes awry, according to Wisse, and for three reasons: (1) The illocutionary 
stance of the original discourser is less significant and possibly even irrelevant 
to the sense of the passage in question since all that has been acquired is just 
sounds and structure; (2) the divine agent only superficially acquires the words 
of the human agent and the relationship between the two speech acts might be 
incredibly thin; and (3) it undermines Wolterstorff’s second hermeneutic, 
meaning that we are free to assume God must mean something else when we 
come to an uncomfortable passage—even if the text stubbornly frustrates such 
interpretations.2 3 9  Wisse notes: 
The fact that interpreting God’s transitive appropriating discourse 
primarily involves attention for the new context in which the speech act 
is performed on the basis of the appropriated discourse, means that we 
have to account much more intensively for the role of the discourser 
‘outside’ the appropriated text. Then, the question is: who is this 
discourser? Wolterstorff might answer, of course, that it is God. The 
difficulty with this answer is, however, that it bypasses the fact that the 
very reason why we want to assign a new meaning to the text as part of 
God’s discourse is that we as religious believers want to give the text this 
meaning, although the text, as it stands, in fact resists it – which is the 
reason why we interpret it in a transitive way.2 4 0  
 
Transitive readings, then, leave the reader open to find passages he does 
not like and reinterpret it through the lens of what he thinks God would say. But 
this is obviously troubling, for it seems our idea of what God would and would 
not say, when not informed by objective facts in the text of authoritative 
                                                 
2 3 9  Ibid p. 171. 
2 4 0  Ibid. 
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revelation, can quickly be put in service of misguided or even malicious 
ideologies and preferences. 
IV. Response to Wisse 
 The success of Wisse’s criticism rests on whether or not there is a more 
intelligible way to understand the role of the human author’s illocutionary 
stance in transitive discourse. Wolterstorff’s description of the act as “counting 
as” another illocutionary act is not terribly informative. This could mean 
anything from the appropriator’s use of the discourse completely trumping the 
original act so that the divine appropriator is in no way responsible for or 
approving of the human author’s illocutionary act, to merely altering parts of 
the original illocutionary act.  
However, Wolterstorff also holds that interpretations should be 
“anchored” by the human author’s discourse.2 4 1  Here he seems to have in view 
the entirety of the appropriated speech act—noematic and designative content, 
illocutionary stance and locutionary act. He also thinks that attention to the 
minutiae of the text restricts the available interpretations. Whatever “counting 
as” means in the context of transitive discourse will determine the ways in 
which our understanding of God’s speech is restrained by the original text. If 
transitive discourse is to resist ideologies and impositions on the text, it needs 
to be in some way limited by some aspect of settled matters in the human 
author’s discourse.  
                                                 
2 4 1  1995, p. 187. 
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Perhaps the situation can be helped by incorporating Wisse’s first 
criticism, that the category of transitive discourse, as it stands in Wolterstorff’s 
work, is too broad. Wisse’s suggests that we restrict the category to literal 
passages that are used as tropes. In tropic discourse the meaning of a sentence 
is the same, but the illocutionary stance changes so that it produces noematic 
and often designative contents that are distinct from the meaning. In the 
context of double agency transitive discourse, the use of the locutionary act (that 
is, the sentence with a fixed meaning) changes so that the illocutionary act is a 
metaphorical one; this produces a second layer of content, but it does so by way 
of not just the meaning of the sentence but by the noematic content of the 
original discourse.2 4 2   
At first glance, this may not be so troubling. I might say that someone 
owes me a “pound of flesh.” On Wolterstorff’s theory, the sentence meaning is 
not different from the literal meaning despite my using it as a metaphor. Rather, 
it is the illocutionary stance that has changed—I am using the phrase 
metaphorically. My illocutionary act is still more complicated than this, though. 
I may use a sentence metaphorically while also asserting, inquiring or 
commanding, etc.2 4 3  Perhaps in double agency cases of transitive discourse, the 
divine agent only appropriates certain aspects of the human author’s 
illocutionary stance. 
                                                 
2 4 2  Ibid pp. 193-4. 
2 4 3  Ibid pp. 154-5. 
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When we test this modified theory of transitive discourse using 
Wolterstorff’s and Wisse’s preferred example, Song of Songs, we see that use of 
a metaphor is still restricted by some aspects of the original illocutionary stance. 
The illocutionary stance of much of Songs and Songs is assertive in the original 
illocutionary act: The human author describes states of affairs, namely his 
desire for his beloved.2 4 4   
Other more complicated speech acts occur within the larger assertion of 
the book. The human author makes inquiries and speaks metaphorically in 
order to accomplish his end of describing his desire for his bride. However, 
taken as a unit, the book easily lends itself to a reading in which the author 
asserts a literal and descriptive account of love conveyed by the means of these 
more complex speech acts. It seems unlikely that the human author took the 
song as a whole to be metaphorical—to apply to something other than the love 
between the Beloved and his Bride (or, in the case that these do not refer to 
specific individuals, beloveds and their brides as a category of relationships), 
understood literally. 
So far the interpretation is unproblematic. However, we still have the 
task of understanding the way in which God appropriates such language. The 
default reading should be to adopt the noematic content and illocutionary 
stance of the human author. As both Wisse and Wolterstorff point out, we 
                                                 
2 4 4  Austin would also categorize assertive language as constative, but I will continue to use 
Wolterstorff’s preferred term. So far as I can tell, the terms are interchangeable for our purposes 
(even though the terms may not be interchangeable in other contexts).  He defines assert as “to 
make a claim” (p. 35). Both Austin’s “constatives” and Wolterstorff’s “assertions” involve 
making a descriptive statement that is either true or false. This is sufficient to use them 
interchangeably in this context, as Wisse also appears to do.  
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certainly cannot attribute sensual love to God and be theologically and biblically 
consistent. We look instead for the next likeliest reading. Following 
Wolterstorff, we will take the song to be transitive. Following Wisse, we will 
restrict this to the available tropic readings of the passage. According to 
Wolterstorff, this means that “the allegorizing discourse belongs to the divine 
author, the allegorized discourse, to the human author.”2 4 5   
God, then, is appropriating the human author’s speech act; however, he 
is appropriating it such that the human author’s illocutionary stance “counts as” 
an allegorical speech act. There does not seem to be any reason to suppose that 
God’s stance has changed from the human author’s assertive stance, so we will 
suppose this is the same. However, the designative content (which Wolterstorff 
holds is distinct from the noematic content) has also changed as a function of 
the allegorical use of the original discourse. Instead of the Beloved and his 
Bride, we now view that language as concerning Christ and the church, or 
perhaps God and Israel. God then acquires certain aspects of the human 
author’s illocutionary stance (assertion), but not others (literal use of speech, 
designation). 
We already have made a departure with Wisse’s evaluation of transitive 
discourse. Wisse presumes that God must either acquire the entirety of the 
illocutionary stance of the human author, or he must acquire only the 
locutionary act, so that “it shares with it only the same sounds, the same words, 
                                                 
2 4 5  Ibid p. 214. 
166 
 
and the same grammatical structure.”2 4 6  For example, in the case of the book of 
I Samuel, God either adopts Samuel’s illocutionary stance of declaring, or he 
adopts the mere locutionary act that is the book of I Samuel: the syntactic 
structure, phonetic features, and semantic content, but not the force or mode of 
Samuel’s illocutionary stance. Using the same locution, he could be promising, 
questioning, or performing some other illocutionary act. 
Presumably Wisse means slightly more than this—there is no reason to 
think that the appropriator does not acquire the same sentence meaning (in 
Wolterstorff’s sense of the term) as the original author.2 4 7  In any case, Wisse 
thinks that the connection to the original discourse will be thin (so thin that the 
passages will become vulnerable to our ideologies). On my altered use of 
Wolterstorff’s theory, the situation is not so binary: According to my assessment 
of Song of Songs, God is asserting like the human author, but he is also 
allegorizing when the human author is not.  The divine agent appropriates some 
aspects of the illocutionary stance, but not others. There remain features of the 
author’s illocutionary stance that restrict the possible meanings of the text; in 
this way, the work of human author still “anchors” the discourse.  
Given that double agency transitive discourse has now been redefined so 
that it only occurs when either the original agent speaks tropically (and this 
                                                 
2 4 6  2002 p. 171. 
2 4 7  Recall that for Wolterstorff, meaning is fixed by  the sentence, not by the illocutionary stance. 
However, a sentence may have more than one sentence: “There is a seal” may  have a meaning 
including a bit of imprinted wax or a flippered mammal. There are certainly  cases of figurative 
language in Scripture that rely on sy nonyms (arguably there are several in the Book of Isaiah), 




language is appropriated by another agent) or when the appropriating agent 
uses the original agent’s literal discourse metaphorically, we still need to 
investigate whether or not the account we have arrived at seems like a plausible 
account of a kind of speech act. On this reading, “counting as” is understood as 
the appropriating agent adopting some aspects of the illocutionary stance of the 
original agent and not others. This results in a second layer of noematic content 
and designative content that is distinct from the content of the original 
discourse. For this version of transitive discourse to succeed, it  needs to be a 
plausible account of discourse consistent with Wolterstorff’s theory of metaphor 
while also providing sufficient distance from the original speech act so as to not 
to commit God to speech acts which we did not want to attribute to him in the 
first place. It must do all of this while still maintaining sufficient connection to 
the original discourse so as not to make our interpretations vulnerable to our 
own ideologies and biases. 
Wolterstorff does not provide an exhaustive theory of tropes, but he does 
give an account of metaphor that is generalizable to most figurative speech.2 4 8  
(In fact, Wolterstorff explicitly indicates that he intends his comments to be 
                                                 
2 4 8  It is not applicable to certain figures of speech like hy perbole, etc. However, the kinds of 
tropic speech it does not apply to are often obviously problematic. For example, hyperbole is 
must easier to cache out in terms of noematic content and illocutionary stance. It also seems less 
likely  to figure into problematic cases of double agency transitive discourse. This is because such 
speech acts are often laden tropes in the human author’s discourse before being appropriated by  
God simply  in v irtue of the nature of the content. In most cases, interpreters who want to 
interpret a problematic passage of Scripture tropically usually do so by using some kind of 
metaphor or closely related figurative speech like analogy or simile. Many other forms of 
figurative speech, like hyperbole, require  the affirmation of what has already been said and 




applicable to tropic language in general.)2 4 9  Accordingly, we can see if our 
attempt to interpret the Song of Songs as transitive discourse meets the criteria 
established above. Metaphors are a matter of use rather than meaning. 
Wolterstorff writes, “The metaphoricity of my use inheres in a certain 
relationship between the [normative] meaning of the sentence and the noematic 
content of what I say.”2 5 0  There is a contrast, then, between the two parts of the 
speech act: On one hand, there is the meaning of the sentence, on the other the 
noematic content of what is said. Metaphors, then, do not involv e two sets of 
noematic content, even though transitive discourse does. What about the other 
aspects of illocutionary acts? Designative content and the action performed on 
that content—assertion, command, etc.—have yet to be determined. It seems 
that in most instances of metaphor, the designative content is made clear by the 
context of the speech act; that is, the designation is made by the implied 
relationship between the metaphor and the subject under discussion. The action 
performed seems to be the same: “Do not look a gift horse in the mouth” is an 
admonition or possible command regardless of whether it is taken literally or 
figuratively. “Does it ring a bell?” is a question according to both its locution and 
the illocutionary acts we tend to attribute to it. 
Problematic, then, will be transitive discourse that takes descriptive 
language as prescriptive, or constative2 5 1  language as commands. This still 
                                                 
2 4 9  1995, p. 193. 
2 5 0  Ibid. 
2 5 1  That is, assertive in Wolterstorff’s terminology.  
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allows for transitive readings of books like Song of Songs: Both the human 
discourse and divine discourse are understood as assertive under the reading 
described above. However, it would prohibit some readings of historical, 
constative passages that transform them into performatives.2 5 2   
Designation, though, seems trickier. If context is supposed to set the 
designees of a metaphor, we have to suppose that the context of the book, 
whether within the book or within the whole of Scripture, lends to its figurative 
reading. However, as Wolterstorff himself notes, “the clues seem to be entirely 
lacking.”2 5 3  The book itself does not suggest a figurative reading—if it did, there 
would be no need for the special double agency transitive discourse reading that 
we have applied to it. The presence of “figurative designees” in the book would 
be evidence that the book is itself a work of allegory, rendering it no longer 
transitive in the relevant sense.  If the book itself is incapable of setting the 
designees of the text given the very nature of transitive discourse, the 
interpreter is left to speculate wildly about the designees intended by the divine 
discourser.  
One might dispute that the book is the only place to look for the 
designees of the transitive reading. Perhaps the entirety of Scripture could serve 
as the context for the transitive use of Song of Songs. The Bible as a whole, then, 
would need to make it clear that the book is meant to designate Christ and the 
church. There does not appear to be sufficient evidence for the allegorical 
                                                 
2 5 2  I mean “performatives” in the technical, Austinian sense of the term.  
2 5 3  Ibid p. 214. 
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reading, though. While the relationship between Christ and the church is 
compared to a marriage, nowhere does the Old or New Testament indicate the 
figurative application of Song of Songs in the way, say, Galatians applies a 
figurative reading to Sarah and Hagar.2 5 4   
How do we make sense of the two sets of noematic content for transitive 
discourse, then, one of which selectively chooses features from the first 
illocutionary act while ignoring others? It appears that, given the parameters of 
tropic language, we might just as well dispose of the entirety of the illocutionary 
act of the original speech. All that is required for tropic language is sentence 
meaning, something derived entirely from the locutionary act, not the 
illocutionary act. 
One clue might be that Wolterstorff also describes locutionary acts as 
“counting as” illocutionary acts.2 5 5  By this he means that the currency of some 
illocutionary act is a locutionary act (even though it easily could have been 
another kind of perlocutionary act like smoke signals or gestures). The 
illocutionary act is what is responsible for the content of the act; the locutionary 
act is the way in which it is performed in some cases.  Perlocutionary acts more 
generally are caused by illocutionary acts. The context of the speech act and our 
acquaintance with the individual speaking is supposed to indicate which 
illocutionary act is intended when the locutionary act itself is ambiguous or 
capable of possible meanings.  
                                                 
2 5 4  Galatians 4. 
2 5 5  1995, p. 33. 
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However, this is of no help in our situation. Even if one illocutionary act 
is meant to “count as” another illocutionary act in the case of transitive 
discourse, the context of the speech is often contained in the initial illocutionary 
act that is being replaced by the illocutionary act of the divine discourser. We 
are left with only our acquaintance with the divine discourser to determine the 
illocutionary act of double agency transitive discourse; there is nothing else to 
indicate exactly what this illocutionary act is meant to be. However, this once 
again leaves us vulnerable to the wax-nose anxieties espoused by Wisse in his 
treatment of Wolterstorff: The interpreter assesses the meaning of the passage 
in a way unrestricted by the context of the speech act; he only needs to account 
for what he thinks God would say in his interpretation. In some cases, the 
interpreter is left to speculate wildly about what it is that a transcendent God 
might have intended to say by co-opting particular speech acts. Having 
exhausted our options, we are left to conclude that Wisse’s suggested 
modifications to Wolterstorff’s theory fail to remedy the wax -nose problem.   
V. An Alternative to Transitive Discourse 
 It seems, then, that if we are troubled by wax-nose anxieties, we would do 
best to avoid transitive discourse so far as we can. For reasons that I cannot go 
into detail about here, I think that we should avoid tropic readings of passages 
that appear to have been intended to be read literally altogether.2 5 6  For one, 
                                                 
2 5 6  For some, interpreting the host of problematic passages in the Scriptures as figurative will 
strike them as an implausible rendering of passages given our growing kn owledge of biblical 
history and archaeology. It seems as though acts of genocide and atrocities did occur among the 
ancient peoples mentioned in the Old Testament, and those who recorded and continued in the 
tradition of the Tanakh seemed to understand many  of these activ ities as the product of God’s 
172 
 
such methodology seems ill-suited to the first-personal nature of the psalms, a 
problem only magnified by Wisse’s criticisms of interpretations that change 
rhetorico-conceptual structure of a text. Also worth mentioning is the dubious 
idea that a loving God would acquire rather horrendous speech to make a 
figurative point. While some of the idioms we use rather casually are violent and 
graphic such as my “pound of flesh” example above, this is not quite the same 
thing as using offensive passages of Scripture to make a metaphorical point. If 
someone were to tell a detailed and graphic story about incest or rape in order 
to make a point, we would likely respond with disgust. Such disgust would only 
be amplified if it turned out the story co-opted for metaphorical use was true, as 
many of the horrendous acts in Scripture likely are.2 5 7  
                                                                                                                                               
command or wrathful judgment. Even if we discount the way in which the authors of the Tanakh 
and Jews understood the Tanakh and argue that this is irrelevant to Christian interpretation, we 
may  be suspicious of a God who coopts such stories in order to convey  figurative messages to 
believers. Furthermore, we would hope that our method of interpretation would be in some way  
reflected in how Christ used the Tanakh in his teachings. Christ does frequently  appeal to  Old 
Testament passages or imply  their relevance in his teachings. However, notably  absent are 
figurative interpretations of passages that do not already  contain language understood as 
figurative by the author. Even in cases where Christ appears to provide a ty pological reading of 
Old Testament passages (e.g., John 6:32-58), it does not appear that he is suggesting that these 
interpretations take the place of nonfigurative understandings of the relevant passages. Instead, 
it seems just as likely  that Jesus intends the reality of the narratives to serve as ev idence for and 
underwrite his ty pological claims.  
2 5 7  Suppose we are willing to grant that resorting to figurative interpretation of troubling 
passages is appropriate in many  cases. We will still encounter some passages of Old Testament 
law, prophecy, and psalms resist figurative interpretation. Psalm 137, a passage of Scripture 
commonly cited for its horrifying elements (calling for the infants of one’s enemies to be 
“dashed against the rocks”), is an unnatural candidate for figurative interpretation. We do not 
read less disquieting psalms (e.g., Psalm 23, 139) figuratively (except for verses in which the 
author is clearly intending to use figurative language), and the first -person nature of the psalms 
suggest the authors are expressing their own experiences, acts of worship and prayers. 
Deuteronomy 21  and 22 are passages that are similarly ill-suited to figurative readings. Since in 
these passages God seems to endorse laws that result in cruelty to women and  children, those 
with modern sensibilities would need to interpret these passages as figurative. But the Mosaic 
Law explicitly purports to proceed from God himself; it is clearly giving directives for liv ing in 
many  of the most offensive passages. Supposing that the whole Mosaic narrative is figurative, 
and that Mosaic Law fits into a fictional story, still does not help us because we know that 
eventually the law was practiced as though intended for application in the society of the Hebrew 
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  In my view, metaphorical readings of Scripture should be avoided when 
there is not an obvious indication in the text that human author intends to 
speak metaphorically. Instead, I would like to use this final section to suggest 
that Wolterstorff need not invoke transitive discourse at all and that his 
purposes can be better served by attending to pattern (2) above. This 
interpretative strategy calls for the interpreter to interpret the text in light of the 
main point that we think God is likely to endorse. It even gives the reader 
license to ignore or dispense with passages if they are merely ways to achieve a 
larger point. 
 Wolterstorff does not explain in great detail how this methodology is 
meant to work, but I think we can easily assimilate Swinburne’s thoughts on the 
subject here. Swinburne writes, 
Cultural context is also crucial for distinguishing what is said from the 
presuppositions in terms of which it is cast. The sentences of the Bible 
often have false scientific or historical presuppositions. They often, for 
example, presuppose that the Earth is flat, square, and stationary, 
covered with a dome across which the sun, moon, and stars travel each 
day and night. But the cultural context reveals these as common 
presuppositions of the society, and the social context typically reveals the 
main message as to communicate not these presuppositions but 
something else by means of them. The falsity of the presuppositions does 
not, therefore (by the argument of Chapter 2), affect the truth-value of a 
                                                                                                                                               
people. Jesus’s c laim to fulfill the Law (Mt. 5:17) and corrections of its practice by Pharisees (Mt. 
23:23) only demonstrates that practice of the Law was expected for a time and that there was a 
right way  to follow it. Using figurative readings to reinterpret offensive p arts of the Torah, and 
not the whole civ ic and religious law, becomes nothing more than an ad hoc strategy for 
allev iating our discomfort. Figurative readings, then, do not seem to be a particularly desirable 
strategy for handling bothersome passages. Still, we have not exhausted the resources dynamic 
conceptual interpretation can offer for dealing with textual issues.  
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sentence which uses them. Psalm 104 praises God for many marvels of 
nature, including that he ‘set the earth on its foundations, so that it shall 
never be shaken’. Now the earth has no ‘foundations’ in some other body, 
as the Psalmist supposed. But what he was getting at was that the Earth 
is not wobbly, it is firm, you can build on it; and he expressed the claim 
that God is responsible for this, using the presuppositions of his culture. 
If God is indeed responsible for this stability, the sentence is true.2 5 8  
Swinburne’s claim is that when reading passages in which the primary 
audience or author of a passage possesses false presuppositions, we should not 
take statements implying or inferring these presuppositions as affirming their 
veracity. They are merely a means to an end. If God’s purpose is to talk about 
his sovereignty, then we need not be concerned about the language he uses that 
may betray the misunderstandings of his audience.  
Note that the point here is not the somewhat similar claim that God only 
speaks on faith and morals, and that details of the text on other subjects may 
turn out to be false (but these details are not God’s speech). According to this 
view, the only parts of Scripture that we should take as necessarily factive are 
passages pertaining to faith and morality; other passages should be interpreted 
by whatever means necessary to yield a plausible teaching on faith and morality. 
On these grounds, the book of Numbers might receive an allegorical 
interpretation, despite the fact that large portions of it are clearly constitutive of 
                                                 
2 5 8  2007, p. 245, emphasis added. 
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a census, so that its teachings might be understood as in some way relevant to 
faith and morality.   
Rather, Swinburne’s claim is that the sentences are true in their own 
right once properly understood. Biblical passages containing assertions about 
science or history may still turn out to be false if the sentence’s purpose is to 
convey scientific or historical facts, or if there was a more accurate way to 
convey the proposition available to the author’s language and culture.2 5 9  For 
example, if the census data in Numbers turned out to be incorrect once 
understood in light of Israelite census practices and mathematics, then these 
passages would be false. Conversely, when the human author states that the sun 
stood still and the moon stopped in Joshua 10, the author’s point (presuming 
that the author intended to speak literally and not figuratively, which is also a 
likely reading) is that the day endured longer that it should have, or that time 
seemed to stop. If it turned out that the day lasted a normal period of time and 
that no miracle occurred, his story would be false; however, his story would not 
be false on the grounds that the sun and moon do not revolve around the earth 
or move through the sky. This is because the point of the passage is to make a 
claim about the length of the day and not about astronomy. 
                                                 
2 5 9  Ibid pp. 31-2, 245-6. 
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Interestingly, the psalm referenced by Swinburne above appears to 
indicate an assertive illocutionary stance. The sentence is a constative (in other 
words, a declarative statement that asserts a particular state of affairs); it is 
describing a feature of reality that is either true or false. However, the 
presuppositions of the author combined with what we take to be the main point 
of the sentence changes what we take to be asserted. It could be read as a 
metaphysical and astronomical assertion about the spatial dimensions of the 
earth. What Swinburne’s point demonstrates is that we have reason to think 
that the metaphysical and astronomical content is not the material claim being 
communicated by the author of this passage: He is making a point about God’s 
relationship to his creation, something we can affirm as true when we take into 
account facts about the author’s presuppositions. 
 Swinburne’s focus here is on the presuppositions that underlie language 
and individual propositions. However, a larger point can be made for genres 
and further, individual books. Just as cultural context and linguistic norms 
contribute to the truth and falsity of particular sentences, so also genre 
contributes to how we understand the claims of a particular book. If the genre of 
a book attaches to it certain assumptions about how the statements within the 
book should be understood, it will change our reading of the text. Swinburne 
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uses the example of the Book of Jonah to make an analogous point.2 6 0  He takes 
it to be a moral fable. If God appropriates a fable, it does not seem that he is 
obligated to underwrite the historical veracity of the sentences in the fable. 
Rather, he might appropriate works in the fable genre the way many parents do 
when they tell a fable to their children, representing it as true: The point of the 
fable, the moral lesson, is true, even if the story communicated is understood by 
all parties as fictive.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, Wolterstorff demonstrates this practice himself 
with his analysis of narrative, a genre he explicitly states should be read as 
transitive.2 6 1  According to our revised, narrow definition of transitive discourse 
under which stories told simply to make a secondary point are no longer 
transitive, though, narrative turns out not to be transitive per se. Wolterstorff 
concludes his analysis of gospel narratives by arguing that there is a 
biographical genre (dubbed “portraits”) in which authors are free to speculate 
about psychological features or interactions that are suggested (but not fully 
justified) by historical facts.2 6 2  This genre also gives license to the author to 
organize events in the subject’s life in order  to draw attention to certain features 
or themes rather than to document the actual chronology. Should such a genre 
exist, God’s appropriation of the gospels would not require his appropriation of 
                                                 
2 6 0  Ibid p. 251 . 
2 6 1  1995, p. 214. 
2 6 2  Ibid, p. 259-60. 
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the historicity of every facet of the gospels.2 6 3  Rather, the relationship between 
God and the gospels would be something a little bit like God’s appropriation of 
moral fables—although certainly not identical to it given that portraits are still 
expected to get all of the central historical facts correct. 
 I am not persuaded that either Swinburne or Wolterstorff are correct in 
their assessment (or, in Wolterstorff’s case, construction) of particular genres. 
However, the general point is right: When appropriating a text, God’s 
appropriation does not necessarily mean that we always should attribute 
individual passages to the mouth of God. Genre dictates much of what we take 
to be God’s speech: Fable is God’s speech in a way that is distinct from 
prophecy. Notice, though, this is not because we are interpreting these books in 
light of what we think God is likely to say. Rather, the genre of the book, 
whether established by the author or by a collector who assimilates various 
writings into a single book (as is the case for Proverbs, Psalms, and possibly 
many other books of various genres). As such, I am still adopting the 
illocutionary stance of a human responsible in some way for the text: The 
author or compiler, as the case may be.  
This means that we are not free to assign historical works like I and II 
Chronicles to the genre of parable or allegory if there is good reason to think 
that there is a more plausible understanding of how the person(s) responsible 
for Chronicles intended it to be understood, like the Jewish genre of historical 
                                                 
2 6 3  Wolterstorff makes a compelling case that this genre does exist, although I am not as 
inclined as Wolterstorff to think that this is an accurate description of the genre of the gospels.  
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narrative. Christians who claim that statements about Israel in books like 
Chronicles have allegorical application to the church would not be reading the 
work in a manner consistent with our best understanding of the genre, so their 
interpretations would be ruled out. Likewise, feminist theologians who interpret 
Scripture as a means of identifying and abolishing patriarchy by centering their 
interpretations on a few biblical figures like Hannah, Ruth, or the midwives in 
Exodus would have to find plausible justifications for the claim that their view is 
supported by the genre(s) that the authors and compilers of Scripture intended.  
Taking genre into account is still not enough, though. Books may still 
have more specific purposes within their genres. Fiction can be used as political 
critique or be part of a subgenre like satire. Candide is at once novel, satire, 
farce and philosophy. It is not all of these things because of the changing 
audience or context in which it is read; rather, it was likely intended to be all of 
these things by the illocutionary stance of Voltaire upon writing the work. Even 
popular literature like the Hunger Games contains this kind of complexity of 
genre: It is youth science fiction about a young woman living in an apocalyptic 
future while also being an analysis of war, trauma and nationalism. Some 
collections of poetry are also journals; for Wittgenstein, writings of philosophy 
were both poetry and therapy. 
 We should ask ourselves, then, what purpose a particular book serves 
within its genre and why it might have a message that God would appropriate 
for himself. C.S. Lewis models just the sort of interpretative strategy I have in 
mind in his various comments on the Psalms. Lewis argued that we should read 
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psalms as writings by close spiritual relatives with whom we have much in 
common.2 6 4  The most horrifying psalms are psalms any one of us could have 
authored: “Whenever we have wronged our fellow man, we have tempted him to 
be such a man as wrote psalm 109.”2 6 5  The purpose of such psalms is not to 
communicate sentiments which God endorses, even metaphorically. In fact, we 
should expect the inclusion of psalms containing sentiments that God 
condemns.2 6 6  Instead, we should think God appropriates the psalms for the 
purpose of modeling the realistic prayer life of persons just like us. They contain 
both a reminder that God allows “tares” to worship alongside his people, and a 
reminder that we must approach God in the darkest nights of our souls.2 6 7   The 
problem the modern reader has with the Psalms is not that we cannot work out 
how to attribute such ancient and barbaric sentiments to God; it is that we lack 
self-awareness about our own inner states and the trials Christians may face. 
We all at least “touch the fringes” of neuroticism, malice, and despair, Lewis 
observes, and it is wishful thinking to assume that many of those who pray and 
worship God will not find themselves expressing horrifying sentiments if they 
expect to approach God honestly.2 6 8  
 Understood in this way, it is easy to see how God might appropriate the 
Book of Psalms. He takes the illocutionary stance of the collector of the book: 
                                                 
2 6 4  1995, p. 117. 
2 6 5  Ibid p. 119. 
2 6 6  Ibid p. 120. 
2 6 7  Ibid pp. 121, 126. 
2 6 8  Ibid pp. 126-7 . 
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These are examples of prayer and worship that may be useful to use in our own 
collective or personal acts of worship and prayer. It is unlikely that the human 
who put together the Book of Psalms shared the hateful or despondent 
sentiments of the various authors. Instead there is an unwritten, implicit 
assertion that the book is a model of worship—so determined by the genre of the 
book. A more specific purpose can be discerned when we think of further 
historical details surrounding the text, as well as its position within the whole of 
Scripture: It is an example of how God’s imperfect, sinful people address 
themselves to a perfect God. The statements within the book are true, insofar as 
they truthfully reflect the reality of how people deal with various dimensions of 
life through worship and prayer. It still qualifies as an act of discourse because 
discourse is “the acquisition of a normative standing in the public domain by the 
performance of an action which is itself publicly perceptible.”2 6 9  God is doing 
just this by appropriating the message of the book for himself. 
 If we take this to be the illocutionary stance of God, we not only dispense 
with the ambiguity inherent in attempting a metaphorical reading. We also do 
not have to bother with making the changes to the rhetorico-conceptual 
structure that Wisse has shown so problematic: A human in the text, or even the 
author of the text, can make an assertion with particular designations without 
the reader having to restructure the sentence so that it is one we can put in the 
mouth of God himself, so to speak. I think strategies like the ones mentioned 
above are possible for many of the texts that interpreters find troublesome such 
                                                 
2 6 9  Ibid p. 197. 
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as the Psalms, Song of Songs, and the more unsettling aspects of the Hebrew 
narratives. If the strategy is successful enough, it may be that Wolterstorff can 
do away with the category of transitive discourse altogether. This may not 
eliminate all wax-nose anxieties, but it surely eliminates one of the most 
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